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ABSTRACT 
The relevance or irrelevance of dividend payments has been the topic of much 
discussion for the past eight decades. The primary objective of this study was to 
determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial 
services companies listed on the (JSE). Dividend Policy and the Agency Theory 
underpinned the study. Secondary data of sampled listed financial companies for the 
period 2005-2016 was sourced from IRESS database. Data was analysed using 
EViews version 9.   
The results revealed that the presence of institutional ownership resolves the 
asymmetry information problems, and, reduces the need to pay dividends. The results 
also revealed that 54.69% of JSE listed companies under the financials’ services 
sector practise dividend decisions. The results further revealed that the dividend 
payout ratio is positively correlated with ROE and LEV, and negatively correlated 
INST, DIRS and FOREIGN variables.  The results confirmed the existence of agency 
problems on listed financial services companies. 
Keywords:  Dividend Policy; Residual Dividend Theory; Agency Theory; Agency 
Problems; Agency Cost Theory; Corporate Governance; Clientele Effect Theory; Bird 
in The Hand Theory; Signalling Effect Theory  
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ISISHWANKATHELO 
Ukubaluleka okanye ukungabaluleki kokuhlawula izahlulo bekusoloko kusisihloko 
sengxoxo kumashumi asibhozo eminyaka edluleyo. Injongo ephambili yesi sifundo 
yayikukufumanisa ulwalamano phakathi komgaqo nkqubo wezahlulelo neengxaki 
zobumeli (ubuarhente) beenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho 
nezidweliswe kwiJohannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Izisekelo zesi sifundo 
nguMgaqo Nkqubo Wezahlulo (Dividend Policy) neNgcingane Yobumeli (Agency 
Theory). Iqela lesibini ledatha yeenkampani ezidwelisiweyo kwiminyaka ye-2005–
2016 yafunyanwa kwiqula leedatha elaziwa ngokuba yi-IRESS database. Idatha 
yahlalutywa ngokusebenzisa isixhobo sohlalutyo iEViews version 9.  
Iziphumo zadiza ukuba ubukho babanini kwiziko loshishino buyazisombulula iingxaki 
zonxibelelwano olungalingani kakuhle kwaye kuyasicutha isidingo sokuhlawula 
izahlulo. Kwakhona, iziphumo zadiza ukuba ama-54.69% eenkampani ezidweliswe 
kwiJSE, phantsi kodidi lweenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho, 
enza izigqibo zezahlulo. Iziphumo zaphinda zadiza ukuba intlawulo yezahlulo 
ihambelana kakuhle neenqobo zeROE neLEV, kanti azihambelani neenqobo zeINST, 
ezeDIRS kunye nekuthiwa ziFOREIGN. Ezi ziphumo zangqina ukuba kukho iingxaki 
zobumeli/ubuarhente kwiinkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho. 
Amagama aphambili: Umgaqo Nkqubo Wezahlulo; Ingcingane Yezahlulelo 
Kwintsalela Yenzala; Ingcingane Yobunini; Iingxaki Zobunini; Ingcingane Yeendleko 
Zobunini; Ulawulo Lwequmrhu; Ingcingane Yefuthe Labatyali Mali; Ingcingane 
Yokugcina Into Onayo; Ingcingane Yefuthe Lezaziso 
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SETSOPOLWA 
Bonnete le go se be bonnete ga ditefelo tša letseno e bile hlogo ya ditherišano tše 
dintši mo mo dingwagasome tše seswai tša go feta. Nepo ya motheo ya thuto ye ke 
go ela kamano gare ga pholisi le mathata a dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša Matlotlo tšeo 
di lego lenaneong la Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Pholisi ya Ditseno le 
Teori ya Etšensi ke motheo wa thuto ye. Datha ya magareng ya dikhamphani tša 
mašeleng tšeo di lego lenaneong la paka ya 2005–2016 e be e hwetšagala go tšwa 
go lenaneo la datha la IRESS. Datha e sekasekilwe go šomišwa EViews version 9.  
Dipoelo di utullotše gore go ba gona ga bong ka gare ga sehlongwa go rarolla mathata 
a tshedimošo ya go se lekalekane, le go fokotša nyakego ya go lefa mašokotšo. 
Dipoelo le tšona di tšweleditše go re diperesente tše 54.69 tša dikhamphani tšeo di 
lego lenaneong la JSE ka fase ga ditirelo tša sekgao sa go phethagatša diphetho tša 
mašokotšo. Dipoelo di tšwetša pele go utulla go re ditekanyetšo tša ditefelo tša 
mašokotšo du sepelelana gabotse le ROE le LEV, le go sepelelana gannyane le INST, 
DIRS le FOREIGN. Dipoelo di netefatša go ba gona ga mathata a Etšensi ao a 
ngwadilwego lenaneong la dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša mašeleng. 
Mantšu a motheo: Pholisi ya mašokotšo; Teori ya mašaledi a mašokotšo; Entšensi 
ya Teori; Mathata a Etšensi; Etšensi ya Theko ya Teori; Taolo ya Tlemagano; Teori 
ya Ditlamorago tša Clientele; Teori ya Bird in The Hand; Teori ya Ditlamorago bja 
Taetšo 
  
  vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
My humble appreciation to my supervisor Prof. MS Ngwenya, for unselfishly using his 
intellectual ability to promote my profession, his scholarly feedback and 
encouragements. Special gratitude to Prof. J Oloami my statistician, who gave 
financial sense to my data. My sincere thanks to the following colleagues: 
 Prof. D Makina who encouraged me to join the academic field; 
 Mr P Kotze who played a critical role to unlock data downloading challenges; 
 Dr G Marozva who further assisted with my data formatting and preparation; and 
 Mrs M van Zyl the departmental librarian who availed relevant research resources 
to our disposal. 
  
  viii
TABLE OF CONTENT 
Declaration ................................................................................................................. i 
Dedication ................................................................................................................. ii 
Editing and proofreading certificate .......................................................................... iii 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... iv 
Isishwankathelo ......................................................................................................... v 
Setsopolwa ............................................................................................................... vi 
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................... vii 
Table of content ...................................................................................................... viii 
List of tables ............................................................................................................ xii 
List of figures ........................................................................................................... xiii 
List of acronyms ..................................................................................................... xiv 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY ............................................................... 1 
1.2 CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE STUDY .................................................. 4 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT ........................................................................... 9 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY ................................................................ 10 
1.4.1 Primary Objective ..................................................................................... 11 
1.4.2 Secondary Objectives ............................................................................... 11 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ....................................................................... 11 
1.6 THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE .............................................................. 12 
1.7 THE CHOICE OF DIVIDEND DECISION ................................................. 13 
1.8 DIVIDEND-AGENCY RELATIONSHIP FROM EMERGING  
MARKETS ................................................................................................ 14 
1.9 DIVIDEND-AGENCY RELATIONSHIP FROM LOCAL MARKETS .......... 15 
1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................ 17 
1.10.1 Overview of the research methodology .................................................... 17 
1.10.2 Research Design ...................................................................................... 17 
1.10.3 Data Collection ......................................................................................... 18 
1.10.4 Sampling Technique ................................................................................. 18 
1.10.5 Data Analysis ........................................................................................... 19 
1.11 SCOPE AND DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY ...................................... 19 
1.11.1 Reliability and Validity of the Findings ...................................................... 19 
1.12 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY ................................................................ 20 
  ix
1.13 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY ............................................................. 20 
1.14 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ............................................................. 20 
1.15 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................. 21 
1.16 CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................. 21 
CHAPTER 2 
DIVIDEND POLICY AND AGENCY THEORY: THEORY AND  
EMPIRICAL ISSUES .............................................................................................. 24 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 24 
2.2 DIVIDEND-AGENCY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK IN SUMMARY ...... 24 
2.3 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON DIVIDEND-AGENCY  
RELATIONSHIP ....................................................................................... 27 
2.4 CORPORATE DIVIDEND RELEVANT THEORY ..................................... 28 
2.4.1 Taxes and Clientele Effect Theory ............................................................ 30 
2.4.2 Signalling Theory / Asymmetric Information ............................................. 31 
2.4.3 Bird in the Hand Theory ............................................................................ 33 
2.5 PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE .......................................................................... 34 
2.6 CORPORATE DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE THEORY ............................... 34 
2.7 RESIDUAL DIVIDEND THEORY .............................................................. 35 
2.8 AGENCY THEORY .................................................................................. 37 
2.8.1 Institutional Ownership ............................................................................. 38 
2.8.2 Insider Ownership ..................................................................................... 41 
2.9 AGENCY COST ....................................................................................... 44 
2.9.1 Outcome Model ........................................................................................ 44 
2.9.2 Substitution Model .................................................................................... 45 
2.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................. 47 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY: ECONOMETRIC MODELS AND RESEARCH DESIGN .......... 49 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 49 
3.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK  
USED ....................................................................................................... 50 
3.3 PANEL DATA ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ............................................. 52 
3.3.1 Regression Analysis ................................................................................. 52 
3.3.2 The Panel Data Regression ..................................................................... 53 
3.4 PANEL DATA ANALYTICAL MODELS .................................................... 54 
  x
3.4.1 The Constant Coefficients (Pooled Regression) Model ............................ 54 
3.4.2 Fixed Effects Models ................................................................................ 55 
3.4.2.1 Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) Model ....................................... 55 
3.4.2.2 Within-Groups Regression Models ........................................................... 55 
3.4.3 Random Effects Models ........................................................................... 56 
3.4.3.1 The Hausman Test ................................................................................... 56 
3.4.3.2 Monte Carlo Experiments/test .................................................................. 56 
3.5 GENERALISED METHOD OF MOMENTS (GMM) .................................. 57 
3.6 GMM ESTIMATION MODEL .................................................................... 57 
3.6.1 The Dynamic Panel Data Model ............................................................... 57 
3.6.2 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation Model ............................................ 58 
3.7 SEVERAL TESTS OF SPECIFICATION FOR PANEL DATA .................. 59 
3.7.1 Tests to Unify FE, RE and BE Estimating Methods: Hausman Test ......... 59 
3.7.2 Fixed Versus Random Effects Models; An Alternative to the  
Hausman Test .......................................................................................... 60 
3.7.3 Test for Heteroscedasticity ....................................................................... 60 
3.7.4 Test for Multicollinearity ............................................................................ 61 
3.7.5 Panel Model with Goodness of Fit Statistics ............................................. 61 
3.7.6 Poolability Test (between Pooled Regression and FE Model) .................. 62 
3.7.7 Testing Serial Correlation ......................................................................... 62 
3.7.8 Testing Over-Identifying Restrictions: Sargan-Hansen Test ..................... 62 
3.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ....................................................................... 63 
3.9 THE STUDY DESIGN .............................................................................. 65 
3.10 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACH ........................................ 65 
3.11 THE STUDY VARIABLES ........................................................................ 66 
3.11.1 Dependent Variables ................................................................................ 66 
3.11.2 Independent Variables .............................................................................. 67 
3.12 DATA COLLECTION ................................................................................ 70 
3.13 CLEANING THE DATA SET AND TARGET POPULATION .................... 71 
3.14 DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE ............................................................... 71 
3.15 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE ......................................................................... 74 
3.16 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE FINDINGS ................................... 78 
3.17 CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................. 79 
  
  xi
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS OF FINANCIALS’ SECTOR ANALYSIS ............................................... 80 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 80 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS .................................................................... 81 
4.3 CORRELATION COEFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES ......... 94 
4.4 PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS ..................................................... 98  
4.5 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE .................................................................. 107 
4.6 REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ...................................... 109 
4.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................... 117 
CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................... 119 
5.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 119 
5.2 SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING SECTION PROVIDES SUMMARY 
OVERVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS ...................................... 120 
5.2.1 Conclusion of each objective .................................................................. 127 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS OF STUDY OBJECTIVES ........................................... 129 
5.3.1 To determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency  
problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE .................. 129 
5.3.2 To determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship of  
financial services companies listed on the JSE in resolving  
agency problems .................................................................................... 129 
5.3.3 To determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship  
reconciles to achieve the goal of maximising shareholder wealth of  
financial services companies listed on the JSE ...................................... 130 
5.4 CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY ............................................................ 130 
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 133 
5.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY .............................................................. 134 
5.7 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE FINDINGS ................................. 135 
5.8 CONTRIBUTION TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE ............................. 135 
5.9 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................ 136 
5.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................... 137 
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................... 139 
APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................ 166 
  
  xii
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1: Panel data studies that determine relationship between  
variables ........................................................................................... 72 
Table 3.2: Formula employed to calculate stratified proportional  
representation .................................................................................. 76 
Table 3.3: Variables, proxies and measurement formulars ............................... 78 
Table 4.1: Group descriptive statistics of the variables 2005-2016 ................... 82 
Table 4.1.1: Individual companies’ descriptive statistics of the variables  
2005-2016 ........................................................................................ 87 
Table 4.1.2: Individual company descriptive statistics of the variables  
2005-2016 ........................................................................................ 89 
Table 4.1.3: Individual company descriptive statistics of the variables  
2005-2016 ........................................................................................ 91 
Table 4.1.4: Individual company descriptive statistics of the variables  
2005-2016 ........................................................................................ 93 
Table 4.2: Group correlation analysis of the variables 2005-2016 .................... 97 
Table 4.2.1: CASH variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 ........... 99 
Table 4.2.2: D(DIRS) variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 ..... 100 
Table 4.2.3: DIV variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 ............. 101 
Table 4.2.4: D(FOREIGN) variable panel unit root test for the period  
2005-2016 ...................................................................................... 102 
Table 4.2.5: D(INST) variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 ...... 103 
Table 4.2.6: LEV variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 ............ 104 
Table 4.2.7: PROF variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 ......... 105 
Table 4.2.8: ROE variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 ........... 106 
Table 4.2.9: Company SIZE variable panel unit root test for the period  
2005-2016 ...................................................................................... 107 
Table 4.2.10: Fixed Effect .................................................................................... 110 
  
  xiii
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1:  Diagrammatic structural framework of the thesis ............................. 22 
Figure 2.1: Dividend-agency theoretical framework in summary ........................ 26 
Figure 3.1: Summary framework of the methodology used ................................ 51 
  
  xiv
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
2SLS − Two Stage Least Square 
3SLS − Three Stage Least Square 
BE − Between Regression 
BEE − Black Economic Empowerment 
BFA − Bureau of Financial Analysis 
CEE − Commission for Employment Equity 
CEO − Chief Executive Officer 
DPS − Dividend per Share 
DW − Durbin-Watson 
EBIT − Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
EGLS − Estimated Generalise Least Square 
EPS − Earnings per Share 
FE − Fixed Effect 
GMM − Generalised Method of Moments 
ILO − International Labour Organisation  
IMF − International Monetary Fund  
IRESS − Internal Ribosome Entry Sites Segments 
IRMSA − Institute of Risk Management South Africa 
IV − Instrumental Variables  
JSE − Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
LSDV − Least Squares Dummy Variable 
MPS − Market Price per Share 
OLS − Ordinary Least Square 
POLS − Pooled Ordinary Least Square  
PRASA − Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 
RE − Random Effect 
REPS − Retained Earnings per Share 
ROA − Return on Assets 
ROE − Return on Equity 
RRSS − Residual Sum of Squares from Restricted Regression  
RSA − Republic of South Africa 
RSS − Residual Sum of Squares 
  xv
SAA − South African Airways 
SABC − South African Broadcasting Corporation  
SOE − State Owned Enterprises 
SPSS − Statistical Package of Social Science  
SUR − Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
TELKOM SA − Telecommunications of South Africa 
URSS − Residual Sum of Squares from Restricted Regression  
US − United States 
WB − World Bank 
  1
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The relevance or irrelevance of dividend payments has been the focus of much 
scholarly discussion for the past eight decades. Three main contradictory theories of 
dividend policies are commonly identified in finance literature, namely, the high 
dividends increase share value theory (or the so-called “bird-in-the-hand” argument), 
the low dividends increase share value theory (the tax-preference argument), and the 
dividend irrelevance hypothesis. The theoretical framework of relevance or irrelevance 
of dividend payment emerged from seminal work of distinguished scholars such as 
Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958; 1961). Similarly, the genesis of the Agency Theory 
literature emanated from seminal papers of the renowned scholars such as Berle and 
Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
According to Basith (2013), the dividend policy is the payout policy that a company 
pursues in determining the size and pattern of proceeds distributions to shareholders 
over time. A company’s board of directors, with the input of executive management, 
together with relevant stakeholders determines companies’ dividend policy. In 
corporate practice, the separation between ownership and control determines the 
genesis of the the Agency Theory (Lambrechts, 1992:27). In addition, the Agency 
Theory stipulates that dividend payouts signal reduction in agency costs rather than 
future profitability (Adjaoud, Chkir & Saadi, 2006). Brigham and Gapenski (1993:21) 
define agency cost as all internal costs borne by shareholders to encourage managers 
to increase shareholder value instead of acting in their own interest. Furthermore, 
Cohen and Uliana (1990:8) mentioned numerous examples of agency costs which are 
as results of agency problems. They include executive levels of management 
remuneration; shrinking (neglect of duty); the appropriation of excessive levels of 
perks; the pursuit of sales growth at the expense of profit or shareholder wealth; 
empire building by managers; manipulation of dividend policy at the expense of 
shareholder wealth creation. Therefore, the study concluded that, if any of these 
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agency costs are observed in a corporate organisation, one can conclude that an 
agency problems do exist. 
Similarly, Boshkoska (2015) argues that one of the measures that can be used to 
overcome agency problems is to incentivise executive managers financially. 
Accordingly, this can be done by calculating executive managers’ bonuses as a 
percentage of the realised profits of the company. The following agency costs are 
borne out of conflict of interests between principal and agents: Internal audit; change 
in the salaries and payments of the managers; concentrate ownership; market of 
capital; law/legal frame (Boshkoska, 2015). In order to accomplish strong corporate 
governance of the company, internal audit plays vital role. It helps to monitor the 
efficiency of the company, to identify and hault the eventually inefficient companies’ 
operations as well as to protect the shareholders’ assets and capital (Jovanova, 2014).  
Meanwhile, Cai, Hiller, Tian, and Wu (2015) reported that audit committee is significant 
in enhancing manager’s efficiency and minimising the agency costs. Dividend-Agency 
Theory, further developed by Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986), 
postulates that cash dividends can be used as a tool to solve or alleviate the corporate 
agency problems. Meanwhile, in South Africa, the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
(JSE) listed companies continously pay dividends; yet they experience agency 
problems as reported by Piketty (2014). As such, the current study sought to determine 
dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
Furthermore, an empirical investigation of companies listed on the JSE found that 
agency problems do exist in a significant number of companies in South Africa 
(Lambrechts, 1992). It is an assumption of the the dividend policy that the payment of 
the dividends resolves the agency problems. 
Rajan (2005) published a critical paper suggesting that executive compensation 
practices in the American financial sector were creating significant risks for the global 
financial system. As such, empirical evidence found that the average United States 
(US) corporate chief executive’s salary has grown from 42 times to 400 times an 
average worker’s salary without an accompanying improvement in company 
performance (Bogle, 2010). Rajan (2005) identified a weak pay-performance 
relationship in the financial industry services as potential risks to the entire financial 
system in the long run. Rajan (2005) asserts that executives in the financial services 
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sector received substantial incentive payouts despite engaging in business practices 
that eroded company performance, threatened company sustainability and the entire 
financial system in the long run. The substantial incentive payouts are often advanced 
as dividends payouts in the form of performance bonuses. Therefore, executive 
compensation can be critically analysed not only as an instrument for addressing 
agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control, but also as 
part of the agency problems itself (Bebchuck & Friend, 2003). In line with this 
assertion, the concurrent existence of dividend payments and agency problems on the 
JSE listed companies warrants, the need to investigate the relationship between 
dividend policy and agency problems in a South African context. 
Piketty (2014) further confirms a weak pay-performance relationship by industry, in 
this regard JSE listed companies. Accordingly, Piketty (2014) observed that despite 
non-significant companies’ performance, two thirds of the increase in income 
inequality were attributable to drastic wage increases for the executive management. 
The process of aligning the wealth interests of management to that of the shareholders 
has led to dividend payments partly contributing to the income inequality globally and 
particularly in South Africa. This income inequality is best captured through Gini 
Coefficient index of 0.8 World Bank (WB) (2018), which is calculated periodically and 
determines the level of inequality between high-income groups and groups earning a 
basic wage. South Africa consistently ranks among countries with the highest levels 
of inequality (World Bank, 2018). The Institute of Risk Management South Africa 
(IRMSA, 2015), in its top ten high profile risks for Republic of South Africa (RSA), 
included severe income disparity, structurally high unemployment/underemployment 
and corporate governance failures such as the collapsed of African Bank meanwhile 
Post Bank needs government bail out.  
In the public sector, the majority of municipalities are essentially defunct and 
consistently receives qualified audits further confirmed the poor state of corporate 
governance (IRMSA, 2015). Subsequent to Rajan (2005) warnings of the world’s 
potential financial crisis owing to agency problems in the form of executive 
compensation in the financial services sector in this regard in America. In 2008, the 
financial services industry underwent a liquidity crunch; Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns were insolvent while other banks received government bail outs (Bussin, 
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2015). The aforementioned literature further demonstrates the role played by dividend 
policy that contributes to income inequality and financial instability. Meanwhile, the 
Agency Theory sought to determine link between executive compensation and 
companies’ performance (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 discusses contextualisation 
of the study. Section 1.3 focuses on the problem statement. Section 1.4 discusses 
objectives of the study covering both primary and secondary objectives. Section 1.5 
focuses on the research questions. Section 1.6 discusses the literature review. 
Section 1.7 discusses the choice of dividend decision. Section 1.8 discusses dividend-
agency relationship from emerging markets. Section 1.9 discusses dividend agency 
relationship from local markets. Section 1.10 discusses research methodology: 
covering research design; data collection; sampling technique; data analysis. Section 
1.11 discusses scope and demarcation of the study covering reliability and validity. 
Section 1.12 discusses limitations of the study. Section 1.13 discussed delimitation of 
the study. Section 1.14 discusses significance of the study. Section 1.15 discusses 
ethical considerations. Section 1.16 concludes Chapter 1. 
1.2 CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE STUDY 
The structural economic inequality is partly to be blamed on South Africa historical 
trajectory of racial exclusion from education, work opportunities, land, and finance 
(World Bank, 2018b). This practice critically determined the genesis of the current 
economic situation in South Africa. It will also take multifaceted efforts, inclusive of 
good corporate governance through the role played by dividend-agency theory to 
achieve social cohesion. The state will need to promulgate new laws to level playing 
field at workplace,meanwhile, rescinding discriminatory laws. Therefore, it is only fair 
to argue that inequality is partly the consequence of historically unjust laws, which are 
subsequently mentioned in the paragraph that follows 
The Union of South Africa, formed in 1910, was characterised by a political partnership 
between English speaking and Afrikaans speaking whites, representing their mining 
and agricultural interests respectively (Bhorat, Naidoo & Yu, 2014). This Union 
formally excluded the African majority from any formal political expression and 
meaningful participation in the economy. A series of bias and racial laws were passed 
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that would deleteriously impact on the smooth functioning of the labour market (Bhorat 
et al., 2014). For instance, the 1911 Mines and Works Act reserved skilled mining jobs 
for whites only. Also, the Pass Laws curtailed the free flow of African migrant labour, 
thereby forcing many African workers into low wage sectors and occupations (Van der 
Berg & Bhorat, 1999; Woolard, 2001). These systematic circumstances are 
inextricably intertwined with the high levels of inequality South Africa currently faces 
(World Bank, 2018). The current inequalities in the South African labour market are 
largely attributed to the past statutory discrimination in the workplace, such as job 
reservation and other factors aforementioned (Commission for Employment Equity 
report (CEE), 2014 – 2015). To level the playing field at workplace and ensure stability, 
government promulgated the Employment Equity Act (EEA) as well as affirmative 
action to be adopted by all JSE listed companies. It is expected that companies 
operating in South Africa should comply with these government policies for stability 
and performance purposes. In 2014, white South Africans held seventy percent (70%) 
of top management positions in the private sector (CCE, 2014 – 2015). Such statistics 
reflected a slow pace of transformation in the workplace, which undermines 
government objectives of equality, stability and maximum performance for business.  
According to International Labour Office (ILO, 2015) social unrest globally is 10% 
higher than before the 2008 financial crisis, which pushed many countries, including 
South Africa, into recession. The unrest was largely the result of increasing inequality, 
with the richest 10th people earning 30-40% of total income, while the poorest 10th only 
accounted for 2-7% total income (ILO, 2015). Although the Agency Theory has offered 
dividend payments as a solution to agency problems, the above research vigorously 
rejects this assumption.  
In 2015, massive European refugee’s also known as European refugee’s crisis 2015 
last seen in the Second World War has brought unrest in the European countries (ILO, 
2017a). Countries such as Greece, Turkey and Argentina perpetually survived on bail 
out loans from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (ILO, 2016b). This 
further shows levels of poverty globally. In 2011, the Egyptian revolution, popularly 
known as Arab Spring sparked largely by inequality manifested in high rate of 
unemployment, poverty and government corruption, brought unrest in the North Africa 
(ILO, 2017a). In South Africa, in August 2012, mineworkers went on strike demanding 
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salary increment. This ended up with 34 mineworkers, killed Council for the 
Advancement of the South African Constitution report (CASAC, n.d.). This further 
demonstrates the instability caused by remuneration. Again in October 2015 students 
across all over South African universities demanded zero percent fee increase. These 
protests brought yet another unprecedented unrest in the country. At times, South 
Africa turns to face sporadic land grabs (CASAC, n.d.), which often brings some 
degree of instability. The income inequality partly contributes to some of these socio-
economic issues mentioned above. Therefore, this justifies an investigation of the 
relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of companies listed on the 
JSE, particularly when dividend-agency relationship is partly blamed for the income 
inequality (Rajan, 2005; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011).  
According to the Agency Theory, Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) remuneration is an 
efficient means of aligning executive interests more closely with those of shareholders 
through a remuneration contract that rewards superior company performance (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Similarly, Boshkoska (2015) argues that one of the measures that 
can be used to overcome agency problems is to compensate managers financially. 
Accordingly, this can be done by calculating managers’ bonuses as a percentage of 
the realised profits of the company. In line with this assertion, McKnight and Weir 
(2009) underscores that corporate governance mechanisms are used to mitigate 
agency conflict; henceforth, realign managers and shareholders’ interests. 
Subsequently, Ozkan (2007) asserts that it is widely believed that the link between 
executive remuneration and company performance is not strong enough, implying that 
executives receive their remunerations regardless of the results of their respective 
organisations. These findings concur with Rajan (2005) who had identified a weak 
pay-performance relationship in the financial industry services as a cause for financial 
instability, and this trend continues unabated. In fact, Rajan (2005) assertions were 
later confirmed by Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), Haldane (2011), and Fahlenbrach 
and Stulz (2011) who contend that executive remuneration policies were partly 
responsible for the collapse in market capitalisation of the United States (US) banks 
and subsequent global financial crisis. 
The corporate practice of continuous payment of dividends despite poor performance 
by companies got the attention of Black (1976:8) who termed this practice the 
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“dividend puzzle”. Black’s (1976:8) critical arguments against corporate practice on 
dividend payments emanated from seminal work of the celebrated Nobel laureate 
scholars Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958). Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that 
dividends should be paid out of cash flows, and when the company has exhausted all 
the investment opportunities, then dividends should be paid out of retained earnings. 
This is commonly known as the dividends irrelevance and residual theory. The leading 
pioneers of the Irrelevance Theory are Modigliani and Miller (1961:414) who based 
their argument on an abstract world that, under perfect capital markets with no taxes, 
transaction costs and other market imperfections, then dividends are irrelevant and 
cannot be used to determine the value of a company’s shares or the company value 
is independent of the dividend policy. Instead, the value of the companies is solely 
dependent on the earning power of the company’s assets and its investment policy, 
and not by how its profits are distributed to shareholders (Modigliani & Miller, 
1961:414).  
Despite voluminous empirical research on dividend policy, the corporate finance 
researchers and industry role players still hold divergent views. On the Agency Theory, 
assumptions are that dividend payment is an efficient means of aligning executive 
interests more closely with those of shareholders through remuneration. It has been 
the argument of the Irrelevance Theory school of thought that continuous payment of 
dividends despite poor company performance is not a sound financial decision (Black, 
1976). 
The theory of dividend policy is focused on two opposing schools of thought namely: 
dividend irrelevance and residual on the one hand and Dividend Relevance Theory on 
the other. An empirical literature by Black and Scholes (1974), Miller and Scholes 
(1978), and Miller (1986), supported the dividend irrelevance argument. Similarly, 
evidence from industry from companies such as Apple and Google only started to pay 
dividends in the early 2010s (Cciccia, 2012). This is a practical demonstration by the 
industry, that maximising companies value has little or nothing to do with the payments 
of dividends. In light of this evidence, the payment of dividends becomes a corporate 
finance mystery. Furthermore, this demonstration by the industry confirms the 
proposition put forward in the irrelevancy theory, which states that; ‘you may pay 
dividends only when you have exhausted all your investment opportunities.  
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In line with the views of Modigliani and Miller (1961) with respect to dividend 
irrelevance is the residual theory, which focuses on making the best investment 
decisions to maximise companies share value. According to this approach, as long as 
the company’s equity need exceeds the amount of retained earnings, no cash dividend 
should be paid out. The argument for this approach is that, it is sound financial 
management to be certain that the company has the liquid financial resources it 
requires to compete effectively. This view of dividends suggests that the required 
return of investors, ks, is not influenced by the company’s dividend policy, a premise 
that dividend policy is irrelevant (Modigliani & Miller 1958:1961). In stark contrast to 
the dividend, Irrelevance Theory is the relevance theory. Relevance theory is based 
on the real world scenario. Based on the assumption of imperfect markets, where there 
are flotation costs, transaction costs and taxes, then dividends do matter (Easterbrook, 
1984). Building on the beliefs of relevancy theory, Lintner (1956:98) found that, 
companies typically set long-term targets dividend payout ratios. Moreover, dividend 
changes tend to lag behind earnings, that is, increases in earnings are followed by 
increases in dividends and decreases in earnings sometimes by dividend cuts. 
Furthermore, Gordon (1963:265) and Lintner (1962) were the first proponents of the 
relevance of dividends in creating shareholder wealth. They argue that there is a direct 
relationship between a company’s dividend policy and its market value. Lintner 
(1956:98) proposed the two-variable dividend model. Fama and Babiak (1968:1160) 
tested this model on the dividend data on 392 major North American industrial 
companies for the period 1946 to 1964. They found that Lintner’s (1956:98) dividend 
model succeeded in explaining the dividend changes of individual companies in North 
America. 
An association of agency costs and dividend policy forms part of developments in the 
corporate finance theory. Ross (1973) first propagated finance corporate theory and 
later extended by Jensen and Meckling (1976), to explain the conflict of interest 
between corporate managers (agents) and shareholders (principals). Agency theory 
argues that dividend mechanism provides incentives to managers to reduce costs 
relative to the principal agent relationship. Given this theoretical assumption by Ross 
(1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976), the current study sought to determine the extent 
to which dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies listed on the 
JSE resolves agency problems. 
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Empirical evidence by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) found 
that, the Agency Theory provides a point of departure from the assumptions of the 
Modigliani and Miller theory (1958) by recognising two points. Firstly, the investment 
policy of the company cannot be taken as being independent of its dividend policy, 
and, in particular, paying out dividends may reduce the inefficiency of marginal 
investments. In line with this view in South Africa, Botha (1985:3) notes that 
investment, financing and dividend decisions are interdependent and must be 
resolved simultaneously. Secondly, the allocation of all the profits of the company to 
shareholders on a pro-rata basis cannot be taken for granted, and in particular the 
insiders may get preferential treatment through asset diversion, transfer prices and 
theft, even holding the investment policy constant.  
Against this background, this study sought to investigate the relationship between 
dividend policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). The objective of the study was to 
determine the extent to which dividend policy and agency problems reconcile in 
achieving the goal of maximising shareholders’ wealth. Conflict of interest between 
corporate insiders, such as managers and controlling shareholders, and minority 
shareholders are central to the analysis of the modern corporation (Berle & Means, 
1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The development and growth of the JSE listed companies has led to an ever-widening 
gap between control and ownership (Lambrechts, 1992). It is this separation between 
ownership and management, which forms the genesis of the Agency Theory 
(Lambrechts, 1992:27). Easterbrook (1984) suggests that one way of solving agency 
conflicts is to increase the dividend payout ratio. However, this has some cost 
implications, with an accompanying detrimental effect on the wealth of the owners. 
Henceforth, the current study set out to determine the extent to which dividend-agency 
relationship of companies listed on the JSE reconciles to achieve the goal of 
maximising shareholder wealth against the backdrop of agency costs. 
Based on dividend policy, de Wet and Mpinda (2013) conducted a study to determine 
relationship between dividend and shareholders’ wealth. The results indicated that in 
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the long run, dividend yield is positively related to market price per share, while 
earnings per share do not have significant impact on the market price per share. On 
agency problems, a study was conducted to determine a relationship between control 
and separation of ownership of companies listed on the JSE (Steyn & Stainbank, 
2013). The results found that a dominant shareholder controls the majority of 
companies in South Africa. Therefore, this should resolve agency problems as per the 
Agency Theory proposition. Furthermore, the control by dominant shareholder serves 
to substitute the use of dividends as monitoring mechanisms.  
The current study found a point of departure from the above previous studies in that it 
was set out to investigate the relationship between two variables across both dividend 
policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
Meanwhile, the previous studies were focused on a relationship within dividend policy 
or agency problems separately from each other. The literature reviews highlighted 
conflict in research results, in that dividend assumption theories argued that the 
payment of dividends resolves agency problems. However, Lambrechts (1992), de 
Wet and Mpinda (2013); and Steyn and Stainbank (2013), Piketty (2014) report that 
JSE listed companies pay dividends and yet they experience agency problems. This 
triggered the current study to investigate the relationship between dividend policy and 
agency problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE. Furthermore, the 
literature revealed a void in that, no similar studies were conducted in South Africa, 
and this has been identified as part of the gap for the current study. The study sampled 
data from all sub-sectors of the financial’ services companies and this too has been 
identified as a gap. 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Fouché and De Vos (2011:94) define research objectives as clearly identified steps 
the researcher has to take to achieve the goal of the study. They include exploration, 
description, explanation, correlation, evaluation, intervention and action research. 
According to Fouché and De Vos (2011:96), correlational research was often used 
towards explanatory research with a view to determine whether a relationship exists 
in this regard between dividend-agency variables without focusing on a cause effect 
relationship between variables. The cause effect relationship between dividend-
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agency variables was not the main focus of the study but served as a secondary 
objective to the study. 
1.4.1 Primary Objective 
The primary objective of this study was to determine the relationship between dividend 
policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). In this study, explanatory research was 
relevant in achieving the primary objective, therefore, determining the relationship 
between dividend-agency variables as defined by Fouché and De Vos (2011:96). 
1.4.2 Secondary Objectives 
In order to achieve the primary objective, the secondary objectives were developed as 
follows: 
 To determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
 To determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship of financial 
services companies listed on the JSE play in resolving agency problems. 
 To determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship reconciles to 
achieve the goal of maximising shareholder wealth of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. 
The secondary objectives sought to determine variables’ relationship in order to find 
out the extent dividend-agency theories reconcile, to achieve the goal of shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Quantitative research questions inquired about the relationships between dividend-
agency variables that the investigator seeks to know (Creswell, 2014). The following 
research questions guided this study to its objectives: 
 What is the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE? 
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 What role does the dividend-agency relationship of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE play in resolving agency problems? 
 What influence do the factors that underpin both agency problems and dividend 
policy of financial services companies listed on the JSE have on the 
shareholder wealth maximisation?  
1.6 THE REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
This chapter investigates empirical evidence and current theoretical thinking on the 
relationship between dividend policy and agency problems. Notably, dividends policy 
has evolved and adjusted in response to ever-changing business conditions, market 
parameters and regulations. By understanding that dividend policy has evolved and 
did not just appear in its current form provides important perspectives about why 
dividend policies vary widely across companies and countries over time. 
Corporate practices demonstrate that despite the robust empirical evidence on the 
irrelevance of dividends, however, corporations follow aggressively deliberate 
dividend payout strategies (Lintner, 1956:98). This evidence by companies leads to 
the following questions, which forms the core of the dividend puzzle: What could be 
the theoretical assumptions for companies to pay dividends? Out of this questioning 
(popularly known as dividend puzzle), corporate finance was shaped into its modern 
current form. Financial economists, through empirical evidence, advanced various 
reasons why companies consistently pay dividends, among others are the following: 
Signalling Theory, tax preference theory, Clientele Effect Theory and agency cost 
theory. These are the theories that seek to justify the relevance of paying dividends.  
However, this review shall examine the main dividend theories: dividend irrelevance 
and residual on the one hand and Dividend Relevance Theory on the other in 
association with the Agency Theory. Nevertheless, it is not the focus of the study to 
contrast the different schools of thought within the dividend policy and justify the 
relevance or irrelevance of dividends, rather to investigate the relationship between 
dividend policy and agency problems, to what extent this relationship reconciles to 
achieve the goal of maximising shareholder wealth, which translates into maximising 
company value. Dividend puzzle has marshalled dividend policy to be at war with itself 
through its opposing schools of thought that is dividend irrelevance and residual theory 
  13
championed by Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1961). The dividend puzzle was driven 
through probing questions, which dictated the course of research to its current form. 
On the opposing school of thought was dividend relevance under the guard of Graham 
and Dodd (1951), Lintner (1956); as well as Gordon (1959), who then developed 
assumption theories (Bird in the hand, Clientele Effect Theory, Signalling Theory to 
mention just a few) to respond to the dividend puzzle and justify the relevancy of 
dividends. 
1.7 THE CHOICE OF DIVIDEND DECISION 
Dividend decisions in the form of dividend policies, which form the focus of this study, 
involve the determination of the payout policy that management follows in determining 
the size and pattern of cash distributions to shareholders over time (Lease, John, 
Kalay, Loewenstein & Sarig, 2000:1). It is acknowledged as common practice that 
there are different principal mechanisms by which corporations distribute cash to 
shareholders, which include ordinary annual dividend payments, special dividends 
and share repurchases. In an attempt to understand the relationship of share 
repurchases with dividend policy, Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) posed a question. 
What determines management choice of cash distribution over the other, against 
backdrop that dividend and share repurchases though similar but are imperfect 
substitutes? 
In line with Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaeli’s (2005) quests for answers to the 
question above, the researchers conducted a survey that revealed that managers’ 
view dividend signals as containing more information than share repurchases. 
Henceforth, they are more concerned with dividends as opposed to share repurchase. 
However, some empirical evidence observed that share repurchases became a 
popular means of distributing excess cash as from 2005 in South Africa (Wesson, 
2015). This development of share repurchase is partly attributed to the implementation 
of the Companies’ Amendment Act 37 of 1999, which saw share repurchases being 
allowed for the first time in South Africa as from 01 July 1999 (Wesson, 2015). The 
choice of dividend decision as a better mechanism to distribute cash to shareholders 
is well developed and substantiated by the following theories underlying dividend 
policy: tax preference theory, dividend Clientele Theory, the Agency Theory, and Bird 
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in the Hand Theory, which are put forward to substantiate the relevance of dividend 
payout ratio. Accordingly, the current study has chosen two of these dividend 
underlying theories: dividend policy and agency problems and seeks to investigate 
their relationship, with regard to resolving agency problems, therefore maximising 
shareholders’ wealth. The other mechanisms of cash distribution lack empirical 
backing that could position them as mechanisms of choice. These theories shall be 
further dealt with in the literature review.  
1.8 DIVIDEND-AGENCY RELATIONSHIP FROM EMERGING MARKETS 
In his study of Indian companies, Manos (2002) observed that payment of dividends 
is one of the measures available to managers for controlling agency behaviours, and 
concluded that by inducing external monitoring, dividends reduce agency problems 
and costs. Similarly, Easterbrook (1984) argues that the reduction of agency problems 
is best achieved by increasing dividend payout (dividend policy). Empirical evidence 
from Tunisia found that dividends play a crucial role in limiting the power of top 
management and their expropriation activities and consequently remove justifications 
of the agency problems by dividend policy (Faccio, Larry, & Young, 2001). 
Agency theory considers dividends as a determinant of the agency conflicts between 
insiders and outsiders as well as between block holders (large shareholders) and 
minority shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Under such conditions, the level of 
dividend payout depends on shareholders’ legal protection. In countries with the 
strongest protection (common-law), companies distribute higher dividends than in 
countries with poor protection (civil law). Furthermore, the Agency Theory argues that 
dividend policy and governance mechanisms are substitute devices to control insiders’ 
opportunism and entrenchments. From the aforementioned studies, it is worth noting 
that legal protection plays a vital role in influencing the dividend decision, especially 
considering that developing countries are generally having a weaker legal protection 
relative to developed countries. In addition, the appearance of corporate governance 
as a control mechanism to reduce agency problems and costs as a substitute to the 
most taunted dividend policy further necessitates the current study. 
In Thailand, Baker and Powell (1999) investigated this unresolved issue of dividend 
policy and found inconsistent results owing to countries’ effects. In addition, Chay and 
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Suh (2009) pointed out that the difference of rules, regulations and cultures in each 
country will affect the dividend policy. As such, dividend policies in those different 
countries should be different. At company level, various factors such as free cash flow, 
company size, growth rate, growth opportunity, business risk, and company 
profitability impact on dividend payout ratios. Although the above studies from 
emerging markets are confirming that dividend policy does reduce agency problems 
and costs, the research is not of similar studies conducted in South Africa. Accordingly, 
the issues of country-to-country effect and company-to-company specifics, further 
warrants the current study as these results cannot be generically applicable across 
emerging markets, considering country and company characteristics. In support of this 
argument, care must be taken not to generalise the findings of ownership and other 
governance related studies performed in developed countries to developing countries 
(Afshan, Chetri & Pradhan, 2011). This study sought to contribute to literature by 
focusing on selected listed financial services companies in South African case, 
considering all the factors mentioned above, which could influence dividend policy.  
1.9 DIVIDEND-AGENCY RELATIONSHIP FROM LOCAL MARKETS 
Dividend policy in South Africa has been extensively studied from the early 1980s 
(Firer, Gilbert & Maytham, 2008). However, none of those studies focused on dividend-
agency relationship on JSE listed financial services companies, nor to what extent this 
relationship achieves the goal of maximising shareholders’ wealth, thereby increasing 
company value. Accordingly, this study frames herein few of the local studies and their 
findings. Only two studies surveyed company management to establish their views on 
issues surrounding the declaration of dividends.  
Seneque and Gourley (1983) took a survey of 145 JSE listed companies and found 
that management at that time pursued dividend policy as an active variable, and 
strongly supported the view that continuity of payments and stable payout ratios were 
of great importance. These findings gave necessary impetus to the assertions for the 
relevance of dividend policy. When setting dividend policy, respondents were chiefly 
influenced by ‘recorded earnings and the prospects of future earnings. Marx (2001) 
concurred with the above results by surveying financial directors of JSE listed 
companies. Overwhelmingly, the respondents believed that reasons for dividend 
  16
policy changes ought to be communicated to investors. These results came against 
the backdrop of information asymmetry as investors rely heavily on information 
communicated through dividends announcements and less on financial statements, 
as they were perceived to be inaccurate and management were accused of 
manipulating financial data. Studies based on data collected during times of relatively 
high inflation found that many companies paid dividends in excess of their real 
earnings. This suggests that at least maintenance of the current nominal dividend is 
an important factor in setting dividend policy. Empirical evidence from a sample of 33 
JSE industrial companies over the period 1968 to 1982 indicate that dividend policy 
was not significant in explaining the changes in shareholder wealth from year-to-year 
(Du Plessis, Archer & Affleck-Graves, 1986; Botha, Bosch & van Zyl, 1987; Gevers & 
Hamman, 1988). 
It suffices to say, although these local findings were focused on dividends, they are of 
little significance to the focus of the current study. These findings were focused on 
various variables in relation to dividend policy, but not specifically on the dividend-
agency relationship and its significance on shareholders’ wealth maximisation, which 
is the focus of the study. It is worth noting that this empirical evidence insinuates that 
dividend policy was not significant in explaining the changes in shareholder wealth. 
The current study investigated the relationship between dividend policy and agency 
problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE. Du Plessis et al. (1986) 
empirical evidence did not reflect on the relationship between dividends-agency 
relationship, henceforth, creates a void that warrants the current study. A number of 
acts were promulgated in South Africa since the period of the above empirical 
evidence. For instance, share repurchases were only allowed as from 01 July 1999, 
following the implementation of the Companies’ Amendment Act 37 of 1999 (Wesson, 
2015). During the period 1999 to 2009, secondary tax on companies (STC) was 
payable on dividend and was governed by sections 64B and 64C, Income Tax Act, 
No. 58 of 1962 (Wesson, 2015:15). According to Wesson (2015), share repurchases 
became a popular means of distributing excess cash as from 2005 in South Africa. 
These tax legislations had a direct impact on dividends decisions in South Africa, 
which further creates a need to investigate the relationship between dividend policy 
and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
  17
1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.10.1 Overview of the research methodology 
The research problem, research questions, objectives and literature review 
underpinned by dividend-agency theories helped to determine methodological choice 
of the current study, which is quantitative research design. Meanwhile, qualitative 
research design is most suitable when study variables and theories that underpinned 
the study are inadequate (Leedy & Ormrod, 2016). Furthermore, qualitative research 
design is bias in favour of exploratory studies, therefore not suitable for the current 
study since it is not exploratory inclined.  
On the contrary, quantitative research design determines the relationship between 
dependent variables and independent variables, which are measured numerically and 
analysed using panel statistical technique (Saunders et al., 2016). This 
methodological choice resonates with the current study in that we are determining 
dividend-agency variables using panel data statistical techniques. Executive directors 
make dividend decisions intended to resolve agency problems and this perfectly fits 
well with quantitative research design associated with positivism for the study. 
Qualitative data are conducted based on human interviews and survey therefore 
largely subjective, prone to human error and bias in data interpretation (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2014). Meanwhile, quantitative research design adopted secondary data 
and the researcher was not a participant in its collection, therefore ensuring objectivity 
of statistical data analysis. 
1.10.2 Research Design 
The research design refers to specific procedures undertaken in the research process, 
namely, data collection, data analysis and report writing (Creswell, 2014). To address 
research problem, this chapter introduced a classification of research designs: 
exploratory, descriptive and causal research (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). It is not the 
intent of this study to develop hypotheses or questions for further research as 
prescribed by exploratory research. In resolving research problem, the research 
question was developed: “What influence do the factors that underpin both agency 
problems and dividend policy of financial services companies listed on the JSE have 
on the shareholder wealth maximisation? This study was descriptive in nature as this 
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was demonstrated by the research questions. The aforementioned research question 
sought to investigate the influence of the factors that underpin both agency problems 
and dividend policy had on the shareholder maximisation of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE, therefore causal research study. This simple means that 
correlational design in this quantitative study aimed to measure the degree of 
association between two or more variables of dividend-agency problems against 
shareholder wealth using the statistical procedure of correlational analysis (Creswell, 
2014). 
1.10.3 Data Collection 
The research questions were empirically answered using secondary data collected 
from IRESS database, supplemented with information from profile stock exchange 
handbook for the period 2016. Justification for the use of annual reports and financial 
statements from IRESS database is that these financial statements are audited and 
standardised. This desktop information was acquired from online services of the stock 
exchange. 
1.10.4 Sampling Technique 
Sampling may be defined as the selection of some part of an aggregate or totality 
based on which a judgment or inference about the aggregate or totality is made 
(Cooper & William, 1995). The JSE is made up of different sectors, namely, 
manufacturing, consumer services, consumer goods, financial services, health care, 
industrial, oil and gas, technology, telecommunication, and utilities. Each sector has 
different subsectors composed of listed companies. These listed companies form a 
population of 410 companies listed on the JSE as of 2016. Owing to financial 
constraints, the current study only focused on the financial services sector. South 
African financial services sector operates under tight regulatory regime, thus, data is 
easily available for research purposes. This sector has a population of 236 listed 
financial services companies with 20 sub-sectors or strata. The sub-populations are 
not equal as some are bigger than others. To correct for this imbalance on a 
characteristic of a sample, a proportional stratified sampling technique was used. 
Stratification ensures that each stratum (sub population) was represented in the 
sample in proportion to that existence in the population (Creswell, 2014). To ensure 
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that each stratum is fairly represented, therefore, the study adopted proportional 
stratification sampling technique. 
1.10.5 Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics were used to determine dividend-agency relationship using 
central measures of tendency such as means, standard deviations and range values. 
This study adopted panel data regression analysis, which involved the cross section 
time analysis to ensure robust statistical findings between dividend-agency 
relationship. The multiple linear correlation regression was used to determine 
dividend-agency relationship for the period 2005 - 2016. Statistical package EViews 
statistical version 9 was used to perform statistical analysis.  
1.11 SCOPE AND DEMARCATION OF THE STUDY 
1.11.1 Reliability and Validity of the Findings 
Reliability is concerned with estimates of the degree to which a measurement is free 
of random or unstable error (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). According to Cooper and 
Schindler (2014), validity refers to the extent to which a test measures what it actually 
wishes to measure. Conversely, reliability has to do with accuracy and precision of a 
measurement procedure. Creswell (2014) reports that there are two types of threats 
to validity, namely, threats to internal validity and threats to external validly. 
Furthermore, Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002) define threats to internal validity as 
problems in drawing correct inferences about whether the covariation between the 
presumed treatment variable and the outcome reflects a causal relationship. 
Meanwhile, threats to external validity are problems that threaten researchers’ ability 
to draw correct inferences from the sample data to other persons, treatment variables 
and measures (Cook & Campbell, 1979). To address selection threat to internal 
validity, the current study used probability sampling to ensure accuracy of 
measurements. The study covered a period of 12 years. Therefore, some companies 
might have fallen out owing to 2008 financial crisis or poor performance.  
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1.12 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The research designs for this study are determined based on the type of data which 
is secondary data and its availability. Annual financial statements of financial services 
companies listed from JSE forms the core of the secondary data for the study. In the 
data classification and analysis, limited proxy variables were chosen in order to limit 
and focus the scope of the study in terms of statistical testing. The current study only 
focused on financial institutions. Against this background, this study cannot be 
generalised for all companies listed on the JSE. 
1.13 DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
The study is delimited to focus on an investigation of the relationship between dividend 
policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
Therefore, this study is not focusing on the justification of the relevance or irrelevance 
of dividends policy. However, it assumes that there is a relationship between dividend 
policy and agency problems. Empirical evidence on the relationship between dividend 
policy and agency problems is highly skewed in favour of the developed economies, 
and less on emerging markets particularly South Africa. The study period is limited to 
twelve years from 2005 to 2016. This period is informed by the promulgation of the 
dividend legislation, which became applicable in 2012.  
1.14 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study sought to add value on the body of knowledge by focusing on dividend-
agency relationship, particularly in a developing country. The study hopes to provide 
answers to some extent on persistent question: Why does industry continuously pay 
dividends regardless at times of poor performance (Black, 1976)? The study sought 
to explore possible solutions on challenges brought about by agency problems, in this 
regard focusing on JSE listed financial services companies. The previous study 
focused on a relationship between dividends and shareholder’ value (de Wet & 
Mpinda, 2013). Meanwhile, Steyn and Stainbank (2013) focused on a relationship 
between control and ownership of companies listed on the JSE. The current study 
provides a point of departure in that it sought to combine both theories therefore, 
determine dividend-agency relationship. In addition, studies by Lambrechts (1992) 
  21
and Piketty (2014) simply confirmed the existence of agency problems on JSE listed 
companies. The study has identified dividend assumption theories and forms of 
ownership proxies and used them to answer research questions.  
1.15 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Research ethics refers to the specific principles, rules, guidelines, and norms of 
research related behaviour that a research community has decided are proper, just, 
objective, fair, and appropriate (Davis, Gallardo & Lachlan, 2012). To maintain 
research integrity, the researcher has applied for the ethical clearance to Unisa Ethical 
Clearance Committee in order to abide by the research standards. This ensured that 
confidentiality and honest reporting is adhered to. In line with ensuring ethical standard 
reporting, results were reported on both positive and negative findings.  
1.16 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
The structure of the thesis is organised in a schematic graph representation as 
exhibited in figure 1.1. The overview of the key components of each chapter of the 
thesis, are introduced through an introduction. Meanwhile, each chapter concludes 
with chapter summary. Essentially, the chapter summary seeks to highlight the key 
components that formed the discourse. This model structure of the thesis enabled the 
researcher to position each chapter to bigger perspective of the study focus. The 
detailed summary of each chapter is contained in chapter five (5).   
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Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic structural framework of the thesis 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
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Figure 1.1 provides structural framework to guide the study to its research objectives. 
The thesis structural framework sought to demarcate the main theme for each chapter 
within the bigger picture of the study. The next paragraph is the chapter summary of 
the current chapter. 
1.16 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Essentially, this chapter unpacked the study through defining key words such as 
dividend policy, the Agency Theory and agency cost. This chapter discussed the 
contextualisation of the study. The research questions together with the objectives of 
the study were outlined to help focus the study. The rationale behind the choice of 
dividend decision was discussed at length in this chapter. In its investigation, the 
current study discussed dividend-agency relationship from an emerging markets 
perspective, scaling down to the local markets. To answer the research questions and 
achieve research objectives, this chapter outlined research methodology together with 
its instruments such as research design, data collection, sampling technique, and data 
analysis. 
The next chapter deals with the dividend-agency theoretical framework together with 
empirical literature from similar previous research. Both dividend policy and the 
Agency Theory were anchored on assumption theories, which were critically 
discussed in the following chapter. The next chapter reviews corporate finance 
literature in line with dividend-agency assumptions theories.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DIVIDEND POLICY AND AGENCY THEORY:  
THEORY AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter dealt with the contextualisation of the study rationale and defined 
the key concepts that underpin the research topic. Furthermore, the previous chapter 
also identify research gap. Essentially, the previous chapter outlined research 
methodology, research design, data collection, sampling technique, and data analysis. 
The research questions and objectives were also outlined. Moreover, the choice of 
dividend decision by management was discussed in the previous chapter. The 
dividend-agency relationship from emerging markets and local markets perspectives 
were discussed. The previous chapter outlined the following: scope and demarcation 
of the study; study limitations; significance of the study; ethical consideration; and 
conclusion. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses theoretical 
framework. Section 2.3 delves into details on the review of the literature on dividend-
agency relationship. Section 2.4 focuses on corporate Dividend Relevant Theory 
covering Clientele Effect Theory Taxes and Clientele Effect Theory, Signalling Theory 
/ asymmetric information, and Bird in the Hand Theory. Section 2.5 discusses pillar 3 
disclosure. Section 2.6 covers corporate dividend Irrelevance Theory. Section 2.7 
discusses residual dividend theory. Section 2.8 discusses the Agency Theory, 
covering institutional ownership, and insider ownership. Section 2.9 discusses agency 
cost, covering outcome model, and the Substitution Model. Section 2.10 concludes 
this chapter.  
2.2 DIVIDEND-AGENCY THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK IN SUMMARY 
Agency theory focuses on separation of ownership from control (Smith, 1776). 
Consequently, this separation led to agency problems and agency costs. Therefore, 
Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
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had advanced a proposition that agency costs can be reduced by substituting 
dividends with managerial ownership (DIRS), institutional ownership, foreign 
ownership, and leverage. Meanwhile, Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958; 1961) offered 
dividend irrelevance and residual theories to resolve agency problems together with 
Lintner (1956), Gordon (1959) and Easterbrook (1984) who advocated Dividend 
Relevance Theory. Accordingly, these theories formed the foundational core of 
dividend-agency theoretical framework for this chapter.  
To determine dividend-agency relationship of JSE listed financial services companies, 
the aforementioned theories are significant in answering research questions. 
Dividend-agency theoretical framework provides an overview of the core theories 
along with assumption theories that underpinned the study. The identified theories are 
used to explain contradictory empirical findings from current and previous studies as 
highlighted in the body of this chapter. The main theories used various proxies to 
determine dividend-agency relationship of JSE listed financial’ services companies. 
Furthermore, these theories provided a solid foundation for research questions, 
objectives and the methodological approach. The contradictory empirical findings 
helped with the identification of the study research gap for the current study. This 
framework provides the context within which the findings from the industry are 
critiqued and recommendations are preferred. Furthermore, the framework helps to 
focus the current study in achieving its research objectives. In line with these theories’ 
assertions, the expected dividend-agency relationship signs were developed for the 
regression equation, therefore, explaining expected dividend-agency relationship. 
Dividend-agency theoretical framework establishes a link between dividend policy and 
the Agency Theory in relation to the reduction of agency conflicts. Dividend-agency 
theoretical framework anchors relationship between companies’ performance in 
relation to dividend policy and the agency problems of companies listed on the JSE. 
In addition, dividend-agency theoretical framework provides theoretical foundation to 
substantiate research findings for the current study. 
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Figure 2.1: Dividend-agency theoretical framework in summary 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
Theoretical framework as outlined in figure 2.1 demonstrates theories, order and 
sequence of theoretical subtopics that underpinned dividend-agency relationship. 
Cooper and Schindler (2014:36) are of the opinion that the main role of theory is to 
help guide the research in accordance with research problem and accompanying 
research questions. Therefore, this chapter investigates empirical evidence and 
current theoretical thinking on the relationship between dividend policy and agency 
problems. The review examined the main dividend theories: dividend irrelevance and 
residual Modigliani and Miller (1961), Dividend Relevance Theory (Lintner, 1956) on 
the other in association with the Agency Theory by Berle and Means (1932), and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Furthermore, the assumption theories of relevant 
dividend policy, namely Clientele Effect Theory, Signalling Theory, and Bird in the 
Hand Theory that are put forward to justify the relevance of dividend payout ratio shall 
be examined. Subsequently, agency sub-theories of ownership structure such as 
institutional ownership and agency cost by Jensen and Meckling (1976) are also 
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discussed herein. The aforementioned theories are to provide guidance to the current 
study in accordance with its research objectives and research questions. 
Nevertheless, it is not the focus of the study to contrast the different schools of thought 
within the dividend policy and justify the relevance or irrelevance of dividends, but 
rather to investigate the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems, in 
relation to resolving agency conflicts of financial services companies listed on the JSE.  
This chapter investigates empirical evidence and current theoretical thinking on the 
determination of relationship between dividend policy and agency problems. To 
investigate the current theoretical thinking on dividend-agency relationship meant that 
this chapter is anchored on the assumption theories of relevant dividend policy, 
namely Clientele Effect Theory, Signalling Theory, and Bird in the Hand Theory which 
are put forward to justify the relevance of dividend payout ratio. The aforementioned 
theories are the focus of the study. Furthermore, agency sub-theories such as 
ownership structure, board ownership, foreign, insider ownership, and institutional 
ownership are also discussed as substitutes to dividend payments (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
2.3 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON DIVIDEND-AGENCY 
RELATIONSHIP 
To investigate the current theoretical thinking on dividend-agency relationship meant 
that this chapter is anchored on the assumption theories of relevant dividend policy as 
mentioned above. These theories are examined together with the Agency Theory 
ownership structure mechanisms, namely, institutional ownership, insider ownership, 
outcome model, and the Substitution Model. These theories seek to justify the 
relevance of paying dividends. This review shall examine the main dividend theories: 
dividend irrelevance and residual and Dividend Relevance Theory in association with 
the Agency Theory. However, it is not the focus of the study to contrast the different 
schools of thought within the dividend policy and justify the relevance or irrelevance of 
dividends, rather to investigate the relationship between dividend policy and agency 
problems, by unearthing previous and current empirical evidence that relates to the 
reduction of agency conflicts. 
  28
The primary goal of a manager whose wealth interests is well aligned to that of the 
company owners should be to maximise the wealth of a company’ owners, which 
translates into maximising company value (Gitman et al., 2014). Henceforth, one of 
the secondary objectives of the study is to determine the extent to which the dividend-
agency relationship reconciles to achieve the goal of maximising shareholder wealth. 
The general view among the finance scholars is that the Agency Theory was borne 
out of corporate governance, and the researcher concluded to say that dividend policy 
emerged from investment practice (Smit, 2015). This study deals with components of 
corporate governance, namely, dividend payments and agency problems. Corporate 
governance refers to the application of the rules, processes and companies’ laws in 
which companies are managed, controlled and regulated (Larcker & Tayan, 2011). A 
company’s corporate governance is influenced by both internal factors, such as insider 
ownership, board of directors, as well as external forces, such as institutional 
ownership and government regulations (Gitman et al., 2014).  
According to Larcker and Tayan (2011), corporate governance refers to the collection 
of control mechanisms (board of directors, and executive officers) that an organisation 
adopts to dissuade or minimise potentially self-interested managers from engaging in 
activities detrimental to the wealth maximisation of shareholders. The success of the 
control mechanism leads to reduction of the agency costs and translates to increase 
in the company value as advanced by the Agency Theory. It is one of the secondary 
objectives of this study to determine the extent to which this assertion is achieved in 
financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
2.4 CORPORATE DIVIDEND RELEVANT THEORY 
Corporate practices demonstrate that despite the robust empirical evidence on the 
irrelevance of dividends, however, corporations follow carefully designed payout 
strategies (Lintner, 1956:98). This evidence by companies leads to the following 
questions, which forms the core of the dividend puzzle: what could be the theoretical 
assumptions for companies to pay dividends? Out of this questioning (popularly known 
as dividend puzzle), corporate finance was shaped into its modern current form. 
Financial economists through empirical evidence advanced various reasons why 
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companies consistently pay dividends. Among others were the following: Signalling 
Theory, tax preference theory, Clientele Effect Theory, and agency cost theory. 
Dividend puzzle has marshalled dividend policy to be at war with itself through its 
opposing schools of thought, that is, dividend irrelevance and residual theory 
championed by Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1961). This research evolved through 
probing questions, which dictated the course of research to its current form. As such, 
dividend irrelevance versus dividend relevance under the guard of Graham and Dodd 
(1951), as well as Lintner (1956); Gordon (1959), who then developed assumption 
theories (Bird in the hand, Clientele Effect Theory, Signalling Theory to mention just a 
few) to respond to the dividend puzzle and justify the relevancy of dividends.  
This study brings forth a point of departure from internal divergence of views from 
within dividends policy, by investigating a relationship between dividend policy and 
agency problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE with an objective 
to determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship reconcile to achieve the 
goal of maximising shareholder wealth. Empirical evidence found that the dividend 
yield had little impact on stock price volatility. Therefore, managers cannot employ 
dividend policy to reduce the stock’s risk (Sarwar, 2013). Furthermore, stock price 
volatility was negatively related with dividend payout and dividend yield (Hashemijoo, 
Ardekani & Younesi, 2012). In line with this empirical evidence, studies by Joshi (2012) 
and Sarwar (2013) concur with the above evidence. 
However, numerous researchers have used dividend per share (DPS), earning per 
share (EPS) and retained earnings per share (REPS) as proxies for examining the 
impact of dividend policy (Azhagaiah & Priya, 2008; Bawa & Kaur, 2013; Sarwar, 
2013). The following empirical studies have observed that an increase in dividend 
leads to an increase in share price while a decrease in dividend leads to a decrease 
in share price (Azhagaiah & Priya, 2008; de Wet & Mpinda, 2013). Overwhelmingly, 
evidence pointed out that financial performance has significant positive relationship 
with dividend payout (Uwuigbe, Jafaru & Ajayi, 2012).  
These findings confirmed the assertion advanced by dividend policy that the payment 
of dividends leads to increase in share price; henceforth, the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth. Furthermore, empirical evidence from de Wet and Mpinda (2013) 
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confirmed that the payment of dividend positively affects the market price per share 
(MPS) for JSE listed companies. Similarly, Azhagaiah and Priya (2008) also report 
that higher dividend increases the market value of the share and vice versa. All these 
findings fully concur with dividend payout policy assumptions and also address the 
secondary objective of the study, to determine the extent to which dividend-agency 
relationship reconciles to achieve the goal of maximising shareholder wealth. In a 
South African context, to measure company performance based on DPS, EPS, REPS, 
as advanced by the aforementioned studies will not be enough. If we were to consider 
corporate governance definition as a guide, then we should include government 
regulation policies on companies. As such, companies in South Africa should include 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) as part of the variables to measure 
performance. It could be measured by determining the total percentage owned by 
company employees. Therefore, the failure to comply with such statutory requirements 
has a potential to negatively affect share price and brings about instability. Corporate 
Dividend Relevant Theory has put forward assumption theories to justify its relevance. 
The critical empirical findings of these assumption theories are discussed below. 
2.4.1 Taxes and Clientele Effect Theory 
Pettit (1977:419) studied the clientele effect of dividends and noted that the retired 
investors and pension funds, for example, tend to prefer cash income, and may 
therefore want the firm to pay out a high percentage of its earnings. On the other hand, 
shareholders in their peak earning years prefer the reinvestment of cash and low 
dividend payments. Similarly, educational institutions and charity companies prefer 
stable dividends because they will not be able to carry on their current operations 
(Baker et al., 2002). Such investors would therefore prefer companies that pay a 
regular dividend yearly. Consequently, shareholders will tend to be attracted to 
companies that satisfy their needs with regard to the balance between cash income 
and capital growth, this is known as Clientele effect theory. 
For example, the decision by Microsoft to start paying dividends was seen as a signal 
that the company was running out of significant future investment opportunities. This 
dividend decision by Microsoft demonstrates the application of residual dividend. It is 
common for companies in a growth phase, not to payout any cash dividends, if they 
adopted residual theory. As such, shareholders will tend to be attracted to companies 
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that satisfy their needs with regard to the balance between cash income and capital 
growth (Correia, Flynn, Uliana, Wormald & Dillon, 2015). 
2.4.2 Signalling Theory / Asymmetric Information 
Empirical evidence from industry from companies such as Apple and Google only 
started to pay dividends in the early 2010s (Cciccia, 2012). This signalled that the 
capital expenditure of these companies was declining, in line with the assertions 
advanced by irrelevant theory (MM, 1958, 1961). Furthermore, empirical evidence 
found that there is a positive relationship between dividend yield and stock prices 
volatility and there is a negative relationship between share price volatility and growth 
of the company (Asghar, Ali, Hamid & Suleman, 2011). Despite these findings, 
dividend yield had little impact on stock price volatility. Therefore, managers cannot 
employ dividend policy to reduce the stock’s risk. In addition, stock price volatility was 
negatively related with dividend payout and dividend yield (Hashemijoo, Ardekani & 
Younesi, 2012). Moreover, financial performance has significant positive relationship 
with dividend payout (Uwuigbe, Jafaru & Ajayi, 2012). 
The Signalling Theory further suggests that dividends are used to signal 
management’s private information regarding the future earnings of the company 
(Bhattacharya, 1979). Corporate dividend payout is not only the source of cash flow 
to the shareholders but it also signalled company’s current and future performance 
prospects (Afza & Mirza, 2010). Corporate governance mechanism of institutional 
investors, in particular, may have greater access to company information and are 
better positioned to influence management (Haye, 2014). Therefore, institutional 
investors substitute asymmetry information. Owing to this information advantage 
enjoyed by institutional owners reduces opportunities for outside companies to 
repurchase stock at bargain prices (De Cesari, Espenlaub, Khurshed & Simkovic, 
2012). Furthermore, Desai and Jin (2011) provided evidence that management alters 
dividend policy to cater to institutional shareholders. In practice, companies are 
forbidden to use their proximity to information for the purposes of insider trading and 
the manipulation of data by management to favour institutional shareholders. Owing 
to this malpractice by the industry, the role of institutional investors as advanced by 
the Agency Theory is distorted.  
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According to Healy and Palepu (1988), investors interpret announcements of dividend 
initiations and omissions as manager’s forecast of future earnings changes. Owing to 
inaccurate financial statements, investors decided to rely on dividend announcements 
as a signal for future prospects of the company performance. The Health and Racquet, 
Enron and WorldCom scandals are some of the few examples in manipulating 
accounting based measures (Bussin, 2015). Therefore, it is a critical element of King 
IV Report (2016) requirement that CEO remuneration be linked to measures of 
company performance (Bussin & Satram, 2012). However, empirical evidence 
stipulates that stock market reactions to dividend-change announcements are not due 
to a signalling role of dividends but rather to a reduction in agency costs within a 
dividend-paying company (Easterbrook, 1984). For instance, dividends can mitigate 
agency costs by forcing companies to seek funds from capital markets in which 
managers are subject to additional monitoring at lower cost. It is dividend assumption 
theory’s assertion that dividend-agency relationship reduces agency costs.  
Against this backdrop, the current study sought to determine the extent to which 
dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies listed on the JSE 
reduces agency costs. This is in light of the co-existence of agency problems along 
with dividends on the JSE listed companies that continuously pay dividends (Piketty, 
2014). 
Basiddig and Hussainey (2010) found that there is negative significant relationship 
between information asymmetry and the shares profit policy in Great Britain. These 
findings simply show that information asymmetry is not only considered for signalling 
role, but also as an important factor that defines the shares profit payment policy of 
companies in this regard in Great Britain companies. Divergent research still persists 
with regard to asymmetry information. This was confirmed through a study by Al-Najjar 
and Hussainey (2010) who found that there is a negative and significant relation 
between shares profit and dividend payment policy. However, research showed that 
dividend payment is positively related with leverage, performance, corporate 
governance, and last year dividend while it is negatively related with companies’ 
liquidity (Dada, Malomo & Ojediran, 2015). In light of the contradictory research, the 
payment of dividends as signaling information as advanced by the the Agency Theory 
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remains unresolved. Therefore, the question persists, why do companies pay 
dividends? 
2.4.3 Bird in the Hand Theory 
Bird in the hand theory asserts that paying higher dividends increases company value 
because dividends represent certainty while future share price appreciation is 
uncertain. An empirical evidence by Al-Makawi, Rafferty and Pillai (2010:176) 
supports this assertion that a higher current dividend reduces uncertainty about future 
cash flows and that a high payout ratio will reduce the cost of capital, and hence 
increase company value. In support of this argument, Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) found 
that bank of North America in 1781 paid dividends after only six months of operation, 
and the Bank Charter entitled the board of directors to distribute dividends regularly 
out of profits. Notably, dividends payments are to be paid out of cash flows not profits; 
profits are estimates and uncertain.  
However, Modigliani and Miller (1961) dismiss the above assertion upon which the 
bird assumption theory is founded by referring to it as the bird in the hand fallacy. 
Furthermore, Bhattacharya (1979) correctly argues that the riskiness of a project’s 
cash flows determines a companies’ risk and an increase in dividend payout today will 
simply result in an equivalent drop in the stock’s ex-dividend price. Therefore, 
increasing the dividend today will not increase a companies’ value by reducing the 
riskiness of future cash flows. Amidu and Abor (2006), Afza and Mirza (2010) and 
Thanatawee (2013) found that there exists a positive relationship between cash flow 
and dividend payout ratio. However, Ahmed and Javid (2008) found negative 
relationship between liquid and payout ratio suggesting that increase in payout ratio 
reduces company’s liquidity level, therefore lowering dividend payments. On the 
contrary, Adedeji (1998) did not find any relationship between liquidity and dividend 
policy. Investors consider corporate dividend payout as not only the source of cash 
flow to the shareholders but it also provides information regarding company’s current 
and future performance (Afza & Mirza, 2010). The corporate practice of continuous 
payment of dividends despite poor performance could be largely attributed to the Bird 
in the hand assumption theory, in that investors and executive management consider 
dividend as a certainty as oppose to future share price that could go either way. In this 
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regard, one could conclude that the wealth interests of management and 
shareholders’ is not aligned, through this theory owing to persistent agency problems. 
2.5 PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURE 
A key goal of the revised Pillar 3 disclosures is to improve comparability and 
consistency of disclosures (Basel Committee, 2015). The guiding principles aim to 
provide a company foundation for achieving transparent, high-quality pillar 3 risk 
disclosures that will enable users to better understand and compare a bank’s business 
and its risks. Pillar 3 disclosures reduce information asymmetry and helps promote 
comparability of banks’ risk profile within and across jurisdiction (Basel Committee, 
2015). At the core of the asymmetry information is a strong perception held by 
investors that management manipulate data, hence unreliable data. It is not clear how 
the improvement of comparability and consistency of disclosure would resolve data 
unreliability, hence reliance on dividend as a signalling factor. A listed company for 
example is subjected to transparent requirements, which are critical in achieving the 
same disclosure requirement of pillar 3.  
2.6 CORPORATE DIVIDEND IRRELEVANCE THEORY 
In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1961:414) provide an elegant analysis of 
the relationship among dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares. In their 
idealised world scenario, (MM, 1961) set forth an Irrelevance Theory based on no 
taxation; transaction and agency costs. Moreover, Irrelevance Theory is underpinned 
by the assertion that when cash surplus exists and no investment opportunities are 
available for the company, then management is expected to pay out some or all of 
those surplus earnings in the form of cash dividends (Ajanthan, 2013). Furthermore, 
MTN invested substantially in Africa particularly in Nigeria and other parts of the 
continent without paying dividends to shareholders. However, when MTN’s growth and 
investment opportunities were winding down, therefore reducing capital expenditure 
then dividends were declared from retained earnings (Correia et al., 2015). 
Essentially, the aforementioned example captures the essence of the dividend 
irrelevance and dividend residual theory in corporate practice. In other words the (MM, 
1961) school of thought is not totally opposed to the payment of dividends, rather 
dividends should be approached as long term and investment strategy.  
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Modigliani and Miller (1961) have their critic in Bernstein (1996:176) who argues that 
the MM theory was admittedly a hypothetical scenario from its genesis, and no one 
including MM, would claim that the real world looks as such. Although examining 
dividend policy in perfect capital markets could provide useful insights about the 
conditions under which dividends may affect stock prices, the dividend Irrelevance 
Theory can also be misleading. Bernstein (1996:180) argues that the final test of any 
theory is how accurately it portrays the real world, weaknesses and all not on a 
theoretical abstract world. This study was not focused on the justification of irrelevance 
dividend policy versus the relevant dividend policy. However, this study investigated 
the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. 
2.7 RESIDUAL DIVIDEND THEORY 
The concept of a residual dividend policy has deep roots in financial literature and 
underlies critical theoretical work. Among the recommendations of the Agency Theory 
is a residual dividend policy specifying that managers should pay shareholders the 
free cash flows remaining after funding all profitable investments (Baker, 2009). 
However, managers generally maintain a smoothed dividend sequence that is as 
strongly related to past dividends as it is to current earnings. This is owing to a survey 
by Brav et al. (2005) that revealed that managers view dividend signals as containing 
more credible and reliable information. 
On 28 April 2013, Business Times published an article indicating that some 
organisations have not shown restraint, as they continuously pay large salary 
increases despite poor company performance (Bussin, 2015:24). This is among other 
factors owing to CEOs who are able to influence boards and compensation 
committees and therefore influence the structure of their remuneration packages 
(Doscher & Friedl, 2011). Local research conducted into the factors driving changes 
in remuneration policies in South Africa showed that financial results of the company, 
governance and merit pay are key factors that are receiving closer attention; reflecting 
a greater shareholder expectation that pay should be linked to performance (Bussin & 
Huysamen, 2003; Bussin & Satram, 2012). However, Aduda and Kimathi (2011) found 
a statistically negative non-significant relationship between executive compensation 
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and performance of commercial banks in Kenya. Furthermore, Fernandez (2005) 
found out that company performance is not significantly related to executive 
compensation. In a study by Osegbue, Ifurueze and Ifurueze (2014) of Nigerian listed 
banks for the period 1990 - 2010 found that there is no significant relationship between 
dividend payout of the banks and all the explanatory variables (free cash flow, current 
profitability, financial leverage, business risk, and tax paid used in the study). 
However, Gill, Biger and Tibrewala (2010) analysed the American service and 
manufacturing companies and found that the dividend payout ratio is a function of 
profit margin, sales growth, debt-to-equity ratio and tax. For the services industry, the 
results indicated that dividend payout ratio is a function of profit margin, sales growth, 
and debt-to-equity ratio. Results for manufacturing companies indicated that dividend 
payout ratio is a function of profit margin, tax and market-to-book ratio.  
The following empirical evidence demonstrates a recent phenomenon in which certain 
CEOs willingly relinquish their bonuses when their companies perform poorly. In 2012, 
Investec’s CEO had his compensation cut by 87% while also asking not to be 
considered for a bonus (Bloomberg, 2012). In the 2012 financial year, ABSA’s CEO 
deferred her R14 million incentive bonuses. ABSA’s CEO would receive the bonus in 
shares in three equal portions in the next three years (Business Day, 2012). BHP 
Billiton’s CEO was appointed in 2013 and offered a base salary that was 20% less 
than his predecessor’s (Moneyweb, 2013). In their study, Core, Guary and Verrechia 
(2003) report that equity incentives are an efficient means to reduce cash outflow. This 
practice from the industry by certain CEOs mentioned in this paragraph is a good 
application of arguments advanced by the residual dividend theory. However, in this 
case, this practice by the industry is not sustainable in that these CEOs voluntarily 
relinquished their equity incentives instant of applying finance principles of residual 
dividend theory as the basis of their decision. Therefore, it is the relationship between 
dividend payments and agency problems becomes detrimental to the shareholders 
when executive management continuously pay dividends despite poor performance 
of the company. Furthermore, the practice by the industry to pay excessive 
compensation packages despite poor performance leads to poor economic growth 
and less job creation. 
  37
2.8 AGENCY THEORY 
The recognition of potential agency costs associated with the separation of 
management and ownership is not new, differences in managerial and shareholder 
priorities have been recognised for centuries. Smith (1937) adjudges the management 
of early joint stock companies to be less prudent in their dividend decision-making 
activities. In addition, Berle and Means (1932); Fama and Jensen (1983); Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) in their seminal work have observed the challenge of agency 
problems that ultimately leads to principal-agency cost. The Agency Theory suggests 
that where there is a separation of ownership and control of a company, the potential 
for agency costs arises because of conflicts of interest between contracting parties 
(Hassain, Tan & Adams, 1994; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Chau & Gray, 2002). 
Accordingly, such conflicts will lead to agency problems and incur significant agency 
costs. To control the challenges imposed by the separation of ownership and control 
of companies, the Agency Theory proposes forms of ownership/ ownership structure 
as mechanisms to mitigate agency problems. Ownership structure is defined as a 
mechanism that aligns the interest of shareholders and managers (Eng & Mak, 2003). 
Accordingly, there are several types of ownership such as management and/or board 
ownership, government, family, foreign, insider ownership, and institutional ownership. 
These forms of ownership will be subsequently briefly discussed as sub-theories that 
support the Agency Theory.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduced the Agency Theory into corporate 
governance. They argue that it is based on economic theory and it describes a 
principal-agent relationship between owners (such as stockholders) and executives, 
with top executives acting as agents whose personal interests do not naturally align 
with shareholder interests. Agency theory assumes that the principal-agent 
relationship involves a transfer of trust and duty to the agent while assuming that the 
agent is opportunistic and will pursue interests, including unethical conduct , which 
breeds agency conflics. This potential conflict of interests is often referred to as “the 
agency problems” (Davis et al., 1997). According to Vo and Nguyen (2014), managers 
who do not have a significant ownership in the company may have incentives to make 
decisions which are not at the best interest of shareholders. However, empirical 
evidence by Davis, Shoorman, and Donaldson (1997) indicate that corporate 
  38
executives are extremely complex in dividend decision making meanwhile the agency 
problems persists. 
Although the Agency Theory provided a point of departure from MM’s dividend policy 
and put forward alternative forms of ownership, the agency problems are not yet over. 
Notably, an attempt to align managerial interests to that of the owners led to a 
persistent problem of agency costs, similar to the dividend policy with its persistent 
dividend puzzle. Despite challenges brought about by the separation of management 
and ownership corporations’ continued survival, and consistent payment of dividends 
and creating employment demonstrate a level of success for both dividend policy and 
the Agency Theory. However, one could argue that success came at the detriment of 
the shareholders. The two theories, that is, the Agency Theory and dividend policy, 
would be examined simultaneously to investigate their relationship in practice through 
studying financial services companies listed on the JSE. This study investigated the 
relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of companies listed on the 
JSE. The empirical findings of agency assumption theories are discussed below.  
2.8.1 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors play an effective role at monitoring and disciplining management 
than the individual investors. This is possible owing to their investment size and the 
resources at their disposal. In the case of a South African context, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) such as South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), South 
African Airways (SAA), Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), and Eskom 
are poorly managed therefore often dependent on government bailout packages 
(Sunday Times, 2017). If these SOEs were to be listed like TELKOM SA, or employ 
debt funding, this will consequently improve their corporate governance through the 
market monitoring mechanism (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This provides institutional 
regulatory oversight and strengthens governance (Sunday Times, 2017). Institutional 
investors have got a clout to discipline management and even bring change when 
management performs inadequately (Stouraitis & Wu 2004).  
However, Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven (2011) aver that a minority shareholder do 
not have the clout to discipline management. On the contrary, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997:738) contend that companies with large shareholders in controlling positions 
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may divert resources from smaller, non-controlling shareholders by paying minimal 
dividends, maintaining higher asset balances. Therefore, using those assets for a 
variety of reasons, such as private perquisite consumption, selling assets to 
themselves or other controlling interests at favourable prices, and other activities 
detrimental to non-controlling shareholders. In this case, large shareholders 
exacerbate the agency costs of equity to the detriment of smaller, non-controlling 
shareholders.  
Owing to these agency costs, managers may not always implement a dividend policy 
that maximises shareholder benefits but rather they may choose a dividend policy that 
maximises their own personal benefits (Jiraporn, Kim & Kim, 2011). Therefore, large 
shareholders prefer to extract private benefits in lieu of dividends, while minority 
shareholders prefer dividends as protection against wealth expropriation by large, 
controlling shareholders and management. Corporate governance (in Europe) 
systems are characterised by large shareholders; such majority control gives the 
largest shareholder considerable authority and discretion over key decisions, like 
dividend decisions (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003:749). 
A case of emerging markets particularly in Africa, in sub-Saharan region, where South 
Africa (SA) is located, companies are mostly held by institutional block holders and 
the corporate platform is characterised by weak and sometimes fragmented regulatory 
systems as well as low levels of investor protection (Abor & Fiador, 2013). Nganga, 
Jain and Artvor (2003) argue that investor protection in Africa is comparable to other 
developing countries but like all emerging markets, the inefficiency in the legal system 
makes enforcement of the law slow and patchy. According to Abor and Fiador (2013) 
in Nigeria, shareholders’ rights are not that well observed. However, compliance to the 
regulation that stipulates equal access to information by all shareholders is also quite 
inconsistent. The World Bank (2005) reports that shareholder rights in Ghana are 
generally observed, but enforcement, especially on material facts disclosure, 
monitoring for content, related party transactions and ownership disclosure, is lacking. 
In line with Abor and Fiador’s (2013) findings, Steyn and Stainbank (2013) revealed 
that majority of companies in South Africa are controlled by dominant shareholder. 
This trend is similar to the developments in Europe which confirms that corporate 
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governance of developing countries is comparable to that one of developed countries 
therefore, underscoring business globalisation.  
Although emerging markets turn to model their corporate governance similar to that of 
developed economies, markets conditions in developing economies prove to be 
different from their counterpart in developed economies. For instance, in this case, the 
empirical findings are consistent in the case of Africa painting rather poor state of 
affairs with regard to law enforcement by directors to protect minority shareholders 
and regulatory regime. Survey results by LaPorta, De Silanez, Sheifer, and Vishny 
(2000) looked at the agency problems and dividends policies around the globe. Using 
a sample of companies from 33 countries around the world, the study found that 
companies operating in countries with better protection of minority shareholders pay 
higher dividends.  
Mirzaei’s (2012) study aimed to find out the relationship between the ownership 
structure and dividend policy. He found that there is a significant negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and dividend policy. However, the researcher could 
not obtain a significant relationship between managerial ownership and dividend 
payment. Mirzaei (2012) also concludes that there is a positive and meaningful 
relationship between the variable of ownership concentration and dividend policy. 
Warrad et al. (2012) examine the potential relationship between the ownership 
structure and the dividend policy for a sample of Jordanian industrial companies traded 
at the Amman Stock Exchange over the period of 2005 and 2007. This research found 
that there is no significant relationship between the dividend policy and private 
ownership, government ownership, family ownership as advanced by the the Agency 
Theory. However, the results also indicated that there is a significant positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and dividend policy. 
Ullah, Fida and Khan (2012) conducted a study on the major factors that have an 
impact on the corporate dividend policy within the context of agency relationship by 
utilising several ownership structure variables such as institutional ownership, 
managerial ownership and foreign ownership. They found that managerial ownership 
has negative impact on the corporate dividend policy. However, institutional ownership 
and foreign ownership both had a positive impact on the dividend payments contrary 
to the dictates of the Agency Theory. The empirical evidence paints conflicting results 
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on the role of dividend policy as an instrument of corporate governance that could be 
used to realign the interests of managers and owners while reducing agency costs.  
Empirical evidence with regard to local environment affirms the need to conduct this 
proposed study owing to different environments of developed and developing markets. 
In support of research in emerging markets, Afshan, Chhetri and Pradhan (2011:89) 
cautioned that care must be taken not to generalise the findings of ownership and 
other governance related studies performed in developed countries to developing 
countries. Therefore, highlighting the need for research in developing countries in this 
regard South Africa. This means that whatever outcomes from developed markets 
cannot be generically applied to emerging markets owing to different market 
conditions, hence the motive for the study. 
2.8.2 Insider Ownership 
A large body of agency literature indicates that insider ownership helps aligning 
managerial wealth interests with the wealth interest of the external shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). In line with this assertion, Jensen and Meckling (1976) Rozeff (1982), 
Easterbrook (1984) and Stulz (1990) assert that debt holders and related monitoring 
tools are also considered important mechanisms for controlling managerial behavior 
and mitigating agency problems. Duc and Nguyen (2014) underscore that managers 
who do not have a significant ownership in the company may succumb to undue 
influence and make decisions which are not at the best interest of shareholders. 
However, greater insider ownership may serve as a substitute control mechanism for 
the dividend payments. Executives who own equity shares have wealth interests more 
closely aligned with shareholders compared with executives who do not. 
Consequently, shareholders of these companies should face lower monitoring and 
bonding costs (Haye, 2014). A case of emerging markets agrees with the above 
assertions. Vo and Phan (2013) contend that the increase in managerial ownership 
will improve the performance of companies in Vietnam. Thanatawee (2013) found that 
higher institutional ownership increases both likelihood and magnitude of dividend 
payouts based on a sample of Thai companies. Moreover, Thanatawee (2013) 
conducted a study in which he found that the likelihood of a dividend payout is 
positively associated with ownership concentration and the percentage of stock held 
by the largest shareholder, particularly if the largest shareholder is an institution.  
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These findings contradict the Agency Theory assumption that an increased 
concentration substitutes dividend payments; hence a negative relationship. However, 
managerial ownership has its own unintended negative consequences. If managers 
hold a significant portion (above 5%) of a company’s equity, an increase in ownership 
may prevent them from being replaced or punished for their improper decisions and 
this may result in managerial entrenchment. Once entrenched, managers are likely to 
consume more perquisites or to reduce the company’s investment opportunities to 
protect their own interests (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988). In other words, increasing 
managerial stake through equity has a potential to make managers risk averse, which 
means that they may fail to take advantage of investment opportunities. Empirical 
evidence in support of this assertion found that managers with a substantial portion of 
their wealth in equities invested in the company, and this lack of diversification 
encourages them to be more risk averse in project selection, an outcome not 
favourable to shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984). 
Corporate finance literature revealed that Rozeff (1982), Eckbo and Verma (1994), 
Moh’d Perry and Rimbey (1995), Dickens, Case and Newman (2002) and Akhigbe 
and Whyte (2012) conducted empirical studies to uncover evidence of a statistically 
significant negative relationship between insider ownership and dividend payout. Wen 
and Jia (2010) also found that dividends are negatively related to institutional 
shareholders. Harada and Nguyen (2011) found a significant negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and dividend payout for Japanese companies.  
Furthermore, Al-Gharaibeh, Al-Zurigat and Al-Harasheh (2013) are other researchers, 
who try to investigate the impact of ownership structure on dividend policy. They used 
Full Adjustment Model and Partial Adjustment Model to analyse the potential 
relationship between ownership structures and dividend policy. They found that 
managerial ownership has a negative influence on the dividend policy in the Partial 
Adjustment Model and therefore, as managerial ownership increases dividend 
payments fell. These researchers argue that this was mainly owing to the reason that 
managers have inclination to use free cash flow for their own personal benefits, an 
arguement advanced by dividend policy. However, Full Adjustment Model pointed out 
that there is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and dividend policy. 
According to Al-Gharaibeh et al. (2013), this relationship is a clear indication that 
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Jordanian companies do not prefer to utilise dividends as a mechanism to reduce 
agency problems between company managers and shareholders. Quite notably, these 
findings further bring controversy on the role of dividend policy and ownership 
structure as a means of ensuring good corporate governance as advanced by the 
Agency Theory. 
However, greater insider ownership (interest in the company which exceeds 5%) of 
the group’s total number of shares in issue, King IV Report (2016) may compromise 
the independency of managers and encourages them to be risk averse as they protect 
their own interests. Sharma (2011) found a positive relationship between board 
independence and total payout, but a statistically weaker relationship with cash 
dividend payouts. In addition, Hu and Kumar (2004) found a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between greater board independence and the propensity to pay 
dividends. Furthermore, Jiraporn and Ning (2006) found that independent board 
representation has a positive and statistically significant relationship with dividend 
yield, but negative and insignificant with dividends to earnings. Whether more 
independent boards produce higher or lower dividends depends upon whether the 
outcome model (dividends will increase) or the the Substitution Model (dividends will 
decrease) prevails (Haye, 2014). According to King IV Report (2016), principle 1.9: 
indicates that the board and its directors should manage conflicts of interests and 
board members should be independent.  
The report further defines an independent director as a non-executive director that 
does not have a direct or indirect interest in the company, which exceeds 5% of the 
group’s total number of shares in issue. Although the issue of independence is often 
argued as a state of the mind, executive management’ ownership of the stake of the 
company above 5% makes them to be conflicted and their independency 
compromised. The executives could view this as failure to exercise their fiduciary duty. 
Furthermore, they become risk averse and emotionally attached to the company, as 
opposed to the Agency Theory assumption that agents are emotional detached from 
the company. Fama and Jensen (1983) postulate that concentration of decision-
making and decision control in CEO or in one individual reduces the board’s 
effectiveness and objectivity in monitoring top management. 
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2.9 AGENCY COSTS 
The modern approach of the Agency Theory seeks to explain corporate governance 
because of attempts to minimise costs associated with the separation of corporate 
ownership and control. Agency theory distinguishes between two types of agency 
costs, namely, the agency cost of equity arising from conflicts of interests between 
insiders and outsider equity holders, and the agency costs of debt arising between 
equity holders and debt holders (Jensen & Meckling 1976). If companies’ payout 
dividends, they turn out to the stock market for financing their new investments. This 
creates transaction costs and debt holders; which corporate structure seeks to 
minimise through the Agency Theory. To resolve agency problems, the Agency 
Theory advances two agency models, namely, outcome model and the Substitution 
Model (Jensen, 1986). The two models are discussed below.  
2.9.1 Outcome Model 
According to the outcome model, governance provisions that enhance the legal 
protection of minority shareholders make it easier for those shareholders, perhaps 
through improved board representation, to prevent wealth expropriation by insiders 
(Haye, 2014). The outcome model further advocates that companies with good growth 
prospects tend to conserve more cash and make payouts only when necessary owing 
to strong legal protection. 
This model has been extensively used in finance literature to understand corporate 
decisions, including dividend payout ratio (Jensen, 1986; Kim & Sorensen, 1986; Mello 
& Parsons, 1992; Leland, 1998; Ang, Cole & Lin, 2000). In addition, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) conducted an empirical study in which they 
found that outcome model established a link between minority shareholders’ 
protection, the agency cost of equity and dividend payouts. In this context of minority 
shareholders, dividend is an outcome of effective systems of legal protection of 
shareholders. A detailed empirical evidence painting a gloomy picture of poor legal 
protection of minority shareholders in developing markets was captured under the 
institutional ownership above. The strength of this model lies in strong regulatory 
regime and legal protection of minority shareholders, therefore necessitate the need 
for the current study under the environment already explained. 
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2.9.2 Substitution Model 
Agency theory argues that the presence of large-block shareholders substitutes the 
need to pay dividends. Given information asymmetries, the presence of large-block 
shareholders may also be viewed as a substitute signal to the dividend that the 
company has favorable investment prospects and this is an assertion of the the 
Agency Theory (Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990). Furthermore, Chung and Zhang (2011) 
found that institutional investors gravitate to companies with pre-existing good 
corporate governance to minimise monitoring costs, but at the detriment of minority 
shareholders. This assertion is further substantiated that cooperating with 
management to exploit other shareholders is likely when the institution has a business 
relationship (e.g. an investment banking relationship) with the company (Cornett, 
Marcus, Saunders & Tehranian, 2007). The Substitution model in this regard argues 
that minority shareholders should be protected through the rule of law. Henceforth, the 
rule of law substitutes the use of dividend payments as a mechanism of good 
corporate governance. This becomes a cause for concern in developing countries as 
the regulatory systems and rule of law are rather weak (Abor & Fiador, 2013). The 
substitution hypothesis postulates that shareholder rights and dividend payout serve 
as alternate control mechanisms (Haye, 2014). This model further asserts that 
companies with better legal protection and improved shareholder rights are less reliant 
on dividends as a control mechanism for good corporate governance. Substitution 
model asserts that managers for companies with weak legal protection will pay more 
dividends in order to develop a reputation of not expropriating shareholder wealth. 
Mehrani, Moradi and Eskandar (2011) found negative association between 
institutional ownership and dividend payout and a positive relationship between 
dividend payout and concentrated institutional ownership. However, no significant 
relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payout was found. 
Furthermore, Shah, Ullah and Hasnain (2011) found a significant positive relationship 
between ownership structure and dividend policy. In line with these findings, Warrad, 
Abed, Khriasat and Al-Sheikh (2012) found a positive and significant relationship 
between foreign ownership structure and dividend payout policy. In support of the 
Agency Theory, Fagerland and Nilsen (2012) found that an increased ownership 
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involvement leads to more aggressive dividend payout policies, and that, this positive 
relationship is as a result of high involvement, strong attachment and power.  
Abdullah, Ahmad and Roslan (2012) found ownership concentration to be the only 
form of ownership that has a significant effect on dividend policy. Although the Agency 
Theory asserts that insider ownership helps aligning agents’ wealth interests with that 
of the owners of the company, however, King IV Report (2016) cautioned against 
strong concentration that it might compromise the independence of the company’ 
directors. Notably, Gharaibeh, Zurigat and Harahsheh (2013) found a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and dividend policy. Furthermore, Al-
Nawaiseh (2013) confirmed these results by establishing that insider ownership and 
family ownership have negative impact on the level of dividends paid whereas 
institutional ownership and foreign ownership are positively related to dividend policy.  
An empirical evidence by Jiraporn et al. (2011) found that companies that have 
enhanced shareholder rights are more likely to pay dividends, and that those that do 
pay a dividend pay larger dividends. Using a sample of companies listed on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange, Adjaoud and Ben-Amir (2010) found that stronger 
shareholder rights lead to higher dividend payouts, also supporting the outcome 
hypothesis. To reduce agency costs of debts, creditors do require and managers 
should agree to pay low dividend to substitute for weaker creditor rights (Brockman & 
Unlu, 2009). In essence, the Substitution Model contends that if the company has 
weak regulatory regime and legal protection for investors, dividends should be used 
as a substitute.  
In line with this assertion a study of companies from 23 countries, Aggarwal, Erel, 
Ferreira, and Matos (2011) found that higher institutional ownership increases the 
likelihood that poorly performing CEOs will be terminated and that company value will 
improve. Furthermore, it was also found that institutional investors help to control 
earnings management (Hadani, Goranova & Khan, 2011). Elston, Hofler and Lee 
(2011) investigated the relationship between institutional ownership and dividend 
payout behavior of companies in Germany. They did not find any significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and dividend payouts. However, they 
provided evidence that the rights of management to retain a significant percentage of 
net profits and lack of tax incentives reduce the agency costs associated with conflicts 
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between management and shareholder interests regarding the use of the company’s 
free cash flow. These findings substantiated the Substitution Model’s assumption 
theory that institutional investors could be used as a control mechanism for good 
corporate governance. 
2.10 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, theoretical framework, current and previous empirical studies set the 
context upon which research questions were to be answered. The core theories under 
review were Dividend Relevance Theory advocated by Lintner (1956) as well as 
dividend irrelevance and residual advocated by (MM, 1961). These theories were 
studied alongside the Agency Theory advocated by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Both 
theories were discussed based on their assumption theories. The dividend policy was 
discussed based on the following assumption theories: Clientele Effect Theory Taxes 
and Clientele Effect Theory; Signalling Theory / asymmetric information, and Bird in 
the Hand Theory. Similarly, the Agency Theory was discussed based on the following 
assumption theories: institutional ownership; insider ownership; agency cost; outcome 
model and the Substitution Model. This chapter provided divergent views through 
empirical studies. To reconcile the contradictory findings, this chapter discussed 
proposition put forward by the Agency Theory. The use of insider ownership, 
institutional ownership, outcome and the Substitution Models to mitigating agency 
problems was discussed. The forms of ownership as substitutes for dividend payout 
were fully discussed. The theoretical framework provided the bases upon which 
assumption theories were critically reviewed. Furthermore, this chapter discussed the 
alignment of management interests with that of shareholders, using the Agency 
Theory approach. 
The next chapter outlines and discusses research methodology and research methods 
for the study in detailed. It further outlines research process and research instruments 
for the current study. In the main, the next chapter adopted panel data methodology 
and its econometric analytical models using EViews version 9 to perform statistical 
analysis. The next chapter was largely informed by this chapter to adopt methods and 
the methodology that are more robust to mitigate limitations experienced by similar 
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studies in this chapter. Several statistical tests were employed to ensure prescition 
and robust empirical findindings. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY: ECONOMETRIC MODELS  
AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter interrogated the key theories of Dividend Policy and the Agency 
Theory, together with empirical findings from previous studies. Furthermore, the 
chapter delt with corporate governance principles such as insider ownership, board of 
directors as internal factors, as well as external forces, such as institutional ownership 
and government regulations (Gitman et al., 2014). In addition, theoretical framework 
was unpacked through seminal papers by acomplished scholars such as MM (1958), 
Lintner (1956) and Gordon (1959). Similarly, on the Agency Theory Berle and Means 
(1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976) provided ground breaking theoretical foundation. 
To confirm or reject assertions advanced by these theories, panel data regression 
analysis was employed using EViews statistical version 9 for robust results. Notably, 
literature review exposed divergent findings therefore, necessitated the investigation 
of dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
The similar previous studies from the previous chapter played a critical role in the 
choice of the methodology adopted in this chapter. Even though some previous 
studies adopted statistical package for social science (SPSS), however, owing to its 
limitations the current study employed panel data regression analysis using EViews 
version 9. The data colleted together with its challenges further informed various 
research methods employed when addressing the data analysis in this chapter. 
Essentially, the objective of this chapter is to provide research methodology that was 
used for gathering and analysing of the data to achieve the outlined research 
objectives. 
In line with its panel data regression model, the study adopted econometric models in 
order to gain robust results. This chapter was organised as follows: Section 3.2 
Summary of research methodological framework used. Section 3.3 panel data 
econometric analysis; this section discusses panel regression analyses. Section 3.4 
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Panel data analytical models, covered the constant coefficients model, random effect 
(RE) and fixed effect (FE) models. Section 3.5 discusses Generalised method of 
moments (GMM). Section 3.6 GMM estimation models, covered the dynamic panel 
data model, and maximum likelihood (ML) etimation model. Section 3.7 several tests 
of specification for panel data, covered hausman test, FE vs RE test, test for 
heteroscedasticity, test for multicollinearity, panel model with Goodness of Fit 
statistics, poolability test, testing for serial correlation and sargan-hausman test. 
Section 3.8 discussed research questions. This chapter further evolves to the last main 
section that deals with the study design, Section 3.9 discusses the study design. 
Section 3.10 covered research philosophy and approach. Section 3.12 discusses the 
study variables, covering dependent and explanatory variables. Section 3.13 
discusses data collection. Section 3.14 discusses cleaning the data set and target 
population. Section 3.15 discusses data analysis technique. Section 3.16 discussed 
data analysis and findings. Section 3.17 concluded this chapter. 
3.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK USED 
The research methodological framework captured in Figure 3.1 is the summary of the 
methodological approach used to carry out the current study. To measure the 
relationship between dividend-agency relationship, the study adopted panel data 
regression analysis approach. Accordingly, to ensure that the study achieves its 
research objective, fixed cross-sectional effect model was adopted. This model 
provides statistically robust results, therefore removing the bias from the data and 
explains only within sample variations (de Wet & Mpinda, 2013). In order to answer 
the research questions on dividend-agency relationship, the study adopted descriptive 
research design. Similarly, previous studies by Huda and Abdullah (2014) also 
adopted descriptive research design in determining the relationship between 
variables. The research methodological framework summarises the entire 
methodology used for Chapter 3. Essentially, methodological framework provided 
methodological technique that guided the answering of the research questions and 
objectives, therefore, determine dividend-agency relationship for the current study. 
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Figure 3.1: Summary framework of the methodology used 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
From the summary framework of Figure 3.1, it can be graphically demostrated that the 
research methodology contained critical research process that cotrols systematic bias 
and ensures robust results. Furthermore, to determine dividend-agency relationship 
of financial services companies listed on the JSE, the study employed positivism. 
Meanwhile, quantitative research combine both objective reality and deductive 
approach using data to test or confirm theoretical assumptions. This process enabled 
the current study to explore dividend-agency relationship with regard to financials’ 
services sector listed on the JSE.  
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3.3 PANEL DATA ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
To robustly investigate the relationship between Dividend Policy (dependent variable) 
and agency problems (explanatory variable) of financial services companies listed on 
the JSE, the current study employed panel data owing to its advantages as mentioned 
below. According to Brooks (2014), panel data are more comprehensive than pure 
time series or pure cross-sectional data. Furthermore, the combination of cross-
sectional and time series data increases the number of degrees of freedom, and 
subsequently the power of the test, through employing data on the dynamic behaviour 
of a large number of entities simultaneously. This arrangement of data has the ability 
to mitigate problems of multicollinearity that might arise if time series are modelled 
separately from each other (Brooks, 2014). Moreover, Wooldridge (2010) asserts that 
panel data and within estimation provided causal effects identification under weaker 
assumptions, therefore, time constant unobserved heterogeneity does not bias 
estimates. 
Baltagi (2013), Andreß, Hans-Jürgen, Golsch and Schmidt (2013), and Cheng (2014) 
advanced the following assertions with regard to the strength of panel data. Panel data 
provided multifaceted approach to numerous challenges inclined to cross-sectional 
specification like unobserved heterogeneity, degrees of freedom, dynamics and 
collinearity among the explanatory variables.  
Furthermore, panel data have an inbuilt mitigating factor to the challenges involved in 
interpreting the regression coefficients in the framework of a cross-section only or time 
series only regression, as demonstrated in the example below: 
3.3.1 Regression Analysis 
This cross-sectional multiple regression with two explanatory variables, X1 and X2: 
Yi = + 1X1i + 2X2i + ui; i = 1, 2, …, N. …. (1) … (1) 
Where X1 is said to be the covariate with regard to X2 and vice versa. Covariates act 
as controlling factors for the variable under consideration. In the presence of the 
control variables, the regression coefficients s are partial regression coefficients. 
Therefore, 1 represents the marginal effect of X1 on Y, keeping all other variables, 
here X2, constant. The latter part, that is, keeping X2 constant, means the marginal 
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effect of X1 on Y is obtained after removing the linear effect of X2 from both X1 and Y. 
A similar explanation applies for 2 as well. Hence, multiple regression leads to obtain 
the pure marginal effects by incorporating all the relevant covariates and thereby 
controlling for their heterogeneity. 
This example further confirmed another advantage of panel data, that of controlling for 
individual or time heterogeneity, which the pure cross-section or pure time series data 
cannot afford. Consequently, the lack of control for heterogeneity runs a risk of getting 
biased results. Essentially, Baltagi (2013), Andreß et al. (2013) and Cheng (2014) 
echo that panel data, through multiple regression, facilitate for the heterogeneity of the 
covariates. 
However, panel data have its own limitations owing to measurement errors that are as 
result of inappropriate information. This can be overcome through various tests such 
as panel conditioning and panel mortality. Furthermore, panel data experiences 
selectivity problems such as poor response, non-response and self-selectivity. This 
panel limitation was unnecessary as the current study relied on secondary data. In 
addition to these, panel data limitations were short time-series dimension. Usually, 
panel includes yearly data covering a short period of time for each individual (Baltagi, 
2013). Despite the mentioned panel data limitations, the robustness of panel data 
mitigates its limitations. As such panel data were preferred for the current study in light 
of its robust characteristics. 
3.3.2 The Panel Data Regression 
This was a pooled data set, which formed a panel data with the following panel 
regression: 
Yi = + 1X1i + 2X2i + ui; i = 1, 2, …, N; t = 1, 2, …, T … (2) 
In this instance, panel regression account for the cross-section and time heterogeneity 
in this model. This was achieved through a two-way error component assumption for 
the disturbances, uit, with 
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uit = μi + t + vit, … (3) 
Where μi represents the unobservable individual (cross section) heterogeneity,t 
denotes the unobservable time heterogeneity and vit is the remaining random error 
term. The first two components (μi and t) are also known as within component and 
the last vit, panel or between components. This depends upon the assumptions about 
these error components, whether they are fixed or random. Therefore, the two types 
of models, namely, fixed effects and random effects. If we assume that the μi  and t  
are fixed parameters to be estimated and the random error term, vit, is identically and 
independently distributed with zero mean and constant variance σv2 
(homoscedasticity), that is, vitIID (0, σv2), then equation (3) gives a two-way fixed 
effects error component model or simply a fixed effects model. On the other hand, if 
we assume that the μi and t are random just like the random error term, that is, μi, 
t and vit are all identically and independently distributed with zero mean and constant 
variance, or, μi IID (0, σμ2), t IID (0,2), and vit IID (0, σv2), with further 
assumptions that they are all independent of each other and of explanatory variables, 
then equation (3) gives a two-way random effects error component model or simply 
the Random Effects Model. Panel data adopted the following analytical models, 
namely, Constant coefficients (Pooled regression) models, Fixed effects models, and 
Random effects models. 
3.4 PANEL DATA ANALYTICAL MODELS 
3.4.1 The Constant Coefficients (Pooled Regression) Model 
Vijayamohanan (2016) argues that where was neither significant cross-sectional nor 
significant temporal effect, the researcher could pool all of the data and run an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model with an intercept  and slope 
coefficients s constant across companies and time. The question of the variables of 
the model exhibiting a constant correlation over time with unobserved time invariant 
heterogeneity depends upon application in mind (Bun & Sarafidis, 2013). 
  55
3.4.2 Fixed Effects Models 
According to Allison (2017), fixed effects models control for, or partial out, the effects 
of time-invariant variables with time-invariant effects. This is the case whether or not 
the variable is explicitly measured. Fixed effects models are able to handle the 
unobserved heterogeneity (Sheytanova, 2014). Nerlove (2005) argues that fixed 
effects methods omit crucial information about the relation between the explanatory 
and dependent variables. The current study sought to measure or establish a 
relationship between Dividend Policy (dependent variable) and Agency Theory 
(explanatory variable) of financial services companies listed on the JSE. Therefore, 
fixed effects models are not suited for the current study in light of its limitations. 
Furthermore, Allison (2017) asserts that fixed effects contained tow models such as 
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) and Within-groups regression model, which 
are briefly discussed below: 
3.4.2.1 Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) Model 
Pillai (2016) notes limitations with fixed effects (LSDV) model, that it hosts too many 
regressors, therefore makes the model numerically unattractive and riddled with 
multicollinearity problems. Meanwhile, the rise of regressors leads to decrease of the 
degrees of freedom, and the error variance rises, leading to Type 2 error in inference. 
Furthermore, this model is unable to identify the impact of time-invariant variables. 
Therefore, it is not suitable for the current study owing to aforementioned problems. 
3.4.2.2 Within-Groups Regression Models 
The nature of our data had some missing variables and these variables could be 
correlated with the variables in our panel regression model. Hence, the choice of fixed 
effects models that may provide a means for controlling for omitted variable bias. The 
bottom line is that whatever effects the omitted variables have on the subject at one 
time, chances are that they will have the similar effect at a later stage. As such, their 
effects will be constant, or “fixed”. However, for this to hold, the omitted variables must 
have time-invariant values with time-invariant effects. 
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3.4.3 Random Effects Models 
Bell and Jones (2015) assert that random effect is more robust than fixed effect. 
Similarly, initial studies by Western (1998) and Shor et al. (2007) concur with the 
aforementioned empirical findings. Furthermore, the Random Effect Model proved to 
be more efficient way to estimate coefficients for variables exhibiting multicollinearity. 
The data demonstrated that companies differed with regard to size, assets, leverage, 
and number of directors. To mitigate this challenge, therefore, the choice of the 
Random Effects Model was more relevant. This model has shown to be robust in 
explaining variations between companies. Similarly, Rashid and Rahman (2009), 
Nazir, Nawaz, Anwar and Ahmed (2010), Hussainey, Mgbame and Chijoke-Mgbame 
(2011) and Kahn, Aamir, Qayyum, Nasir and Kahn (2011) employed the same model 
in resolving similar challenges in similar previous studies. These are standard 
econometrics techniques used to analyse panel data: fixed and random effects. (Two 
classes of panel estimator approaches that can be employed in financial research-
fixed effects models and the Random Effects Models). However, the Random Effects 
Models have their own shortcomings. Among the limitations of random effects 
approach, is the problem of potential bias that partial pooling can impose in estimates 
of  To avoid this bias, the current study adopted the Hausman test. 
3.4.3.1 The Hausman Test 
The Hausman test helps to determine the violation of the Random Effects Modelling 
assumption that the explanatory variables are independent to the unit effects. The 
Hausman test statistic H was a measure of the difference between the two estimates:  
H = (βˆRE−βˆF E) t-1 [ Var (βˆF E) – Var (βˆRE)]-1 (βRE - βˆF E).  
Consider the null hypothesis orthogonality, H was distributed chi-square with degrees 
of freedom equal to the number of regressors in the model. According to Akit, Hamzah 
and Ahmad (2015), REM or FEM should be adopted once the data are tested with 
Hausman Fixed test. 
3.4.3.2 Monte Carlo Experiments/test 
Monte Carlo experiments/test was adopted to determine the conditions under which 
the Random Effects Model provides better estimates of β. The Monte Carlo test was 
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best suited to investigate the strength of correlation between x and the unit effects, the 
strength of association between x and y, and the amount of variation in x within units. 
Furthermore, the Monte Carlo test determined whether the majority of variation in x is 
located between units or within units.  
3.5 GENERALISED METHOD OF MOMENTS (GMM) 
The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is a statistical method that combines 
observed economic data with the information in population moment conditions to 
produce estimates of the unknown parameters of this economic model. In essence, 
the idea behind GMM estimation is that once it is impossible to solve the system of 
equations provided by the sample moment conditions, researchers can still have an 
estimate of θ that brings the sample moments as close to zero as possible. 
Bun and Sarafidis (2013) argue that panel data analysis with a small number of time 
exhibits inference challenges, such as small sample bias in coefficients estimation and 
hypothesis testing. Owing to this limitation, least squares based inference methods 
such as fixed effects or and random effects estimators are biased and inconsistent. 
To overcome this problem, the current study adopted Instrumental Variables (IV) 
methods or the GMM, which produce consistent parameter estimates. The GMM 
estimator is more robust of the two methods. Therefore, it was the relevant choice for 
the current study. Furthermore, the GMM estimation approach could provide 
asymptotically efficient inference through adopting a relatively minimal set of statistical 
assumptions (Bun & Sarafidis, 2013). Henceforth, the GMM estimator resonates with 
the current study. However, the GMM estimator has its own limitations. Therefore, the 
current study has proposed the use of alternative inference methods that require 
stringent assumptions. Among these assumptions is the mean stationarity assumption 
that underpins the system GMM estimator. 
3.6 GMM ESTIMATION MODEL 
3.6.1 The Dynamic Panel Data Model 
In this regard, the estimation of the dynamic panel data model is represented by the 
equation quoted as follows: 
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   yit = µt + β1 xit −1 + β2 yit −1 + δ1wit  + γ 1 zi + α i  + ε it 
Moral-Benito (2013) avers that parameters in the equation above can be estimated 
through maximum likelihood without differencing and any assumptions about initial 
conditions. The use of GMM estimation approach could lead to asymptotically efficient 
inference, therefore adopting a relatively minimal set of statistical assumptions. 
Therefore, GMM estimators generally are more robust than ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and two stage least squares. Moreover, Benjamin (2015) recommends the use 
of OLS to determine correlation between explanatory and dependent variables. As 
such, the OLS regression method was not preferred to determine the correlation 
between dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies listed on the 
JSE owing to its limitations. 
3.6.2 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimation Model 
Notably, maximum likelihood estimation is often used to overcome many of the 
limitations of the GMM methodology. Moral-Benito (2013) and Bai (2013) demonstrate 
that maximum likelihood estimation can be achieved by eliminating the incidental 
parameters problem, with no need for special assumptions about initial conditions. 
The following equation was used to specify the model. 
yit  = λ yit −1 + xi′t β + wi′δ + αi  + ξt  + υit  (t = 1...,T ) (i = 1,..., N) (1) 
Where 
yit is the value of y for individual i at time t 
yi0 is the initial observation of yit, treated as an exogenous variable 
xit is a vector of sequentially exogenous/predetermined time-varying variables 
wi is a vector of time-invariant, strictly exogenous variables 
αiis the unobservable time-invariant fixed effect 
ξt captures unobserved common factors across units in the panel 
υit is the time-varying error term 
Moral-Benito (2013) confirms that ML is more efficient than GMM under normality. 
Furthermore, ML are preferred to GMM counterparts with regard to finite-sample 
performance. Moral-Benito (2013), and Allison (2014) compared the panel GMM 
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estimator of Arellano-Bond (1991) with its ML counterpart and confirmed these 
findings for dynamic panel models with predetermined regressors.  
Furthermore, to carry out empirical analysis, the study adopted two main estimators, 
namely: 
 Difference GMM, as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991); and 
 System GMM estimator as advocated by (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & 
Bond, 1998). 
The study assumed dynamic linear panel data model as follows: 
yit  = βyit−1 + αi + eit  = βyit−1 + εit 
According to Calzolari and Magazzini (2013), the difference GMM estimator explores 
the assumption of lack of serial correlation in eit. Furthermore, this can be tested by 
using the Sargan / Hansen test and the test for autocorrelation of first difference 
residuals. Although, Arellano and Bond (1991) demonstrated that in Monte Carlo the 
test for serial correlation of difference residuals is more powerful than the Sargan / 
Hansen test. At the core of the current study is an investigation of a relationship 
between explanatory and dependent variables. Therefore, these tests are consistent 
with the current study. 
3.7 SEVERAL TESTS OF SPECIFICATION FOR PANEL DATA 
To ensure that estimation methods were consistent, and estimates are reliable, the 
current study employed diverse diagnostic techniques. Consequently, several tests of 
specification were undertaken. 
3.7.1 Tests to Unify FE, RE and BE Estimating Methods: Hausman Test 
Hausman test was adopted to compare estimators of the tested models. According to 
Bontempi (2015), this test unifies FE, RE and (between regression) BE estimating 
methods, therefore enabling the robust version of the Hausman test: Test H0: ξ = 0 
for individual effects uncorrelated with covariates. The researcher avoids problems in 
computing Hausman test. This allows the researcher to test for sub-sets of covariates. 
Consequently, we can simultaneously estimate the within (effect of an increase over 
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time of x) and the between (effect of differences between units of x) effects. The (θ, β) 
estimates are FE; as a bonus we have estimates of δ. Hausman test proved to be 
robust in panel data when comparing the estimates of the fixed and random models.  
3.7.2 Fixed Versus Random Effects Models; An Alternative to the Hausman 
Test 
In essence, a Hausman test was employed to contrast random and fixed effects 
(Allison, 2009). Notably, a Hausman test was not without its own challenges such as 
negative values for some data configurations. However, a likelihood ratio test could 
produce more robust statistical properties. To demonstrate this, the researcher 
estimates a fixed effects model with the Bollen and Brand data. The latent variable 
representing fixed effects was allowed in association with all the time variant 
exogenous variables. Therefore, in the Random Effects Model those correlations are 
limited to zero. Upon estimating both models, then lrtest could be adopted to contrast 
the outcomes. Consequently, in the Random Effects Model, the unobserved variables 
were assumed to be statistically independent of all the observed variables. In a fixed 
effects model, the unobserved variables were allowed to have any correlation with the 
observed variables (Allison, 2014). 
3.7.3 Test for Heteroscedasticity 
Davidson and Zinde-Walsh (2017) notes that a user-friendly method when testing 
omitted variables using Wald test. Therefore, the concept of Wald test was to estimate 
the model with and without constraint. Wald test null hypothesis assumption was that 
the coefficients of the omitted variables were equal to zero. If this test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis, then it indicates that removal of variables does not prejudice the 
fit of the model. Henceforth, a predictor with a coefficient that was relatively small to 
its standard error was considered not doing much to assist predict the dependent 
(dividend policy) variable. Both linear models and nonlinear models are susceptible to 
use Wald test. Consider the following null and alternative hypotheses in both linear 
model and nonlinear models (Davidson & Zinde-Walsh, 2017): 
H0 : R β − r = 0 
Ha : R β − r ≠ 0 
H0 : R − r = 0 
  61
Ha : R − r ≠ 0 
The current study uses research questions and secondary objectives; therefore, the 
Wald test was no longer necessary owing to its strong null hypothesis credentials.  
3.7.4 Test for Multicollinearity 
Williams (2015) cautions that a tolerance closer to one meant the bit present of 
Multicollinearity, yet a value closer to 0 suggested that Multicollinearity could be a 
problem. Adding more variables to the regression model, often minimise the precision 
of all the estimates. The greater the standard errors, the more the Multicollinearity. 
However, it should be noted that other factors besides Multicollinearity are responsible 
for the large standard errors. If the presence of high Multicollinearity is detected, then 
confidence interval for coefficients is often very wide meanwhile t-statistics are often 
very small. It becomes impossible to reject null hypothesis in the presence of 
Multicollinearity. 
To mitigate the Multicollinearity, the current study increased the sample size to thirty 
companies. Accordingly, these usually reduced standard errors, therefore make the 
results less of sampling bias. The researcher used several panel data analytical 
models from similar previous studies to overcome Multicollinearity as per the 
recommendation of (Williams, 2015). The researcher had foreign variable to determine 
its influence. However, the researcher was more than willing to drop this variable if it 
caused Multicollinearity. 
3.7.5 Panel Model with Goodness of Fit Statistics 
Brooks (2014) posits how well does the panel data regression model exhibiting the 
explanatory variables explain variations in the dependent variable. The researcher 
considered residual sum of squares (RSS) in an effort to address the question of 
goodness of fit statistics. Notably, attention was paid to OLS that selected the 
coefficient estimates that minimised this quantity. Consequently, the lower was the 
minimised value of the RSS, the better the model fitted the data. The most employed 
goodness of fit statistic by similar studies was called R2. 
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3.7.6 Poolability Test (between Pooled Regression and FE Model) 
In order to test whether the population parameters are the same across individuals, a 
pooltest tested the hypothesis (Alvarez, Barbero & Zofio, 2017). Therefore, the 
researcher wants to test the stability of the coefficients, H0: βi = β. However, the t-test 
is not sufficient to cope with this sort of hypothesis test. To overcome this limitation, 
the current study adopted an F-test. According to Brooks (2014), the F-test statistic for 
testing multiple hypotheses about the coefficient estimates is calculated as follows: 
Test statistic ൌ ோோௌௌି௎ோௌௌ௎ோௌௌ 	ݔ	
்ି௞
௠  
Where  
URSS = residual sum of squares from restricted regression  
RRSS = residual sum of squares from restricted regression  
m = number of restrictions 
T = number of observations 
k =  number of regressors in unrestricted regression including the constant 
Assume the residual sum of squares increased after the restrictions were undertaken, 
it would be concluded that the restrictions were not supported by the data and 
consequently, the hypothesis should be rejected. Alternatively stated that RRSS ≥ 
URSS. 
3.7.7 Testing Serial Correlation 
It was necessary for the current study to identify serial correlation in the error term. 
Consequently, it can bias the standard errors and causes loss of efficiency. Therefore, 
the current study tested for serial correlation in both random and fixed effects models. 
Wooldridge (2010) argues for woolserial test to be performed for the null hypothesis 
of no serial correlation in the error term of a fixed effects model. 
3.7.8 Testing Over-Identifying Restrictions: Sargan-Hansen Test  
A Sargan Hansen type test was used to test for over-identifying restrictions. This test 
further evaluates the validity of the instruments in instrumental panels. Assume the 
null hypothesis that instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, validity of the 
over-identifying restrictions, the statistic was distributed as a χ2 where r is the number 
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of over-identifying restrictions. The input of the sarganoitest function must be an 
estimation output structure from an instrumental panel. Researchers overwhelmingly 
employed difference GMM and system GMM, owing to its ability to generate 
instruments sufficiently. To determine whether the estimated model was over fitted 
with instruments, Sargan test has proven to be best suited. 
3.8 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To answer the following research questions, the researcher focused on the financial’ 
services sector of the JSE listed companies. This sector had 236 JSE listed financial 
services companies by the year-end 2016. The following questions sought to 
determine the key research objectives, that is, to determine the extent dividend-
agency relationship reconcile to reduce agency problems, and also to determine 
whether the dividend-agency relationship mitigates agency cost on the JSE listed 
financial services companies. The analysis of research questions was executed using 
EViews version 9 owing to its robust statistical analysis. The research questions are 
as follows: 
 What is the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE? 
 What role does the dividend-agency relationship of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE play in resolving agency problems? 
 What influence do the factors that underpin both agency problems and dividend 
policy of financial services companies listed on the JSE have on the 
shareholder wealth maximisation?  
Secondary data were collected from IRESS database and was further supplemented 
with annual financial reports (JSE, 2017). These data came through in shareholders’ 
analysis and shareholding data reports.  
What is the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE? 
In order to answer the first question, both shareholders’ analysis and shareholding 
data reports were key. The shareholding data report had full details of the local and 
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international companies in terms of their shareholding ownership. The challenge with 
this data was that financial services companies were not disaggregated as local or 
international; they were just mixed up. To mitigate this challenge, the researcher relied 
on shareholders’ analysis report. This report clearly disaggregated between local and 
international companies in terms of their shareholding ownership. The study covered 
a period of 12 years from 2005 until 2016. Owing to this lengthy period, some 
companies were missing. In mitigating this challenge, the researcher used annual 
financial reports (JSE, 2017). The annual financial reports were able to explain in detail 
that the missing companies were because of mergers and takeovers. Furthermore, 
critical information regarding directors’ share ownership and dividend decision was 
detailed in the annual financial statements. After addressing these data challenges, 
the researcher was able to answer the main research question. 
What role does the dividend-agency relationship of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE play in resolving agency problems? 
The Agency Theory posits that dividend-agency relationship mitigates agency cost 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Although JSE listed financial services companies 
continued to pay dividends, they consistently experienced agency cost (Steyn & 
Stainbank, 2013; Piketty, 2014). In light of this contradiction to the Agency Theory’ 
expectations, therefore, the current study sought to determine the extent to which the 
role played by dividend-agency relationship in resolving agency problems. 
What influence do the factors that underpin both agency problems and dividend 
policy of financial services companies listed on the JSE have on the shareholder 
wealth maximisation? 
The factors that underpin both dividend policy and agency problems of financial 
services companies listed on the JSE are company size, total assets, percentage 
shareholder ownership by companies, and management. The challenge observed by 
the researcher was that all sampled companies differed with regard to the mentioned 
factors. To mitigate this difficulty, the researcher ensured equal representation of 
companies. A proportional stratified sampling technique was employed to ensure 
accuracy of the statistical findings. Furthermore, King IV Report (2016) recommends 
that shareholding ownership per director should not exceed 5% in order to maintain 
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independency. However, directors vote as a block, meaning that even if the director 
owns less than 5%, once their vote goes to a pool, it becomes more influential. To 
mitigate this challenge, shareholders’ analysis report clearly disaggregates between 
the total percentage of shares owned either by directors or companies. Consequently, 
the statistical analysis was well informed of the influence of the factors 
aforementioned. Descriptive statistics were used to compare averages or means to 
determine whether wealth maximisation was influenced by the underpinned factors or 
otherwise.  
3.9 THE STUDY DESIGN 
This research design was intended to employ various measures to control systematic 
bias, confounding variables and other sources of error (Mouton, 1996:176). Zikmund 
(1997:48) defines research design as a masterpiece plan specifying the methods and 
procedures for collecting and analysing the required data. Accordingly, Hesketch and 
Laidlaw (2013) mentioned three research designs, namely, explanatory research, 
descriptive research and causal research. Explanatory research is focused on ‘why’ 
questions and it was irrelevant for the current study. Essentially, descriptive research 
was more concerned with the relationship between two variables, in this instance 
dividend-agency relationship. Therefore, descriptive research design was relevant in 
answering the main research question that sought to investigate the relationship 
between dividend policy and agency problems (dependent and independent variable). 
3.10 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY AND APPROACH 
Quantitative research is generally associated with objective reality especially when 
used with predetermined and highly structured data collection techniques (Saunders 
et al., 2012). In this regard, the secondary data were collected without the involvement 
of the researcher. Therefore, it fits the description of objective reality. Positivism 
prefers collecting data about an observable reality and search for regularities and 
causal relationships in your data to create law-like generalisations like those produced 
by researchers (Gill & Johnson, 2010). As a result, management’s dividend decision 
and its relationship with agency problems resonate with the concept of positivism. 
Quantitative research is usually associated with a deductive approach, where the 
focus is on using data to test or confirm theoretical assertions (Saunders et al., 2012). 
  66
In this study, dividend policy and the Agency Theory were used to guide and inform 
the formulation of research questions, the collection and analysis of data. Against this 
backdrop, this was referred to as deductive research (Gill & Johnson, 2010).  
The process of deductive research was often associated with quantitative research 
and involves examining relationships between variables (dividend-agency variables), 
which are measured numerically and analysed using a range of statistical techniques. 
In this study, the deductive process was closely associated with confirming 
assumption theories that guided the development of research questions (Creswell, 
2015). It is in the nature of quantitative research designs to give clear and 
unambiguous results about causal relationships, which this study hopes to achieve 
(Marx, 2004). This characteristic of quantitative research design was critical in the 
current study, considering that the secondary objectives are focusing on a cause effect 
relationship to determine the extent to which dividend and agency theories reconcile, 
to achieve the goal of shareholders’ wealth maximisation. Furthermore, if the 
alignment of management interests to that of the company owners was achieved, does 
this resolve agency problems of JSE listed financial services companies? The 
generalisability of findings and external validity of quantitative research are based on 
large statistical sample across several companies in this regard 236 JSE listed 
financial services sector (Creswell, 2015). 
3.11 THE STUDY VARIABLES 
To address the research questions and objectives of the study, the researcher 
considered dependent and independent variables that can be tested and measured to 
confirm theoretical assumptions of dividend-agency relationship.  
3.11.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are dividend payout ratio measured by dividends per share 
divided by earnings per share and dividend yield measured by dividends per share 
divided by the price of the stock. 
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3.11.2 Independent Variables 
Company Size represents the total assets owned by the company and measured by 
the natural log of total assets. This is in accordance with many other studies, including, 
Sharma (2011), Adjaoud and Ben Amir (2010), Akhigbe and Whyte (2012), and 
Thanatawee (2013). Certainly, the current study had as its objective determine what 
influence do the factors that underpin both agency problems and dividend policy of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE have on the shareholder wealth 
maximisation?. The extent of the size of the company influences the payment of 
dividends thereby aligning the interests of management to that of the company 
owners. Notably, the study observed with great interest the results between the 
smaller and bigger companies on this variable. This is possible because the population 
for the study consists of companies with a variation in their sizes. It is generally 
presumably that larger companies are more often than not subject to greater agency 
problems. Therefore, this variable is very relevant to be scientifically tested and put 
the assumption to rest. International studies have identified a positive relationship 
between the natural log of total assets and dividend payout (Adjaoud & Ben-Amir, 
2010; Warrad, Abed, Khriasat & Al-Shiekh, 2012; Thanatawee, 2013). 
Institutional Ownership, such as hedge funds, insurance companies and mutual 
funds measured by the percentage of stock held by institutions, could have a negative 
or positive relationship with dividend payout ratio, depending upon whether 
institutional ownership serves as substitutes for dividends, reducing agency problems 
or they are non-responsive to agency problems of financial services companies listed 
on the JSE. 
In a study, focusing on bank holding companies, Wen and Jia (2010) found that 
institutional ownership is negatively related to dividend yield and this was also the case 
for insurance companies and hedge funds companies. These findings seek to confirm 
the theoretical assumption that institutional ownership mitigates agency problems 
thereby aligning management interests to that of the company owners. However, Khan 
(2006) reports a positive relationship between insurance companies’ ownership 
concentration and dividend payout ratio. Meanwhile, Fama and French (2001:3) 
underscore that the declining propensity to pay dividends could be explained by the 
changing characteristics such as the size of the company, return on assets and the 
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upholding of corporate governance principles by publicly listed companies. It is worth 
noting that the declining propensity to pay dividends differ from country to country as 
highlighted above in the case of South Africa. In line with Fama and French (2001), 
Denis and Osobov (2008) and Fatemi and Bildik (2012:662) also found that non-
payers tend to be newly listed, smaller and less profitable companies with fewer 
investment opportunities available to them (as measured by asset growth rates), 
compared with dividend payers. Notably, these findings cut across developed and 
developing countries and further confirm that companies live in a global village despite 
their locally unique landscape. 
Cash Flows are frequently used to determine the relationship with dividends. As such, 
Amidu and Abor (2006), Gill, Biger and Tibrewala (2010) contend that this variable is 
the major determinant of dividend policy; hence its choice for this study. Furthermore, 
the Agency Theory advocates a positive relationship between dividend payout ratio 
and company cash flows. In light of this theoretical assumption, the objective of the 
study is to determine the dividend-agency relationship of financial institutions listed on 
the JSE. 
Financial Leverage indicates the level of a company indebtedness measured by total 
liabilities divided by total assets. Agency theory asserts that companies should pay 
out high dividends therefore, reducing cash flows available to management. 
Accordingly, this will force the company to borrow funds from the markets to finance 
its investments. As a result, an investigation into the relationship between leverage 
and dividend is relevant for the current study. To determine the relationship between 
leverage and dividends, Al Shabibi and Ramesh (2011) conducted a study in United 
Kingdom and found no significant relationship between the mentioned variables. 
However, Al-Kuwari (2009) found strong negative correlation between leverage and 
the dividend payout ratio. The divergence of statistical findings on the aforementioned 
variables necessitates that we investigate the relationship of these variables in South 
Africa listed financial services companies for the period 2005-2016.  
Profitability, the dividend policy decision to pay dividends starts with company profits. 
Therefore, company owners, creditors and management pay close attention to 
company profits given its role in attracting capital and external investors. Amidu and 
Abor (2006), Anil and Kapoor (2008) conducted empirical studies in which they have 
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used profitability in order to determine the relationship with company’s dividend payout 
ratio. These studies found a positive relationship between profitability and dividend 
payout ratio, which meant that companies with high profits tend to payout more 
dividends. However, in this study profitability will be used to determine its influence 
when it is used as a substitute for bonus dividends, whether it does mitigate agency 
problems. Certainly, there are various measures of profitability (Gitman et al. 2014). 
Gill et al. (2010) used EBIT / Total assets as a measurement of profit. Meanwhile, Al-
Kuwari (2009) used ROE (Net profit / Equity) as a measurement of profits. The current 
study on dividend payout ratio, hence the choice of ROE. 
Foreign is a measure of the percentage of foreign ownership (Manos, 2002). The 
developed countries often hold stock of developing countries as part of long-term 
investment strategy (Glen, Karmokolias, Miller & Shah, 1995). Therefore, this 
suggests a negative relation between Foreign and the payout ratio (Manos, 2002). 
The Agency Theory postulates that the present of foreign control in a local company 
brings forth monitoring hence lesser need for the dividend induced monitoring device. 
Contrary to Manos’ findings (2002), Cavda and Aydin (2015) found a significant 
positive association with the dividend payout ratio at 5% significance level. Based on 
these findings, it means that the higher the foreign ownership in the local company, 
the higher will be dividend payment. 
CEO Ownership is measured by the percentage of stock owned by the CEO. It is 
predicted to be negatively related to dividends. This means that the higher the CEO 
ownership steak, the lower the dividend payout ratio. Executive stock ownership may 
serve as an important device in reducing agency friction in situations in which 
information asymmetries prevent the board from effectively monitoring the company’s 
cash management and capital spending activities (Williams, 2015; Haye, 2014). 
Explanatory research design is more relevant in creating hypotheses while the causal 
research determines the causal effect relationship through an experiment. For the 
current study, descriptive and causal researches are more relevant as the study 
employed quantitative approach and used secondary data. Descriptive research was 
used to determine the relationship between payout ratio (dependent variable) and any 
of the independent variables such as institutional or insider ownership. To help carry 
out the secondary objectives, the study has employed causal relationship in order to 
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determine if the relationship between the variables from two theories is positive, if so 
does it increase the shareholder wealth. Alternatively, if the relationship is negative 
does it reduce the shareholder wealth? 
3.12 DATA COLLECTION 
The research questions were empirically answered using secondary data collected 
from IRESS database, supplemented with information from profile stock exchange 
handbook for the period 2015. Justification for the use of annual report and financial 
statements from IRESS database is that these financial statements are audited and 
standardised. All the downloaded data were captured in MS Excel spreadsheet and 
further imported into statistical packages EViews version 9 for robust analysis 
purposes. The collected data included the companies’ names, the JSE Code, the 
percentage shareholding by directors, the percentage shareholding by institutions, 
payout ratios, and total assets, and total liabilities, earnings per share, net profit, and 
notes where companies might have changed names. To normalise data, ensuring that 
it is comparable between the different companies, the following variables were 
calculated for each company (Steyn & Stainbank, 2013): 
 Profits attributable to ordinary shareholders as a percentage of total assets; and 
 Directors’ remuneration as a percentage of total assets. 
Furthermore, annual reports from the Internet were obtained to further supplement the 
data and also used to verify data to ensure accuracy. Cooper and Schindler (2014) 
defined secondary data as textbooks, handbooks, newspaper articles, sales analysis 
summaries, and investor annual reports. The study employed secondary data 
considered to be very objective in that the researcher was not party in its collection. 
According to Marx (2004), the higher objectivity and reliability as pre-defined statistical 
and mathematical analysis techniques was an advantage of using quantitative 
research to ensure credible findings. 
Although the annual report, to those who are outside the company was viewed as a 
primary source because it represents the official position of the corporation (Cooper & 
Schindler, 2014). Quantitative research was ideal for a study that aims at generalising 
the findings within the financial services companies and data were as objective as 
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possible (Terre Blanche, Durrheim & Painter, 2011). This is what this study strives to 
achieve. Henceforth, quantitative research was more relevant to be used in this 
regard. 
3.13 CLEANING THE DATA SET AND TARGET POPULATION 
In some instances, companies appeared twice in the IRESS database. As such, we 
had to double-check the data using annual reports and delete the repeated 
companies. At some stage during financial period, companies changed their names 
and others merged. Therefore, annual reports of these companies were used to verify 
data ensuring accuracy. The population was made up of financial services companies 
listed on the JSE and delisted companies were identified through cleansing period and 
were removed from the data. Although some companies were suspended by the JSE, 
they remained operational, therefore, they were included in the sample frame. The 
main reason for delisting of companies was bankruptcy as per annual reports. For the 
purpose of this study, there was no need to conduct interviews to further supplement 
the secondary data at hand. The companies under the financial services sector had 
some common defining characteristics, therefore constituted target population as 
defined by Creswell (2014). Accordingly, in this research, the target population refers 
to the entire 236 financial’ services sector companies listed on the JSE as of 2016. 
3.14 DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE 
The study adopted descriptive statistics measures of tendency to determine dividend-
agency relationship of JSE listed firms for the period 2005-2016. In addition, the White 
cross-section method was employed owing to its robustness to cross-equation 
correlation and heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, to correct for heteroscedasticity and 
general correlation observations within a cross-section, the study employed 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model. Similarly, Vo and Nguyen (2014) 
employed SUR model to address similar statistical challenges. In response to the 
problem of non-stationarity, the current study employed Co-integration analysis to 
resolve spurious statistical findings. This study adopts panel EGLS (Cross-section 
weights) regression model to provide answers to the research questions and 
objectives. According to Bruderl (2005), panel data further reduces the collinearity 
among the independent variables and increases the precision of the regression model. 
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Furthermore, panel data allow the control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. The 
multiple linear correlation regression analysis was used to examine dividend-agency 
relationship. Owing to SPSS’ limitations on econometrics modelling, EViews version 
9 was employed to perform statistical analysis. Descriptive statistics was more 
relevant for the study to help determine dividend-agency relationship and answer 
research questions. 
The current study took cure from similar previous studies that employed diverse panel 
data techniques to analyse their data, therefore, adequately responded to the research 
questions and objectives. A highlight of such studies are captured as per the Table 
3.1. The various statistical techniques used ensured robust statistical findings, which 
the current study hope to achieve. The dynamics of data limitations forced the 
researcher to drop some of panel data statistical techniques, such as OLS regression 
and random effect. As such, this study turned to be slightly different from other 
previous studies, even though it had employed similar panel data statistical 
techniques. To mitigate the limitation challenges for the current study, Table 3.1, 
brought forth multifaceted panel data statistical techniques to guide study to robust 
findings.  
Table 3.1: Panel data studies that determine relationship between variables 
Author(s) Estimation Method(s) 
Olufawoye, Iyoha & Izedenmi (2017) Panel Data regression & FE 
Chemilo & Kiprop (2017) Panel data regression analysis 
Brown & Roberts (2016) OLS Regression & Tobit Model 
Akit, Hamzah & Ahmad (2015) Pooled OLS Regression, RE, & FE 
ENG, Yahya and Hadi (2013) GMM, & RE 
Ehikioya (2015) OLS Regression 
Guizani & Kouki (2012) OLS Regression, RE, & FE 
Hong Vo & Nguyen (2014) Two Stage Least Square (2SLS),  
Three Stage Least Square (3SLS), Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR)  
Aydin & Cavdar (2015) Standard OLS 
Nnadi, Wogboroma, & Kabel (2013) Tobit Model 
De Wet & Mpinda (2013) Pooled OLS Regression, RE, & FE 
Sakinc & Gungor (2015) Panel data regression analysis 
 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
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Panel data analytical techniques estimation models highlighted from the Table 3.1 
studies underscored the methodology employed to ensure reliability and consistency 
with similar previous studies. The study focused on all sub-sectors of the financial’ 
services sector companies called cross sectional analysis. Furthermore, the study 
time frame covered 12 years from 2005 to 2016, therefore, time series analysis. This 
period was informed by the promulgation of dividend legislation, which became 
applicable from 01 April 2012. The study sets out to determine trends prior and post 
the implementation of the aforementioned dividends legislation. Notably, all 
companies differed based on the following factors: company size, leverage, total 
assets, percentage of stock ownership by management and by other companies. To 
mitigate this effect, proportional stratified sampling model was used. Similarly, Nawaz, 
and Ahmad and Javid (2010), Hussainey, Mgbame and Chijoke-Mgbame (2011), 
Kahn, AaMir, Qayyum, Nasir and Kahn (2011) adopted the proportional stratified 
sampling model to address the similar challenges. Similarly, the current study adopted 
proportional stratified sampling model as a sampling technique to ensure equal 
representation. 
Similar previous studies also adopted panel data regression analysis (Steyn & 
Stainbank, 2013; Huda & Abdullah, 2014; Ahmed, 2014; Deysel & Kruger, 2015). All 
these studies dealt with a relationship between variables. Therefore, the current study 
adopted panel data so that the results are comparable with other findings. 
Consequently, the EViews was used to measure the extent to which a correlation 
analysis present in one variable is presented by a variance in another variable to 
ensure comprehensive analysis. To determine correlation between dependent and 
explanatory variables, Pearson’s correlation matrix was adopted in a similar study 
(Huda & Abdullah, 2014). According to Osegbue, Ifurueze and Ifurueze (2014), 
Durbin-Watson autocorrelation statistics was employed in similar previous study to 
determine the presence of serial or autocorrelation. Meanwhile, Asteriou and Hall 
(2011) argue for the use of Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) method in 
determining autocorrelation. The problem of multicollinearity in explanatory variables 
on similar previous studies was detected through correlation and coefficient variation 
statistics. 
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However, the current study employed panel data regression and the cross section 
time analysis to provide answers to the research questions raised. The motivation to 
use panel data allowed the control for variables that cannot be observed or measured 
like differences in business practices across sub sectors within financial’ services 
sector of companies listed on the JSE. Furthermore, panel data allowed the control of 
variables that change over time but not across companies; for example, national 
policies and government regulations (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Consequently, panel data 
accounted for companies’ individual heterogeneity, henceforth, ensuring robust 
results. 
To describe variables, descriptive statistics test provided the central tendency, 
variability and relative standing measures to answer research questions and 
hypotheses expectations (Creswell, 2014). Measures of central tendency were used 
to describe trends in independent variables through the use of mean, mode, median, 
therefore, indicating general tendencies in the data (Creswell, 2014). Saunders et al. 
(2016) argue that in a time series study, trends could also be calculated using time 
analysis. As a result, this found resonance with the current study. Measures of 
variability, namely, variance, standard deviation, and range were used to compare the 
spread of scores with other studies. A bar graph can be used to further demonstrate 
the frequency of occurrence as determined by the length of each bar (Saunders et al., 
2016). To answer the main research question: What is the relationship between 
dividend policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the 
JSE? Inferential statistics were used to analyse data from the financial services sector 
sample to draw conclusions about an unknown entire JSE financials population. A 
sampling technique is described below to assist in answering the main research 
question. 
3.15 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
Creswell (2014) defines a sample as a subgroup of the target population and the 
current study plans to generalise its findings, in this regard within the financial services 
sector. Meanwhile, Cooper and Schindler (2014) argue that sampling was necessary 
to achieve greater accuracy of results and greater speed of data collection, hence the 
reason sampling was done for the current study. The financial services sector consists 
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of a number of sub-sectors: banks, insurance companies, investment companies, 
investment entities, life assurance companies, real estate, and companies offering 
specialty and other financial services, investment banks that provide a range of 
specialist financial services, stockbrokers, institutional providers of mortgages and 
mortgage insurance and financial holding companies (Muller, Firer & Viviers, 2013). 
This study sought to test associations between dividend-agency relationship, 
therefore, place a considerable emphasis on large sample size. As a rule, the larger 
the sample size the more accurate the findings and the lower the likely error in 
generalising to the population within financial services sector (Saunders et al., 2012). 
In proportionate sampling, each stratum was properly represented so that the sample 
size drawn from the stratum was proportionate to the stratum’s share of the total 
population (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). The financial services sector, which was the 
target population, consists of sub-sectors and these sub-sectors represent study 
strata. The characteristics of the stratum reflected an imbalance, as some are bigger 
than others; hence, the use of proportionate stratified sampling to ensure that each 
stratum was proportionately represented. This approach has higher statistical 
efficiency than a simple random sample. In support of this sampling technique, Cooper 
and Schindler (2014) further argue that this approach was much easier to carry out 
than other stratifying methods. 
To determine the sample size, a confidence level of 95% was required for the data to 
ensure that the collected data were representative of the characteristics of the total 
population. Furthermore, 5% was considered the margin of error the study can tolerate 
for accuracy. In line with Stutely’s (2003) advice of a minimum sample of 30 was 
adopted for the study to ensure a normal distribution. Similarly, Creswell (2014) argues 
for a minimum sample size of 30 for a correlational study that relates variables. 
Therefore, this was consistent with the current study. Furthermore, minimum sample 
population was necessary to ensure generalisability of the findings within financial 
services sector. As demonstrated in Table 3.2, Creswell (2014) provides the following 
procedure employed for calculating a proportional stratified sampling: 
 Divide the population by the stratum, this led to a fraction;  
 The researcher decided to record only three digits after the decimal point; 
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 Sampling within each group in the stratum by multiplying fraction and minimum 
sample size, to ensure proportional representation in the total population; and 
 Some of the proportional representation figures were captured as fraction, 
which total up to up to a minimum sample of 30. 
Table 3.2: Formula employed to calculate stratified proportional representation 
Sub-sectors/Strata Stratum / Population 
Fraction x Minimum 
sample = proportional 
representation 
Banks  = 7 7/236 = 0.029 0.02966 x 30 = 1 
Financial services  = 27 27/236 = 0.114 0.1144 x 30 = 3.4 
Asset managers  = 7 7/236 = 0.029 0.02966 x 30 = 1 
Investment services  = 8 8/236 = 0.034 0.03390 x 30 = 1 
Speciality Finance  = 10 10/236 = 0.042 0.04237 x 30 = 1 
Insurance  = 8 8/236 = 0.034 0.03390 x 30 = 1 
Life insurance  = 9  9/236 = 0.038 0.03814 x 30 = 1 
Equity Investments  = 11 11/236 = 0.047 0.04661 x 30 = 1 
Real Estate  = 49 49/236 = 0.208 0.2076 x 30 = 6.2 
Real estate investment &  
services  = 17 
17/236 = 0.072 0.07203 x 30 = 2.2 
Real estate holding &  
development  = 17 
17/236 = 0.072 0.07203 x 30 = 2.2 
Real estate investment  
trusts  = 33 
33/236 = 0.139 0.1398 x 30 = 4 
Diversified reits  = 13  13/236 = 0.055 0.05508 x 30 = 2  
Industrial reits  = 6 6/236 = 0.025 0.02542 x 30 = 0.8 or 1 
Retail reits  = 14  14/236 = 0.059 0.05932 x 30 = 1.8 or 2 
Financials population  = 236  Minimum sample = 30 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
As a result of proportional sampling technique adopted in Table 3.2, proportional 
representation of companies per sector might appear as a fraction. In such instances, 
if a fraction is 0.5 or above, we rounded off the number to one. However, if a fraction 
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is below 0.5, we did not round off. Therefore, the figure is captured as a fraction. The 
whole list of 236 financial services companies that form the target population was 
attached as a Table 3.2.1, under appendix A. 
Model Specification: Based upon the gathered data, the theoretical model was 
tested by means of available research statistical methods (Regression analysis, 
Cluster analysis, Structural equation modeling, advanced Time Series, Multivariate 
data analysis, among many others). Depending on the significance level of the tested 
models, therefore, theoretical assumptions are confirmed or rejected (Moser, Sauer & 
Xu, 2014). 
The following Multi Linear Regression Equation was modeled after several 
researchers’ work (Manos, 2002; Said 2013; Huda & Abdullah, 2014). 
DIVit = βo - β1 INSTi-t - β2 DIRSi-t + β3 SIZEi-t - β4 FOREIGNi-t + β5LEVi-t  
   + β6 ROEi-t + β7PROFi-t - β8 CASHi-t + εi-t 
Where: 
βo  is the intercept 
εit is composite stochastic error term 
β1 is the regression coefficient 
i  the subscript represents different companies 
t  represents different years 
In line with the Agency Theory as articulated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
numerous measurements and proxies were employed to determine dividend-agency 
relationship. A series of similar previous studies are highlighted in this Table 3.3, which 
adopted similar measurements and proxies like the current study. The utilisation of 
these measurements and proxies provides consistency and reliability in determining 
dividend-agency relationship. Consequently, this will allow comparison of findings with 
other previous similar studies that adopted same measurements to determine 
relationship between dependent and indepent variables. 
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Table 3.3: Variables, proxies and measurement formulars 
Dependent 
variable Definition Measurement 
Cash Cash Flow Current ratio used by Olufawoye, Iyoha and Izedonmi 
(2017) 
Prof Profitability ROA, EPS after tax used by Ali, Azam, Shehzadi, Tahir 
and Ullah (2016) 
Lev Leverage / Debt 
ratio 
Total liabilities / total assets used by Al Malkawi (2007) 
and used by Olufawoye, Iyoha and Izedonmi (2017) 
INST Institutional 
ownership 
Percentage of shares held by insurance firm, hedge 
funds, mutual funds 
Foreign Foreign Percentage of foreign ownership 
DIRS Directors Percentage of share held by directors. Used by Al 
Malkawi (2007) 
SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of book value of total assets 
ROE Return on Equity Net profit/Share holders’ equity 
DIV Dividends Payout ratio 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
From Table 3.3 depicted the use of cash flow to measure agency cost between 
dependant and independent variables (Olufawoye, Iyoha & Izedonmi, 2017). Similarly, 
the current study adopted cash flow as part of the proxies to measure agency cost 
between dividend-agency relationship. A performance measure return on equity 
(ROA) was used to measure agency cost, in this regard between dividend-agency 
relationship (Ali, Azam, Shehzadi, Tahir & Ullah, 2016). The current study provides a 
point of departure from similar previous studies by adopting foreign and institutional 
ownership measurements. This makes the study to be slightly unique from other 
similar previous studies. 
3.16 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE FINDINGS 
Bryman and Bell (2011) define validity as proper measurements chosen for the study 
and well aligned to achieve the study objectives; in this regard to investigate the 
relationship between dividend-agency variables. Meanwhile, Saunders et al. (2016) 
report that validity demonstrated the extent to which the measurements are correct 
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and the research outcomes are truthful. Creswell (2014) cautions that there are two 
potential threats to validity, namely, threats to internal validity and threats to external 
validity. 
3.17 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter focused on the panel data methodology and the study design to achieve 
its research objectives. Panel data regression analyses were employed to ensure 
robust results. The panel data models enhanced the quantity and quality of data far 
better than any other methodology for the current study. The panel regression analysis 
took control of individual heterogeneity, therefore, confirming that JSE listed financial 
services companies are heterogeneous. To test the relationship between variables, 
this chapter discussed dependent and explanatory variables, as well as several tests 
for panel data. Panel data also ensured less collinearity among variables. GMM 
models and GMM estimation model were discussed on how to control the impact of 
omitted variables. In order to address the problems of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, this chapter adopted panel data econometric analysis. In addition, 
GMM models were employed in this chapter to control heteroscedasticity and 
normality owing to its robustness. The last component adopted in this chapter was the 
study design. In this chapter, dividend policy and the Agency Theory informed the 
development of research questions. This chapter has employed research design that 
ensures validity and reliability through the quantitative approach. This chapter 
specified methods and procedures for analysing quantitative data therefore, 
answering the research questions. 
In Chapter 4, several tests for panel data and confirmation of statistical results will be 
examined and compared with other previous findings from similar studies. 
Furthermore, Chapter 4 provides scientific results to research questions using 
research statistical package EViews version 9 to perform statistical analysis to 
determine dividend-agency relationship between variables. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS OF FINANCIALS’ SECTOR ANALYSIS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter builds upon the previous chapters and mainly seeks to answer research 
questions, using EViews version 9 to perform regression statistical analysis. The 
choice of EViews for data analysis was motivated by its robustness ability and user-
friendly approach. Essentially, the previous chapter adopted panel data methodology 
and study design in order to answer research problem through research questions, in 
order to achieve research objectives. The previous chapter through its panel data 
models and several statistical tests provided tools to determine the extent of dividend-
agency relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
This chapter applied research instruments from the previous chapter to determine 
dividend-agency relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
Furthermore, this chapter conducted several tests to confirm or reject assumption 
theories’ expectations, as well as test statistic. This chapter presents statistical 
analyses results, discusses empirical findings and juxtaposes with similar previous 
studies. In line with Saunders’ et al. (2016) assertion that for reporting, tables, and 
statistics were adopted to explore, present, describe, and examine dividend-agency 
relationships. Essentially, this chapter presents the findings, thereby answering the 
research questions and achieves the study objectives. To determine dividend-agency 
relationship, the study had to answer the primary research question. What is the 
relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE? The research question arose owing to contradictory 
empirical findings that confirmed the existence of dividend-agency problems. 
Notwithstanding, dividend policy assertion that if a company pay dividends, then it 
resolves agency problems (Easterbrook, 1984). 
The rest of the chapter covers the following subtopics: Section 4.2 presents descriptive 
statistics, which covers the central measures of tendency. Section 4.3 presents 
correlation matrx analysis to determine the dividend-agency relationship between 
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variables. Section 4.4 presents panel unit root test results, therefore determine 
stationarity of data. Section 4.5 presents the analytical procedure. Meanwhile section 
4.6 presents regression results. Section 4.7 concluded the chapter. 
4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analysis were performed using 
EViews statistical version 9 package. This was in line with similar previous studies, 
which had similar choice of statistical software package (Aydin & Cavdar, 2015). The 
central measures of tendency namely, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum values of the variables were captured in Table 4.1. The latter contains 
group descriptive statistics of the variables for the period 2005-2016. Where CASH 
stands for cash flow, DIRS stands for directors, DIV represents dividend payout ratio, 
FOREIGN represents foreign companies, INST represents hedge funds, insurance 
companies, mutual funds etc. LEV represents level of company indebtedness, PROF 
represents company profits, ROE represents return on equity, SIZE represents 
companies’ size. The results from Table 4.1 are analysed subsequently per 
aforementioned variables. 
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Table 4.1: Group descriptive statistics of the variables 2005-2016 
VARIABLES CASH DIRS DIV FOREIGN INST LEV PROF ROE SIZE 
Mean 1.781239 28.69266 0.546935 4.374352 65.31026 2631864. 0.038488 0.178283 15.41317 
Median 0.953927 32.61850 0.361959 2.683600 59.17870 210176.8 0.025988 0.107027 15.72577 
Maximum 118.9189 52.55060 3.471248 23.12280 99.49630 49911815 5.558751 33.39196 20.86103 
Minimum 0.000000 0.415200 -3.500000 0.000000 43.40450 219.1767 -1.770588 -15.51657 7.601402 
Std. Dev. 6.789046 13.62915 0.577076 5.103651 15.74453 7626875. 0.350382 2.265426 2.607769 
Skewness 15.52382 -0.419562 -1.252515 1.512615 0.647143 3.987876 11.05559 9.105808 -0.360682 
Kurtosis 265.7546 2.259628 16.58768 5.647516 2.276539 19.06388 187.3763 151.0406 3.021620 
Jarque-Bera 980055.1 17.53193 2672.602 226.2590 30.77999 4503.250 482769.3 311467.6 7.291651 
Probability 0.000000 0.000156 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.026100 
Sum 598.4963 9640.735 125.2903 1469.782 21944.25 8.84E+08 12.93189 59.90308 5178.825 
Sum Sq. Dev. 15440.53 62227.47 111.5607 8725.831 83043.27 1.95E+16 41.12718 1719.272 2278.154 
          
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
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Table 4.1 demonstrated that companies on the JSE under the financial services sector 
on average experienced dividend payout ratio (DIV) of 54.69% mean ranging from 
minimum (min) -3.5000 to maximum (max) 3.4712. This implies that the majority of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE practice dividend decision. Notably, 
this practice is well entrenched, considering gradual improvement from negative range 
of min -3.5000 to positive range of max 3.4712 over a period of 12 years (2005-2016). 
It can be noted that these findings are in line with results reported by (Piketty, 2014). 
In South Africa, dividend legislation became applicable for the first time from 01 April 
2012, therefore negative range (min -3.5000) to some extent elucidates the period 
prior dividend regime. The results were consistent with other South African studies 
that had confirmed that JSE listed financial services companies do pay dividends 
(Muller, Firer & Viviers, 2013). Bird in the hand sub-theory postulates that dividends 
received today are less risky than future value, as confirmed by (Monogbe & Ibrahim, 
2015). This is further confirmed by high average payment of dividend payout of 
54.69%. 
From Table 4.1, it can be observed that ownership stake on JSE listed financial 
services companies by FOREIGN companies had an average mean of 4.3743 ranging 
from min 0.000 to max 23.1228, implying that ever since the application of dividend 
regime JSE listed financial services companies enjoyed improved business 
confidence to a maximum of 23.1228. This implied that local business enjoyed foreign 
confidence from business counterpart of almost 5%. Furthermore, this meant that 
foreign companies exert minimum corporate governance principles on local 
companies. The involvement of foreign companies locally boosts investor confidence 
and further improves corporate governance. Consequently, this forces management 
to align their interest to that of the shareholders, therefore maximises shareholder 
wealth. 
Table 4.1 depicts that companies’ directors (DIRS), inclusive of both executive and 
non-executive directors was calculated as percentage of shares held by directors. 
According to Table 4.1, DIRS on average had a mean of 28.6926 ranging from min 
0.41520 to max 52.5506, implying a very robust dividend policy practice by JSE listed 
companies under the financial services sector. Agency theory argues that there is no 
need to pay dividends to directors, rather use institutional ownership (INST) as 
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substitutes. The findings are contrary to the Agency Theory, in that even though INST 
was used as substitute JSE listed companies carried on incentivising their directors. 
This meant that despite the use of INST, JSE listed financial services companies 
incurred agency costs.  
According to Table 4.1, the formula applied to measure the institutional ownership 
(INST) was calculated as a percentage of shares held by other companies. As such, 
Table 4.1 demonstrates that on average, INST had a mean of 65.3102 ranging from 
min 43.4045 to max 49.9118. This implies a very high volume of business between 
local companies listed on the JSE. Notably, institutional shareholding was twice the 
number of share ownership by directors a good sign of company dominance over the 
directors’ influence. However, the Agency Theory posits that INST can be used to 
discipline management, therefore, align their interest to that of the shareholders. As 
such, there is no need for incentivising directors to incur agency costs. The results are 
contrary to the Agency Theory’s assertions as directors carried on being incentivised 
despite the use of INST as substitutes. Therefore, it can be inferred from the current 
results that dividends payments did not align the interest of managers to that of the 
shareholders.  
In Table 4.1, cash flow (CASH) on average had a mean of 1.7812 ranging from min 
0.0000 to max 118.918, implying positive availability of cash to management. Agency 
Theory has argued against the availability of cash to management because this 
contributes to agency problems. Consequently, these findings confirmed that JSE 
listed financial services companies do pay dividends; yet they experienced agency 
problems. Financial LEVERAGE was measured by total liabilities divided by total 
assets. On average, it had a mean of 26.319, ranging from min 219.1767 to max 49. 
912. This implies a high volume of indebtedness of financial services companies listed 
on the JSE. The findings are in line with the Agency Theory’s assertion that the use of 
debt mitigates agency costs. The Agency Theory advocates the use of debt as a 
management tool to reign in management to follow corporate governance principles 
because creditors monitor them. Even though the financial services companies listed 
on the JSE incurred agency costs in the form of dividends payments, it was, however, 
significantly reduced. Consistent with the current results is Thanatawee (2014) who 
found similar results between dividend payout and leverage. 
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Table 4.1 applied the formula return on assets to measure Profitability (PROF). From 
Table 4.1, descriptive statistic on average PROF had a mean of 4.48% ranging from 
min -1.771 to max 5.558. This implies improvement on profits from negative to a 
positive value (maximum 5.559). This meant that JSE listed companies can attract 
capital and foreign investors thus foreign investments had shown a maximum of 
23.123. Furthermore, this meant that companies under the financial’ services sector 
on the JSE can enter into dividend decision henceforth, staggering dividend payout 
ratio of 54.69%. The current findings demonstrated a positive relationship between 
dividends and profitability. This implied that as JSE companies under the financial’ 
services sector showed improved results, they then pay dividends, and this is in 
tandem with the Agency Theory assertion.  
Table 4.1 applied the formula net profit divided by shareholders’ equity to measure 
Return on equity (ROE). On average, ROE had a mean of 17.83% ranging from min -
15.5165 to max 33.3919. This implies an improvement from a negative to a positive 
(max 33.3919). This was a positive indicator for company performance of JSE listed 
companies under financial services sector. Once more, an observed negative min of -
15.516 to some extent reinforced the assertion that dividend regime came to play only 
from the 01 April 2012. This demonstrates a consistent negative performance of equity 
prior the dividend regime. Furthermore, the results demonstrated a very robust 
dividend practice by JSE listed companies under the financial services sector. 
Table 4.1 adopted the formula natural logarithm of book value of total assets to 
measure Companies (SIZE). From Table 4.1, it can be shown that on average, 
company SIZE had a mean of 15.4131, ranging from min 7.6014 to max 20.8610. This 
implies that a total asset value of 15.4131 determined the market capitalisation of max 
20.8610 for the financial services companies listed on the JSE. The Agency Theory 
postulates that company SIZE influences the payment of dividends. This assertion can 
be confirmed through growth rate from min 7.6014 to max 20.8610. Therefore, a 
dividend payout ratio 54.69% as demonstrated by Table 4.1. Furthermore, the 
regression equation for the current study expected a positive sign for the company 
size variable as per the Agency Theory’s assertion, and the current results concur with 
the Agency Theory’s assertion. 
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Table 4.1.1 provides individual companies’ descriptive statistics further demonstrating 
the central measures of tendency per company. The analysis of the individual 
companies as per Table 4.1.1 was conducted per individual variables: CASH FLOW, 
DIV, FOREIGN and INST ownership respectively. Individual companies had the 
highest mean of 14. 5955 on cash flow ranging from min 0.0000 to max 13.4663. This 
was consistent with the group descriptive statistics findings in that individual 
companies listed on the JSE demonstrated positive cash flows availability. This 
implied that JSE listed companies under the financial services sector are experiencing 
agency problems, despite the use of substitutes such as INST and the payment of 
dividends as incentives.  
From Table 4.1.1, it is observed that quite a number of companies kept cash flow at 
0.000000. This is in line with the Agency Theory that encourages companies to 
minimise cash availability, therefore, reducing agency cost (Jensen, 1986). However, 
it should be noted that on average, the majority of companies had a mean of 14.5955. 
This contradicted the Agency Theory, which had argued that the use of substitutes 
such as INST, dividends incentives and FOREIGN will reduce cash flow availability, 
thus, resolved agency problems. The standard deviation of 33.67819, meaning 
relatively large degree of dispersion between mean as per individual companies. 
Notable from the individual companies’ descriptive statistics is the consistency with 
group companies’ descriptive statistics in that cash flow range from min 0.0000 with 
slight variation on maximum of 3.8187. The findings on both individual and group 
descriptive statistics confirmed the availability of cash flows. Therefore, this further 
confirmed the existence of agency conflicts among the financials’ services companies 
listed on the JSE.  
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Table 4.1.1: Individual companies’ descriptive statistics of the variables 2005-
2016 
Descriptive Statistics for CASH FLOW   
Categorized by values of COMPANY   
Sample: 1 336     
Included observations: 336    
COMPANY Mean Max Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
ADRENNA PROP GROUP LTD (ANA) 0.986688 1.763237 0.316427 0.457697 12 
AFRICAN EQUITY EMPOWERMENT 
INVESTMENTS LTD (AEE) 1.107665 2.223065 0.000000 0.485118 12 
AFRICAN OXYGEN LTD (AFX) 1.256711 4.024904 0.000000 0.947425 12 
AFRICAN PHOENIX INVESTMENTS LTD (AXL) 3.818770 8.079504 0.000000 3.047520 12 
BARLOWORLD LTD (BAW) 1.330709 1.656033 1.036088 0.187051 12 
BONATLA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD (BNT) 14.59555 118.9189 0.132732 33.67819 12 
BRIMSTONE INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
LTD (BRT) 0.992081 1.610203 0.000000 0.509333 12 
CORONATION FUND MANAGERS LTD (CML) 1.516024 2.786885 0.000000 0.783279 12 
ECSPONENT LTD (ECS) 1.262705 4.337281 0.164189 1.145023 12 
EMIRA PROPERTY FUND LTD (EMI) 1.913229 13.32714 0.075704 3.825989 12 
FAIRVEST PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD (FVT) 1.644680 5.473607 0.000000 1.854069 12 
FIRSTRAND LTD (FSR) 0.831775 2.494669 0.187655 0.594562 12 
GROWTHPOINT PROPERTIES LTD (GRT) 1.420591 13.46634 0.000000 3.801399 12 
HYPROP INVESTMENTS LTD (HYP) 0.779437 2.719274 0.000000 0.884251 12 
INGENUITY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS LTD 
(ING) 3.013525 8.110781 0.545880 2.669109 12 
INTU PROPERTIES PLC (ITU) 0.766263 1.555468 0.000000 0.482831 12 
INVESTEC LTD (INL) 0.848861 1.103873 0.465140 0.252588 12 
OCTODEC INVESTMENTS LTD (OCT) 0.156725 0.557978 0.000000 0.149489 12 
OLD MUTUAL PLC (OML) 0.590054 2.279995 0.000000 0.720478 12 
ORION REAL ESTATE LTD (ORE) 0.613696 1.565700 0.000000 0.427655 12 
REDEFINE PROPERTIES LTD (RDF) 0.823422 2.226677 0.139600 0.641522 12 
RESILIENT REIT LTD (RES) 0.726687 2.640226 0.025356 0.864754 12 
SA CORPORATE REAL ESTATE FUND (SAC) 1.984584 5.444599 0.751841 1.526524 12 
SANLAM LTD (SLM) 1.471214 2.416980 0.002914 0.885027 12 
SASFIN HOLDINGS LTD (SFN) 0.981720 1.399322 0.133333 0.378018 12 
SYCOM PROPERTY FUND (SYC) 0.912746 1.570677 0.443297 0.313079 12 
TRADEHOLD LIMITED (TDH) 2.957986 7.640239 0.532500 2.197198 12 
VUKILE PROPERTY FUND LTD (VKE) 0.570594 1.270817 0.159992 0.390989 12 
All 1.781239 118.9189 0.000000 6.789046 336 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
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Table 4.1.1 demonstrated individual companies’ descriptive statistics for a cash flow 
variable. From Table 4.1.1 it is observed that almost all companies depicted positive 
CASH FLOWS. This implied existence of agency conflicts amongst financial services 
sector listed on the JSE. The regression equation expected negative sign for cash flow 
variable as per the Agency Theory assertion. However, findings from Table 4.1.1 
demonstrated positive sign. 
Table 4.1.2 provides individual companies’ descriptive statistics reported through the 
central measures of tendency per company. This analysis of the individual companies 
as per the Table 4.1.2 was conducted for dependent variable dividend payout ratio 
(DIV). From Table 4.1.2, it is observed that individual companies had highest mean of 
98.36% on dividend payments ranging from min -0.032258 to max 3.4712 as per Table 
4.1.2. The results were in tandem with the findings from the group descriptive 
statistics. This emphatically confirmed that the JSE listed financial services companies 
at an individual level do pay dividends. This is consistent with Dividend Relevance 
Theory advanced by Graham and Dodd (1951), Lintner (1956) and Gordon (1959) and 
Easterbrook (1984). All these theorists argue that dividends do matter. This further 
confirmed that industry in practice follows a robust dividend payout strategy. Quite a 
number of companies had mean of 0.000000 on dividend payment ratio (DIV). This 
could be interpreted as the period before the application of dividend regime the 01 of 
April 2012. Furthermore, from Table 4.1.2, it is noted that when companies declared 
a mean of 0.000000, the min range is also 0.000000 for more often. The payments of 
dividends could be explained in various ways through the use of dividend theories, 
such as the Bird in the Hand Theory and Smoothed Dividend Theory, which are 
dividend theories adopted by various financial services companies on the JSE. 
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Table 4.1.2: Individual company descriptive statistics of the variables 2005-
2016 
Descriptive Statistics for DIV   
Categorized by values of COMPANY   
Sample: 1 336     
Included observations: 336    
COMPANY Mean Max Min. Std. Dev. Obs. 
ADRENNA PROP GROUP LTD (ANA) 0.955578 1.763237 0.316427 0.462803 12 
AFRICAN EQUITY EMPOWERMENT 
INVESTMENTS LTD (AEE) 0.019968 0.106250 0.000000 0.037420 12 
AFRICAN OXYGEN LTD (AFX) 0.747779 3.471248 0.407075 0.863318 12 
AFRICAN PHOENIX INVESTMENTS LTD (AXL) 0.656032 1.095215 0.000000 0.310946 12 
BARLOWORLD LTD (BAW) 0.384514 0.592568 0.244300 0.107360 12 
BONATLA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD (BNT) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 12 
BRIMSTONE INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
LTD (BRT) 0.098011 0.700000 -0.727273 0.328708 12 
CORONATION FUND MANAGERS LTD (CML) 0.690648 0.925603 0.000000 0.329895 12 
ECSPONENT LTD (ECS) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 12 
EMIRA PROPERTY FUND LTD (EMI) 0.914155 1.410864 0.628466 0.254549 12 
FAIRVEST PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD (FVT) 0.075752 0.909028 0.000000 0.262414 12 
FIRSTRAND LTD (FSR) 0.427324 0.481212 0.376881 0.027972 12 
GROWTHPOINT PROPERTIES LTD (GRT) 0.246040 1.111404 -0.032258 0.454609 12 
HYPROP INVESTMENTS LTD (HYP) 0.147200 0.917491 0.000000 0.344095 12 
INGENUITY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS LTD 
(ING) 0.193348 0.650000 0.000000 0.288061 12 
INTU PROPERTIES PLC (ITU) 0.098918 1.166327 -3.113636 1.560395 12 
INVESTEC LTD (INL) 0.467534 0.634328 0.282132 0.102564 12 
OCTODEC INVESTMENTS LTD (OCT) -0.145105 0.784945 -3.500000 1.107056 12 
OLD MUTUAL PLC (OML) 0.555038 1.923077 0.204918 0.452351 12 
ORION REAL ESTATE LTD (ORE) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 12 
REDEFINE PROPERTIES LTD (RDF) 
 0.316431 1.614035 0.000000 0.534121 12 
RESILIENT REIT LTD (RES) 0.101086 0.512976 0.000000 0.194972 12 
SA CORPORATE REAL ESTATE FUND (SAC) 0.983627 1.291277 0.831303 0.126827 12 
SANLAM LTD (SLM) 0.526025 1.315700 0.248067 0.279213 12 
SASFIN HOLDINGS LTD (SFN) 0.371073 0.398515 0.334063 0.028657 12 
SYCOM PROPERTY FUND (SYC) 0.954611 1.384276 0.576347 0.221982 12 
TRADEHOLD LIMITED (TDH) 0.327635 1.666667 0.000000 0.607197 12 
VUKILE PROPERTY FUND LTD (VKE) 0.327635 1.666667 0.000000 0.607197 12 
All 0.372888 3.471248 -3.500000 0.577076 336 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
  90
Table 4.1.2 demonstrates a number of financial services sector companies with min 
range of 0.000000 and -0.032258. This explains the period before the practice of 
dividend regime, 01 April 2012. Meanwhile, the company with the highest standard 
deviation standard deviation set at 1.560395. This demonstrates the degree of 
dispersion from the mean.  
An individual company had highest mean of 21.09117 with some companies declaring 
a mean of 0.000000 on FOREIGN ranging from min 0.0000 to max 23.1228 as per the 
Table 4.1.3. The results were consistent with the findings from the group descriptive 
statistics mentioned above. In that, the mean demonstrated a positive sign, yet 
regression equation expected a negative sign. According to the Agency Theory, 
companies that employed FOREIGN are expected to reduce the dividend payout ratio 
(Jensen, 1986). As such, the Agency Theory postulates that foreign can be used as a 
discipline mechanism to align management interest to that of the shareholders. 
Furthermore, foreign can be used to force corporate governance principles. It is the 
cause for concern that in this regard, the JSE listed companies under financial services 
sector are experiencing agency costs despite the use of the FOREIGN as substitute 
mechanism. Based on the current findings on this variable, FOREIGN contradicts the 
Agency Theory’s assertions that it resolves agency conflicts. It is demonstrated from 
Table 4.1.3 that the company with the highest standard deviation standard deviation 
set at 3.000921. This implied the degree of dispersion from the mean under the 
variable FOREIGN. Quite a number of companies are within a minimum range of 
0.000000 and mean of 0.000000 as per the Table 4.1.3. From the following Tables: 
4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, some companies declared mean of 0.000000 as well as min 
range of 0.000000. The best possible analysis for this occurrence can be attributed to 
that era before the adoption of dividend regime of 01 April 2012. 
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Table 4.1.3: Individual company descriptive statistics of the variables 2005-
2016 
Descriptive Statistics for FOREIGN   
Categorized by values of COMPANY   
Sample: 1 336     
Included observations: 336    
COMPANY  Mean  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Obs.
ADRENNA PROP GROUP LTD (ANA) 0.605200 0.605200 0.605200 0.000000 12
AFRICAN EQUITY EMPOWERMENT 
INVESTMENTS LTD (AEE) 0.905700 0.905700 0.905700 0.000000 12
AFRICAN OXYGEN LTD (AFX) 7.629575 8.071300 6.304400 0.799111 12
AFRICAN PHOENIX INVESTMENTS LTD (AXL) 5.445492 6.202200 5.376700 0.238301 12
BARLOWORLD LTD (BAW) 21.09117 23.12280 17.02790 3.000921 12
BONATLA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD (BNT) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 12
BRIMSTONE INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
LTD (BRT) 0.637525 0.696100 0.461800 0.105966 12
CORONATION FUND MANAGERS LTD (CML) 13.42890 14.75650 9.446100 2.401719 12
ECSPONENT LTD (ECS) 0.018250 0.021900 0.000000 0.008525 12
EMIRA PROPERTY FUND LTD (EMI) 4.240350 4.993600 3.487100 0.786744 12
FAIRVEST PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD (FVT) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 12
FIRSTRAND LTD (FSR) 8.109600 8.109600 8.109600 0.000000 12
HYPROP INVESTMENTS LTD (HYP) 8.886100 8.886100 8.886100 0.000000 12
INGENUITY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS LTD 
(ING) 0.079600 0.079600 0.079600 0.000000 12
INTU PROPERTIES PLC (ITU) 0.021700 0.021700 0.021700 0.000000 12
INVESTEC LTD (INL) 10.08270 10.08270 10.08270 0.000000 12
OCTODEC INVESTMENTS LTD (OCT) 0.059300 0.059300 0.059300 0.000000 12
OLD MUTUAL PLC (OML) 1.435100 1.435100 1.435100 0.000000 12
ORION REAL ESTATE LTD (ORE) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 12
REDEFINE PROPERTIES LTD (RDF) 6.609900 6.609900 6.609900 0.000000 12
RESILIENT REIT LTD (RES) 5.161300 5.161300 5.161300 0.000000 12
SA CORPORATE REAL ESTATE FUND (SAC) 3.213800 3.213800 3.213800 0.000000 12
SANLAM LTD (SLM) 10.12460 10.12460 10.12460 0.000000 12
SASFIN HOLDINGS LTD (SFN) 5.555200 5.555200 5.555200 0.000000 12
SYCOM PROPERTY FUND (SYC) 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 12
TRADEHOLD LIMITED (TDH) 0.027500 0.027500 0.027500 0.000000 12
VUKILE PROPERTY FUND LTD (VKE) 2.153400 2.153400 2.153400 0.000000 12
All 4.374352 23.12280 0.000000 5.103651 336
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
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Table 4.1.3 revealed individual company with the highest standard deviation of 
3.000921 and a mean of 21.09117. This demonstrated a poor degree of dispersion 
from mean This implies that few individual companies that adopted FOREIGN as a 
discipline mechanism.  
Individual company had the highest mean of 99.49630 on INST ranging from minimum 
43.4045 to maximum 86.4746 as per the Table 4.1.4. The results were in tandem with 
the findings from the group descriptive statistics. This implied a high-stake ownership 
by individual companies within financial services sector of the JSE listed companies. 
According to the Agency Theory, INST substitutes the need to payout dividends, 
therefore, monitors management. The consistent payment of dividends despite 
monitoring role played by INST contradicted the Agency Theory’s assertion. However, 
the findings are consistent with de Wet and Mpinda (2013) who found that a dominant 
block shareholder control South African companies. 
The individual company had the highest standard deviation of 5.703945. This implied 
the degree of dispersion from mean as per Table 4.1.4. This demonstrated a very 
robust practice of INST ownership principle by JSE listed financial services 
companies. However, it is not yielding the expected results because companies 
continued to pay dividends despite the use of INST ownership as substitutes. The 
regression equation for the current study had anticipated a negative sign for INST 
ownership as per the Agency Theory’s assertion that the use of INST ownership 
negates the need to pay dividends. However, the current findings from table 4.1 to 
4.1.4 demonstrated positive sign for the INST ownership variable and this is contrary 
to the dictates of the Agency Theory. 
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Table 4.1.4: Individual company descriptive statistics of the variables 2005-
2016 
Descriptive Statistics for INST   
Categorized by values of COMPANY   
Sample: 1 336     
Included observations: 336    
COMPANY  Mean  Max  Min.  Std. Dev.  Obs.
ADRENNA PROP GROUP LTD (ANA) 86.16625 86.47460 85.94600 0.272191 12
AFRICAN EQUITY EMPOWERMENT 
INVESTMENTS LTD (AEE) 82.88140 82.88140 82.88140 0.000000 12
AFRICAN OXYGEN LTD (AFX) 82.73113 86.32740 71.94230 6.505906 12
AFRICAN PHOENIX INVESTMENTS LTD (AXL) 49.64913 54.70620 49.18940 1.592563 12
BARLOWORLD LTD (BAW) 55.49303 56.99750 52.48410 2.222245 12
BONATLA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD (BNT) 64.08730 64.08730 64.08730 0.000000 12
BRIMSTONE INVESTMENT CORPORATION 
LTD (BRT) 73.37060 73.93730 73.18170 0.341733 12
CORONATION FUND MANAGERS LTD (CML) 45.09592 50.17020 43.40450 3.059903 12
ECSPONENT LTD (ECS) 56.63608 68.84750 54.19380 5.703945 12
EMIRA PROPERTY FUND LTD (EMI) 56.45335 57.61000 55.29670 1.208082 12
FAIRVEST PROPERTY HOLDINGS LTD (FVT) 71.83590 71.83590 71.83590 0.000000 12
FIRSTRAND LTD (FSR) 51.95020 51.95020 51.95020 0.000000 12
GROWTHPOINT PROPERTIES LTD (GRT) 57.12140 57.12140 57.12140 0.000000 12
HYPROP INVESTMENTS LTD (HYP) 54.71790 54.71790 54.71790 0.000000 12
INGENUITY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS LTD 
(ING) 54.91400 54.91400 54.91400 0.000000 12
INTU PROPERTIES PLC (ITU) 80.74450 80.74450 80.74450 0.000000 12
INVESTEC LTD (INL) 58.86810 58.86810 58.86810 0.000000 12
OCTODEC INVESTMENTS LTD (OCT) 45.73280 45.73280 45.73280 0.000000 12
OLD MUTUAL PLC (OML) 73.02430 73.02430 73.02430 0.000000 12
ORION REAL ESTATE LTD 
(ORE) 97.57200 97.57200 97.57200 0.000000 
12
REDEFINE PROPERTIES LTD (RDF) 52.40720 52.40720 52.40720 0.000000 12
RESILIENT REIT LTD (RES) 47.75290 47.75290 47.75290 0.000000 12
SA CORPORATE REAL ESTATE FUND (SAC) 61.19060 61.19060 61.19060 0.000000 12
SANLAM LTD (SLM) 48.50640 48.50640 48.50640 0.000000 12
SASFIN HOLDINGS LTD (SFN) 73.47780 73.47780 73.47780 0.000000 12
SYCOM PROPERTY FUND (SYC) 99.49630 99.49630 99.49630 0.000000 12
TRADEHOLD LIMITED (TDH) 87.63210 87.63210 87.63210 0.000000 12
VUKILE PROPERTY FUND LTD (VKE) 59.17870 59.17870 59.17870 0.000000 12
All 65.31026 99.49630 43.40450 15.74453 336
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
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From table 4.1.4, it is noted that the payment of dividends does confirm improved 
corporate governance of the financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
4.3 CORRELATION COEFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF THE VARIABLES 
In this subtopic, the study sought to respond to the main research question to 
investigate the relationship between dependent and independent variables. As such, 
correlation matrix was carried out as per the Table 4.2. Firstly, the researcher had to 
examine if there was Multicollinearity between dependent and independent variables 
of the chosen research model. If the correlation coefficient was close to positive one 
(positive correlation) and on the other hand, the correlation coefficient was close to 
negative one (negative correlation), that confirms the presence of Multicollinearity. 
However, after examining the correlation coefficients of the variables, no 
Multicollinearity were confirmed in the current study. 
Table 4.2 demonstrates that the dividend payout ratio is positively correlated with 
FOREIGN, institutional ownership (INST), PROFITS and return on equity (ROE) 
variables. Essentially, the study sought to establish what type of relationship existed 
between dividend-agency relationship. This implied that the increased profitability 
(PROF) and return on equity (ROE) encouraged the JSE listed financial services 
companies to pay out dividends. Furthermore, both FOREIGN and institutional 
ownership (INST) are positively correlated to dividend payout ratio. The findings were 
contrary to the dictates of the Agency Theory that these variables should demonstrate 
negative correlation because they were used as substitutes. Agency theory argues 
that the use of FOREIGN and institutional ownership (INST) as substitutes negated 
the need to pay out dividends, therefore expects a negative correlation. In this regard, 
this relationship has failed to resolve agency costs. Therefore, it has failed to reduce 
agency problems. Consistent with these findings were Cavda and Aydin (2015), who 
also found positive correlation between dividend-agency relationship. However, 
Osegbue et al. (2014) found negative relationship between PROF and dividend 
payout. Such findings are at the heart of the “dividend puzzle” continuous payment of 
dividends when a company’ profits are declining (Black, 1976). According to the 
Smoothed Dividend Theory, a company that pursues smoothed dividend strategy 
might continuously pay dividends despite poor performance. 
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However, Dividend Relevant Theory argues that the payment of dividends compels 
companies to raise funds externally in order to finance new investments. Accordingly, 
the current results found a positive relationship between LEV, FOREIGN and INST, 
which concurs with Dividend Relevant Theory’s assertion (Gordon, 1959). This implied 
that the payment of dividends forced JSE listed financial services companies into debt 
financing, therefore increased corporate monitoring mechanism by capital markets. 
However, Vo and Nguyen (2014) found negative relationship between dividend payout 
and LEV. Consistent with the current results were Jiraporn et al. (2011) and Osegbue 
et al. (2014) as well as Aydin and Cavdar (2015) who found positive relationship. 
Furthermore, positive relationship between dividend payout, LEV, FOREIGN and 
INST despite increased debt and the use of FOREIGN and INST as substitutes 
contradicted the Agency Theory’ assertion. The findings confirmed the existence of 
agency conflicts. The current results have emphatically answered the main research 
question: What is the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE? The relationship between the 
variables has been established, and therefore, leads to the second research question. 
In light of the findings, the second research question has arisen, ‘What role does the 
dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies listed on the JSE play in 
resolving agency problems?’ According to the Agency Theory, the use of FOREIGN 
and institutional ownership (INST) as substitutes, leads to the substitution of dividends 
payments to directors. Ultimately, this resolves agency problems. In this regard, 
positive relationship between DIV, FOREIGN and INST as depicted in Table 4.2 meant 
that JSE financial services companies continued to experience agency costs despite 
the use of INST and foreign as substitutes. The results were contrary to the Agency 
Theory’s assertions, that the use of the aforementioned variables reduce agency 
conflicts (Meckling & Jensen, 1976). However, Crane, Michenaud and Weston (2016) 
report that bigger institutional ownership stake significantly leads to increase in 
dividend payout. Crane et al.’s (2016), findings are in tandem with the current findings. 
Meanwhile, dividend payout ratio demonstrated a negative correlation with DIRS, and 
company SIZE as per Table 4.2. The increased dividend payout ratio is consistent with 
the Agency Theory’s assertion that companies should pay out high dividends in order 
to significantly reduce the cash availability to management. In line with these findings 
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was the research work by Vo and Nguyen (2014) and Haye (2014) who reported a 
negative relationship. To reduce the stake ownership by directors and increased 
dividends, consequently, reduces agency friction. Subsequently, directors become 
more independent, well aligned and less entrenched, therefore ensuring the principle 
of separation between ownership and control. The negative correlation between 
dividends and company size implied that when investment opportunities are winding 
down on JSE listed financial services companies, therefore, reduced market 
capitalisation, then dividends were paid out. In line with these findings Correia et al. 
(2015) found similar results. Furthermore, these empirical findings are consitent with 
Irrelevance Theory that dividends should be paid only when company’ growth 
prospects are diminishing. In line with Irrelevance Theory, Baker and Weigand (2015) 
found that the declining companies’ investment opportunities leads to the larger 
dividend payout. However, Ayman (2015) found a positive relationship between a 
company SIZE and dividend payout. This is consistent with relevance theory assertion 
that companies with large SIZE are less risky to face bankrupcy. As a result they can 
afford to payout more dividends relative to smaller companies. 
One of the research questions sought to investigate the role played by this relationship 
in resolving agency problems. The literature review had revealed that dividend 
assumption theories argue that the payment of dividends resolves agency problems. 
From Table 4.2, it is observed that the negative correlation between dividends and 
directors confirmed the dividend assumption theories. This implied that reduced 
directors’ ownership concentration led to the payment of dividends. Consequently, this 
leads to the reduction of the agency friction, thereby increasing shareholder wealth. 
Furthermore, the findings implied the reduction of agency problems of the JSE 
financial’ services companies. Henceforth, the findings are consistent with the dictates 
of the relevance of dividend policy that payments of dividends reduce agency 
problems. Consequently, this answered the third research question: What influence 
does the factors that underpin both agency problems and dividend policy of financial 
services companies listed on the JSE have on the shareholder wealth maximisation?  
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Table 4.2: Group correlation analysis of the variables 2005-2016 
Covariance Analysis: Spearman rank-order       
Sample: 1 336         
Included observations: 336        
Correlation 
Probability CASH  DIRS  DIV FOREIGN INST LEV PROF  ROE  SIZE 
CASH  1.000000         
 -----          
          
DIRS  -0.057647 1.000000        
 0.2921 -----         
          
DIV  0.069691 -0.113984 1.000000       
 0.2026 0.0368 -----       
          
FOREIGN  0.028799 0.285012 0.220504 1.000000      
 0.5989 0.0000 0.0000 -----      
          
INST  0.053296 -0.921995 0.035715 -0.540465 1.000000     
 0.3301 0.0000 0.5141 0.0000 -----     
          
 0.0268 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----    
          
PROF  0.161030 -0.045758 0.175188 0.009444 0.078725 -0.043287 1.000000   
 0.0031 0.4031 0.0013 0.8631 0.1499 0.4290 -----    
          
ROE  0.083962 0.120306 0.120045 0.199918 -0.121656 0.197919 0.639063 1.000000  
 0.1245 0.0275 0.0278 0.0002 0.0257 0.0003 0.0000 -----   
          
SIZE  -0.102464 0.250750 0.332453 0.730536 -0.457957 0.956464 -0.009485 0.185898 1.0000
 0.0606 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8625 0.0006 ----- 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
The current findings revealed negative correlation between dividends and directors as 
per Table 4.2. The findings were consistent with the expectations of the current 
regression equation, which had expected negative relationship between the identified 
variables. The findings implied that directors are less entrenched, and their interest is 
aligned to that of the shareholders. As such, the shareholders’ wealth is maximised in 
light of the improved corporate governance of JSE listed financial services companies. 
From Table 4.2, it is confirmed that the negative sign attributed to the DIRS ownership 
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upheld the principle of separation of ownership and control, therefore, strengthens 
governance of financial services companies listed on the JSE for the period 2005-
2016. 
4.4 PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS 
Initially, the study had to determine whether the data variables were having stationary 
properties before conducting estimation. In this regard, the use of OLS method could 
have produced the spurious regression, which may ultimately lead to statistical bias. 
To overcome the aforementioned statistical challenges, the study adopted panel unit 
root tests: ADF - Fisher Chi-square test, and PP - Fisher Chi-square test. De Wet and 
Mpinda (2013) faced with the similar statistical challenge adopted the panel unit root 
test method. The panel unit root test results are captured in Tables 4.4.1 to 4.4.9. The 
results demonstrate that some variables were non-stationary, which proved to be a 
potential problem for econometrics analysis for the current study. This could lead to 
spurious regressions, and problems on goodness of fit measures that are relatively 
high. Consequently, non-stationarity makes regression results rather challenging to 
evaluate. To address non-stationarity problem, the study adopted Co-integration 
analysis to allow non-stationary data to function such that spurious results are 
resolved. In addition, the study employs differencing a series successively until a 
stationary state was achieved (de Wet & Mpinda, 2013). 
The following variables were confirmed to be stationary at level (no differencing): 
CASH, DIV, LEV, PROF, ROE, and company SIZE. The choice of ADF test is owing 
to its robust analytical ability to take cognisance of autocorrelations in residuals, in 
case they do exist, therefore includes additional lags of the first differenced variable 
(Baltagi, 2013). Table 4.2.1 demonstrated stationary time series. Hence, there was no 
need to difference the series for CASH variable. In this regard, the panel unit root test 
for the period 2005-2016 was carried out on each variable of the current study as 
demonstrated by Tables 4.4.1 until 4.4.9 respectively. 
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Table 4.2.1: CASH variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 
PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST (no differencing) 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -12.6336  0.0000  28  307 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -8.48204  0.0000  28  307 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  163.620  0.0000  28  307 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  163.223  0.0000  28  308 
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation. 2018. 
Table 4.2.1 employed ADF - Fisher Chi-square test, and PP - Fisher Chi-square tests 
to determine the findings for the panel unit root test of CASH variable whether it is 
stationary or non-stationary. The rest of the variables were stationary after differencing 
of order one are: Table 4.2.2 D(DIRS), Table 4.2.4 D(FOREIGN) and Table 4.2.5 
D(INST). In light of these test results, the analysis used the following stationary 
variables: CASH, DIV, LEV, PROF, ROE, company SIZE D(DIRS), D(FOREIGN) and 
D(INST) as per Tables 4.4.1 to 4.4.9 respectively. Furthermore, where computation 
was possible owing to sample size, the variables demonstrated cross-sectional 
dependence in the series. This meant that a correlation exists between the samples 
in the 28 financial services companies listed on the JSE for each of the variables used 
in the study. From tables 4.1 until 4.4.9, the findings demonstrated correlation further 
confirming the results of panel unit root tests as revealed in this chapter.  
Table 4.2.2 provides findings for panel unit root test for D(DIRS) variable after it has 
been determined to be non-stationary; hence, the application of differencing technique 
to mitigate non-stationary problems. 
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Table 4.2.2: D(DIRS) variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 
After differencing 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.08815  0.0000  4  40 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.57555  0.0000  4  40 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  31.7792  0.0001  4  40 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  34.5063  0.0000  4  40 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
Table 4.2.2 depicts successive differencing of a series until stationary time series was 
achieved. It is rather impossible to achieve goodness of fit measure, if stationarity of 
time series is not achieved. As such, the current study had to run differencing of 
D(DIRS) until time series stationarity was achieved. The differencing technique was 
more relevant for the current study in light of data shortcomings such as missing data. 
Similarly, other studies faced with the similar statistical challenge adopted the same 
differencing technique (De Wet & Mpinda, 2013). As such, Im, Pesaran and Shin W-
stat statistical test, and ADF - Fisher Chi-square statistical test have helped the current 
study to achieve robust ruslts. The results meant that the study avoided spurious 
regression results that could have produced statically bias findings for JSE listed 
financial institutions for the period 2005-2016. 
Table 4.2.3 provides findings for panel unit root test of DIV variable after it has been 
determined to be stationary time series. As such, there was no differencing need for 
the stationary time series. Consequently, it can be observed that from Table 4.2.3 
there were no statistical bias of the findings. The stationarity of DIV variable time series 
implied goodness of fit measure for the variable of JSE listed financial services 
companies for the period 2005-2016. 
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Table 4.2.3: DIV variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 
No differencing 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -54.0947  0.0000  24  259 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -14.9592  0.0000  24  259 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  130.677  0.0000  24  259 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  154.788  0.0000  24  264 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 2018. 
Table 4.2.3 exhibits results in which panel unit root test adopted time series modelling 
technique, therefore ensuring that stationarity of the DIV variable is achieved for the 
period 2005-2016. From Tables 4.1 and 4.2, it is observed that the stationarity of DIV 
variable was evident, therefore, ensuring robust findings for financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. 
Table 4.2.4 provides findings for panel unit root test of D(FOREIGN) variable after it 
has been determined to be non-stationary time series. The statistical challenge with 
non-stationary time series is that regression findings could lead to spurious regression 
results, and ultimately statistical biasness. To mitigate this statistical challenge, we 
employed successive differencing of foreign variable until we achieve stationary time 
series.  
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Table 4.2.4: D(FOREIGN) variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 
After differencing 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -4.85028  0.0000  3  30 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3.76878  0.0001  3  30 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  22.8014  0.0009  3  30 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  24.6771  0.0004  3  30 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
The study adopted Co-integration analysis to mitigate non-stationarity of FOREIGN 
variable. Table 4.2.4 exhibits the application of the Co-integration, which adopted 
Dickey-Fuller Fisher tests to avoid spurious results, and ultimately statistical biasness 
of JSE listed financial institutions variables for the period 2005-2016. This implied that 
FOREIGN variable eventually achieved stationary time series as per Table 4.2.4. 
Chelimo and Kiprop (2017), faced with the similar statistical challenge, applied panel 
unit root tests of Dickey-Fuller fisher test to avoid spurious findings and statistical bias 
results. 
Table 4.2.5 exhibits findings for the panel unit root test of D(INST) variable after it has 
been determined to be non-stationary time series. Several statistical tests inclusive of 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat test, ADF - Fisher Chi-square test, and PP - Fisher Chi-
square test was carried out and all tests assume asymptotic normality to avoid 
spurious results.  
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Table 4.2.5: D(INST) variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 
After differencing 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -6.08815  0.0000  4  40 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.57555  0.0000  4  40 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  31.7792  0.0001  4  40 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  34.5063  0.0000  4  40 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
From Tables 4.4.2 D(DIRS), 4.4.4 D(FOREIGN), and 4.4.5 D(INST), the findings 
cannot be generalised outside the focus sector and period of 2005-2016. This implied 
that the findings can be generalised within the stated focus period (2005-2016) of the 
financial services sector. This is the case with all non-stationarity time series variables 
for the JSE listed financial services companies. 
Table 4.2.6 exhibits findings for the panel unit root test of LEV variable after it has 
been determined to be stationary time series at level (no differencing). The key feature 
of stationary time series analysis method is that statistical properties do not change 
over time. This key feature became more relevant for the current study in light of its 
length period 2005-2016; hence, ensuring consistent findings for the financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. 
  
  104
Table 5.2.6: LEV variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 
No differencing 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -28.2179  0.0000  28  300 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -10.4788  0.0000  28  300 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  134.648  0.0000  28  300 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  146.181  0.0000  28  308 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
Table 4.2.6 provides findings for the panel unit root test of LEV variable after it has 
been determined to be stationary time series. The stationarity of LEV variable implied 
its goodness fit test which was further demonstrated by findings in Table 4.2 group 
correlation analysis as well as Table 4.1. All these results avoided spurious regression 
and statistical biasness. 
Table 4.2.7 exhibits findings for the panel unit root test of PROF variable after it has 
been determined to be stationary time series at level (no differencing). Brooks (2014) 
refers to stationary time series as constant mean, variance and auto covariance of 
time series data for each given lag; in this regard of financial services companies listed 
on the JSE. Table 4.2.7 exhibits tests results for stationary technique used to 
determine stationary time series for PROF variable panel unit root test for the period 
2005-2016. The statistical technique tests applied in the Table 4.2.7: Levin, Lin and 
Chu test; Im, Pesaran and Shin W-start test; ADF - Fisher Chi-square panel unit root 
tests. The aforementioned statistical tests help to determine the order of integration of 
the variables for the purpose of running regression analyses for the current study 
within the timeframe 2005-2016. 
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Table 4.2.7: PROF variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 
No differencing 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -106.844  0.0000  28  300 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -25.7393  0.0000  28  300 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  200.020  0.0000  28  300 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  188.810  0.0000  28  308 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018 
From Table 4.2.7, it is noted that PROF variable demonstrated stationarity of time 
series at level (no differencing) for financial services companies listed on the JSE. This 
implied that statistical measures as well as goodness of fit measures are not weigh 
too high, which could have made the evaluation of regression equation impossible or 
produce spurious and statistical bias results. 
At first, data had to be tested and it was confirmed to be stationary time series, 
eliminating the need to perform differencing. Table 4.2.8 provides findings for the panel 
unit root test of ROE variable after it has been determined to be stationary time series 
at level (no differencing). One of the differentiating characteristics of stationary as 
opposed to non-stationary is that it can absorb shocks temporarily, and over time their 
impact will be eradicated as the time series return to their long run mean values. From 
Tables 4.4.6 to 4.4.9, the probability of 0.0000 can be observed, which implied 
stationarity of the identified variables in the mentioned tables. Consequently, this 
implied robust finding as demonstrated through Tables 4.1 to 4.4.9 of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. 
  
  106
Table 4.2.8: ROE variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-2016 
No differencing 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -194.310  0.0000  28  299 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -39.8195  0.0000  28  299 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  186.530  0.0000  28  299 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  215.852  0.0000  28  308 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018 
From Table 4.2.8 panel unit root test exhibited the application of Im, Pesaran and Shin 
W-stat test, ADF - Fisher Chi-square test, and PP - Fisher Chi-square tests owing to 
statistical challenge of insufficient data experienced by the financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. Furthermore, the aforementioned tests improve the 
robustness of the findings. Therefore, it resonates with the current study. 
From Table 4.2.9, panel unit root test for company SIZE exhibits stationary time series 
at level. Therefore, this implied no need to conduct differencing. Furthermore, the 
company SIZE variable demonstrated that there is Cross-sectional dependence in the 
time series which meant that there is a correlation between the samples in the 28 
financial services companies for each of the variables adopted. From Table 4.2.9 
applied Levin, Lin and Chu panel unit root tests, this test allows for fixed effects and 
heterogeneous serially correlated errors thus, avoid spurious results (Baltagi, 2013). 
Furthermore, this test ensures the reliability and eliminates statistical bias of the results 
for JSE listed financial institutions for the period 2005-2016. 
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Table 4.2.9: Company SIZE variable panel unit root test for the period 2005-
2016 
No differencing 
Sample: 1 336   
Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 1 
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
Method Statistic Prob.** Cross-sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -11.4947  0.0000  28  306 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -7.74948  0.0000  28  306 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  159.422  0.0000  28  306 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  177.595  0.0000  28  308 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume 
asymptotic normality. 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
From Table 4.2.9, it can be noted that the panel unit root test outcomes were confirmed 
through Tables 4.1 to 4.2.9 respectively. Panel unit root tests in this regard applied Im, 
Pesaran and Shin W-stat test, ADF - Fisher Chi-square test, and PP - Fisher Chi-
square tests to ensure robustness of the findings to achieve correlation between the 
identified samples. 
4.5 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURE 
Unbalanced panel data meant that some observations are missing. Therefore, not all 
cross-sections were observed in all time periods. This was owing to JSE financial 
services companies declaring zero dividend prior the implimentation of dividend 
regime before 2012 in South Africa. To mitigate the possible statistical bias owing to 
unbalanced panel data, the study adopted fixed effect cross-sectional regression 
model for the robustness of the findings. As such, fixed effect cross-sectional 
regression model was employed to ensure statistical validation of the findings. 
Furthermore, the correlation that exists between explanatory and dependant variables 
makes fixed effect cross-sectional regression model the best possible choice. In light 
of the unbalanced panel data, the choice of random effect estimation model was not 
statistically feasible. 
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The dividend policy and the Agency Theory assertions are substantially confirmed or 
rejected through Panel Estimated Generalised Least Square (EGLS) regression 
model. The panel EGLS demonstrates robust statistical findings when compared with 
two stage least square (2SLS) and GMM. As such, on assumptions of statistical unbias 
results that the model is free of autocorrelation, multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, this model is more relevant for the current study. 
Furthermore, panel EGLS regression results demonstrated consistence, precision and 
efficiency of estimates in the presence of simultaneity statistical bias. Therefore, cross 
section weights estimate a feasible panel EGLS regression model specification 
assuming the presence of cross-section heteroscedasticity. 
To determine the presence of autocorrelation and independence of errors, Durbin-
Watson (DW) statistic test was adopted for each variable. The Durbin-Watson value 
of 1.7128 is within overall value range between -2 to 2 DW values, which confirmed 
the absence of autocorrelation (Gozali, 2013). The DW value of 1.7128 demonstrates 
the independence of errors from one another in the regression model within the period 
of the study. Furthermore, these regression results confirmed that the serial correlation 
of errors is correlated. 
The current study employed Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method to 
mitigate heteroscedasticity and general correlation of observations within a cross-
section regression model (Vo & Nguyen, 2014). Various panel data statistical 
techniques and modelling technique such as differencing were used to mitigate 
statistical bias of heteroscedasticity. To mitigate further statistically biasness owing to 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the current study employed White test cross-
section for robustness of the findings. The White test cross-section method assumes 
that the errors are contemporaneously (cross-sectional) correlated. Therefore, this 
estimator is robust to cross-equation (contemporaneous) correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. White test method assumes that the errors for a cross-section are 
heteroskedastic and serially correlated. Consequently, the estimator is designed to 
accommodate arbitrary heteroscedasticity and within cross-section serial correlation. 
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4.6 REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A multi linear regression model was undertaken, using EViews statistical package to 
determine the relationship between dividend-agency relationship of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. 
DIVit =  βo - β1 INSTi-t - β2 DIRSi-t + β3 SIZEi-t -  β4 FOREIGNi-t + β5LEVi-t   
    + β6 ROEi-t + β7PROFi-t - β8 CASHi-t + εi-t 
Table 4.2.10 exhibits panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) regression model. 
According to Table 4.2.10, the model is as follows: The overall effect of the explanatory 
variables is able to explain the dividend payout ratio up to 89% as demonstrated by 
adjusted R2 and the remaining 11% is controlled by other factors outside the listed 
variables as per Table 4.2.10. Similarly, Table 4.2.10 exhibits the F-statistic value of 
75.6014, which implies that the model is well fitted and overall statistically significant 
at P (F-statistic) value 0.0000 of the explanatory variables on the dividend payout ratio. 
Table 4.2.10 depicts Durbin-Watson value of 1.7128 indicates a tolerable serial 
correction within the period 2005-2016 of the study. The findings are consistent with 
Dividend Relevance Theory advanced by Berle and Means (1932), Lintner (1956), 
Gordon (1959), and Easterbrook (1984), who report a positive relationship between 
dividends and listed explanatory variables. 
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Table 4.2.10: Fixed Effect 
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) regression model 2005-2016 
Sample: 1 336 and Dependent Variable: DIV                                          
Cross-sections included: 28;   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 308; Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.078016 0.145774 0.535183 0.5930 
CASH -0.000247 0.000157 -1.575369 0.1163 
D(DIRS) -0.156975 0.057562 -2.727058 0.0068 
D(FOREIGN) -0.157515 0.062589 -2.516637 0.0124 
D(INST) -0.162588 0.059789 -2.719350 0.0070 
LEV 2.79E-09 4.79E-10 5.816952 0.0000 
PROF 0.020660 0.009262 2.230682 0.0265 
ROE -0.001124 0.001452 -0.773588 0.4398 
SIZE 0.018167 0.009531 1.906082 0.0577 
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.906787     Mean dependent var 1.352367 
Adjusted R-squared 0.894793     S.D. dependent var 2.594589 
S.E. of regression 0.455023     Sum squared resid 56.31651 
F-statistic 75.60142     Durbin-Watson stat 1.712848 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
 Unweighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.338770     Mean dependent var 0.367369 
Sum squared resid 64.12816     Durbin-Watson stat 1.884464 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation, 2018. 
It can be observed from Table 4.2.10 that cash flow (CASH) has negative sign and 
statistically insignificant association with dividend payout ratio. The regression results 
reveal that the coefficient of the relationship between dividend payout and cash flow 
is -0.000247 CASH as per Table 4.2.10. This implies that for every 1% increase of the 
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cash flow, dividend payout will decrease by 0.000247 units. Furthermore, Table 4.2.10 
depicts that the T-test is -1.5753 with insignificant level of 0.1163. The findings are 
consistent with the Agency Theory arguments that the reduction of cash flow leads to 
high dividends payout to shareholders. Consequently, this reduces misappropriation 
of funds by management for their own benefits (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) to ultimately 
resolve agency costs. In line with these findings were Osegbue, Ifurueze, and Ifurueze 
(2014), Ringborg and Dai (2016) all reported of negative relationship between dividend 
payout ratio and cash flow in Nigeria and Sweden respectively. Similarly, Harada and 
Nguyen (2011) confirm a negative relationship between the cash flow and dividend 
payout. However, Vo and Nguyen (2014) found contradicting results with statistically 
positive relationship. 
What role does the dividend-agency relationship of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE play in resolving agency problems? 
The main research question sought to determine the relationship between dividend 
payout ratio and explanatory variables. Cash flow (CASH) has partly answered the 
research question by demonstrating a negative and statistically insignificant 
relationship between dividend payout ratio and cash flow. Therefore, cash flow 
ultimately resolves agency costs of the financial services sector listed on the JSE 
between the period 2005-2016 as per Table 4.2.10. 
Table 4.2.10 demonstrates that D(DIRS) has negative and statistically significant 
relationship with dividend payout ratio. The regression results reveal that the 
coefficient of the relationship between dividend payout and D (DIRS) is -0.156975 D 
(DIRS) as per Table 4.2.10. This implies that for every 1% increase of the D (DIRS), 
dividend payout will decrease by 15%. From Table 4.2.10, it can be observed that the 
T-test is -2.7270 with significant level of 0.0068. The findings resonate with the genesis 
of the Agency Theory, that is, separation between control and ownership. Therefore, 
the higher the percentage of share ownership by directors in the company the lower 
will be the dividend payout ratio. A lower dividend payout meant agency costs 
reduction. The negative relationship of D (DIRS) will ensure the independence of the 
directors to become less conflicted. Furthermore, this meant that D (DIRS) can be 
used as substitutes for dividend payout an assertion advanced by the Agency Theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The findings of this study are consistent with those of 
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Hommel (2011), Houcine and Ajina (2013), Vo and Nguyen (2014), Haye (2014) and 
Aydin and Cavdar (2015), who found that there is significant and negative relationship 
between dividend payout and managerial ownership. However, Huda and Abdullah 
(2014), Jojadeh and Pouraghajan (2014), Vo and Nguyen (2014), and Uwalomwa, 
Olamide and Francis (2015) reportedly found statistically and positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and dividend payout. 
Table 4.2.10 depicts that D (FOREIGN) has negative and statistically significant 
association with dividend payout ratio. The regression results reveal that the 
coefficient of the relationship between dividend payout and D (FOREIGN) is -0.157515 
D (FOREIGN) as per Table 4.2.10. This implies that for every 1% increase of the D 
(FOREIGN), dividend payout will decrease by 15%. From Table 4.2.10, it can be 
observed that the T-test is -2.5166 with significant level of 0.0124. The findings implied 
that foreign can be used as a substitute mechanism for dividend payout to instil 
discipline management and reduce agency costs. The findings are in line with the 
Agency Theory that foreign ownership can be used as substitutes mechanism to 
reduce agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Similarly, Lam, Sami and Zhou (2012) concur with the current findings for a negative 
relationship. However, Aydin and Cavdar (2015), Dandago, Farouk and Muhibudeen 
(2015) found contrary results that there is a statistically positive relationship between 
dividend payout and foreign. Furthermore, contrary findings by Bogonko (2013) and 
Vinh (2014) indicate that there is no statistically relationship between foreign 
ownership and dividend payout. 
According to Table 4.2.10 D (INST) has negative and statistically significant 
relationship with dividend payout ratio. The regression results reveal that the 
coefficient of the relationship between dividend payout and D (INST) is -0.162588 D 
(INST) as per Table 4.2.10. This implies that for every 1% increase of the D (INST), 
dividend payout will decrease by 16%. Table 4.2.10 demonstrates that the T-test is -
2.7193 with significant level of 0.0070. The results are in line with the Agency Theory’s 
assertion that you can use D (INST) as a discipline mechanism, therefore, substitutes 
dividend payout (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The JSE financial services sector 
demonstrates through the current results that the negative relationship reduces 
agency problems. Furthermore, the results emphatically reinforce assertion of 
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Dividend Irrelevance Theory canvased by MM (1961). The results are consistent with 
Berezinets, Ilina and Alekseeva (2014); Aydin and Cavdar (2015), who report on 
negative and statistically significant relationship. Similarly, Fairchild, Guney and 
Thanatawee (2014) found similar results that companies with higher ownership 
concentration are likely to pay less dividends. However, contrary findings by Daradkah 
and Ajlouni (2013), Thanatawee (2013), Thanatawee (2014) and Dandago et al. 
(2015) found statistically positive and significant results. The contrary results are in 
line with Dividend Relevance Theory’s assertion advanced by Lintner (1956) and 
Gordon (1959). According to this Dividend Relevance Theory, the financial 
compensation of management leads to high dividend payout, and this is confirmed by 
the current results. 
What is the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE? 
The main research question was mainly focused on determining the nature of the 
relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. The results have since revealed that CASH FLOW, 
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, and DIRS (share 
ownership by directors) have negative and statistically insignificant relationship with 
dividend payout ratio. To resolve the challenges of agency problems, the Agency 
Theory has advocated the use of the aforementioned explanatory variables as 
substitutes mechanism Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Easterbrook (1984). The 
companies listed on the JSE under the financial services sector, through current 
results demonstrated largely affirmative results to the Agency Theory’s assertion. The 
presence of institutional ownership resolves the asymmetry information problems, 
therefore, reduce the need to pay dividends. Black (1976) once pondered on the 
industry practice of consistently paying dividends. Apparently, the industry continued 
to pay dividends when faced with asymmetry information. However, the current results 
demonstrate that the Agency Theory has partly provided relief to Black (1976) dividend 
puzzle. In this regard, this is achieved by offering CASH FLOW, INSTITUTIONAL 
OWNERSHIP, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP and DIRS (share ownership by directors) as 
substitute mechanisms to dividend policy. Furthermore, Signalling Theory argues for 
the use of dividend payout to signal companies’ prospects to shareholders. 
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Consequently, the Agency Theory’ proposition to use aforementioned explanatory 
variables as substitutes mechanisms, reduces the need for Signalling Theory, in other 
words the consistent payment of dividends. 
Table 4.2.10 reveals that LEV has positive and statistically significant relationship with 
dividend payout ratio. The regression results reveal that the coefficient of the 
relationship between dividend payout and LEV is 2.79E-09 LEV as per Table 4.2.10. 
This implies that for every 1% increase of the LEV, dividend payout will increase by 
2.79%. From Table 4.2.10, it can be observed that the T-test is 5.816952 with 
significant level of 0.0000. The results are consistent with Easterbrook’s (1984) 
assertion that increase in dividend payout reduces cash flow, therefore the need to 
raise funding externally for future investments. This reduces CASH availability to 
executive directors and minimises chances of expropriation of CASH for personal 
benefits. In line with results is Osegbue et al. (2014) who report positive and significant 
relationship between leverage and dividend payout. The results are contrary to what 
was anticipated in light of the Agency Theory assertion. Consequently, positive 
relationship between leverage and dividend payout meant that JSE listed financial 
services companies incur transaction costs. However, Thanatawee (2014) found 
contrary results of a negative relationship between leverage and dividend payout. The 
results concur with the Agency Theory’s assertion that you can use leverage as a 
substitute mechanism for dividend payout (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, 
the company will be funded externally, such arrangement draws in external 
disciplinary market mechanism to align management interests to that of the 
shareholders at significantly reduced agency costs. The financial risk that comes along 
with this arrangement is the bankruptcy of the company. A company with negative 
balance in its financial statements might not be attractive to the investors, creditors 
and could lose some employees. Furthermore, negative relationship meant that 
companies reduce transaction costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
From Table 4.2.10, it is depicted that PROF has positive and statistically significant 
relationship with dividend payout ratio. The regression results reveal that the 
coefficient of the relationship between dividend payout and PROF is 0.02066 PROF 
as per Table 4.2.10. This implies that for every 1% increase of the PROF, dividend 
payout will increase by 0.02%. Table 4.2.10 demonstrates that the T-test is 2.2306 
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with significant level of 0.0265. This implied that an increase from the profits influences 
the company to pay dividends. The results are in line with Dividend Relevance 
Theory’s arguments that dividends should be paid from profits (Gordon, 1959). 
Accordingly, Lam et al. (2012), Houcine and Ajina (2013), Thanatawee (2013), 
Thanatawee (2014), Dandago et al. (2015) report positive relationship between 
dividend and ROA.  
However, Ullah et al. (2016) found contrary results of negative relationship between 
dividend and ROA. In this regard the results indicate diminishing investments 
prospects for the company. According to Lintner (1956), this marks an opportune time 
to pay dividends to shareholders. The controversy caused by dividend puzzle (Black, 
1976), it is partly resolved. It is crystal clear that companies adopt different strategies 
in resolving agency problems. Against this backdrop, the payment of dividends 
manifests itself in various ways as demonstrated by the current results. 
Table 4.2.10 demonstrates that ROE has negative and statistically insignificant 
relationship with dividend payout ratio. The regression results reveal that the 
coefficient of the relationship between dividend payout and ROE is -0.001124 ROE as 
per Table 4.2.10. This implies that for every 1% increase of the ROE, dividend payout 
will decrease by 0.11%. From Table 4.2.10 it can be observed that the T-test is -0.7735 
with insignificant level of 0.4398. The findings are contrary to the Dividend Relevance 
Theory espoused by Lintner (1956) and Gordon (1959) that an increase in earnings 
leads to higher dividend payments. According to the Signalling Theory, the payments 
of dividends send a positive message to shareholders (Easterbrook, 1984). 
Meanwhile, the results concur with the Agency Theory that you can use ROE as 
substitutes for dividend payout (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, findings give 
credence to the dividend Irrelevance Theory MM (1961), that a company must pay 
dividends from retained earnings. Companies that demonstrate good investment 
prospects ultimately have a need for financing. According to dividend Irrelevance 
Theory, (MM, 1958, 1961) such companies should be financed from their retained 
earnings, therefore less need to pay dividends. Consequently, the use of retained 
earnings substantively reduces agency problems. Consistent with the results was 
Aydin and Cavdar (2015) who confirmed statistically significant and negative 
relationship between ROE and dividend payout. Accordingly, managers often take 
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advantage of the companies’ investment prospects and pay higher dividends. This 
forms part of the investment strategy owing to lower bankruptcy risks and lucrative 
investment opportunities to financial markets signalled by the dividend payout. 
Table 4.2.10 depicts that company SIZE has positive and statistically significant 
relationship with dividend payout ratio. The regression results reveal that the 
coefficient of the relationship between dividend payout and company SIZE is 0.018167 
company SIZE as per Table 4.2.10. This implies that for every 1% increase of the 
company SIZE, dividend payout will increase by 0.018 units. Table 4.2.10 exhibits that 
the T-test is 1.9060 with significant level of 0.0577. This implied that company size 
determines the company dividend decision. In this regard, this relationship increases 
the shareholder wealth maximisation. The findings were consistent with Warrad, Abed, 
Khriasat and Al-Shiekh (2012) and Thanatawee (2013) who confirmed positive 
relationship between company size and dividend payout. 
What influence do the factors that underpin both agency problems and dividend 
policy of financial services companies listed on the JSE have on the shareholder 
wealth maximisation? 
The factors that underpin both dividend policy and agency problems of companies 
listed on the JSE are company size, total assets, percentage shareholder ownership 
by companies, and management. The company SIZE demonstrated positive and 
statistically significant relationship with a positive influence on shareholder wealth 
maximisation as per Table 4.2. The positive influence that leads to the payment of 
dividends justifies Bird in the Hand Theory assertion, that current dividends are worth 
more than future capital prospects, which are still subject to market risk (MM, 1961). 
Meanwhile DIRS, INST and ROE revealed negative relationship with dividend payout 
as per Table 4.2. This implies that dividends were paid out despite negative 
relationship with other explanatory variables. This relationship gives credence to Black 
(1976) “dividend puzzle” critic, why companies consistently pay dividends despite their 
poor performance. However, the current results demonstrated that JSE listed financial 
services companies followed Smoothed Dividend Theory, and continued to pay 
dividends despite negative relationship. In this regard, dividends are used as part of 
signalling effect theory to resolve asymmetry information (Thanatawee, 2013). The 
current findings from Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.5.1 exhibited that companies pursue 
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different dividend strategies offered by dividend policy and the Agency Theory to 
reduce agency conflict. 
Table 4.2.10 demonstrates that company SIZE has positive and significant 
relationship with dividend payout ratio. Meanwhile, company SIZE on average had 
dividend payout ratio (DIV) 54.69% as per Table 4.1. This implied that positive and 
statistically significant relationship had positive influence on the dividend payments for 
the companies listed on the JSE financial services sector. The payment of dividends 
meant shareholders’ wealth maximisation. As such, this addressed the third research 
question on the influence of company SIZE in relation to the shareholder wealth 
maximisation. Table 4.1 reports that ROE had a mean of 17.83% on average. From 
Table 4.2, it can be observed that ROE had positive relationship with dividend payout. 
The influence of positive relationship between ROE and dividend payout led to 
improvement in dividend payments by JSE listed financial services companies. The 
payment of dividends increases shareholder wealth maximisation as demonstrated in 
this subtopic, therefore, research question resolved.  
4.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter tested research questions and objectives as demonstrated in Tables 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.5.1. In addition, this chapter determined the relationship between dividend-
agency relationship by employing various statistical techniques. The findings 
demonstrated an overall positive relationship between dividend-agency relationship in 
Table 4.2. Quite noticeable, the findings further revealed complementary relationship 
between dividend policy and the Agency Theory in resolving dividend-agency 
relationship. According to the findings, a significant number of JSE listed companies 
pay dividends. This is in tandem with Piketty (2014) who reports similar results, 
confirming that JSE listed financial services companies pay dividends yet they 
continuously experience agency problems. Contrary, to the findings is the dividend the 
Agency Theory’s assertion that, dividends payments resolve agency problems 
(Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). However, the confirmation of 
dividends payment by JSE listed companies meant that JSE listed financial institutions 
are experiencing agency problems. 
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The results were explained through assumption theories such as Clientele Effect 
Theory, Smoothed Dividend Theory, a Bird in the Hand Theory and Information 
Asymmetry Theory. The co-existence of agency problems despite continuous 
payment of dividends by JSE listed financial services companies was explained 
through Smoothed Dividend Theory. The study sought to determine the extent to 
which dividend-agency relationship of companies listed on the JSE play in resolving 
agency problems. The current study recorded an overall positive and significant 
dividend-agency relationship of JSE listed financial services companies. This was to 
respond to the research question that sought to determine the extent to which 
dividend-agency relationship reconciles to achieve the goal of maximising shareholder 
wealth of financial services companies listed on the JSE. The study found positive and 
significant relationship between dividend payout and JSE listed company SIZE. This 
implied that company SIZE impacts positively on JSE listed companies, and therefore, 
achieve the goal of maximising sharelder wealth.  
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided empirical evidence of dividend-agency relationship of 
financial services sector of companies listed on the JSE. Quite notably from the results 
is the alignment of (MM, 1958) Irrelevance Theory with the Agency Theory’s (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) assertion on dividend irrelevance. Notwithstanding contradictory 
results, the results exhibited overall positive and significant dividend-agency 
relationship of JSE listed financial services companies. As such, the results confirmed 
the Agency Theory’s assertion that ownership structure can be used to substitute 
dividends thereby reduce agency problems (Easterbrook, 1984). The results 
demonstrate that a significant number of JSE listed financial services companies 
adopted ownership structure and thereby significantly reduce agency problems. 
Accordingly, the reduction of agency problems leads to the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth as per results. Therefore, this talks directly to secondary research 
objectives. In determining the extent and significance of dividend-agency relationship 
in resolving agency problems, the previous chapter adopted various panel data 
techniques, such as Durbin Watson (DW) statistical tests, Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR), White tests, and Heteroscedasticity. The primary objective of this 
study was to determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems 
of financial services companies listed on the JSE, the previous chapter sought to 
determine the nature of the relationship through aforementioned statistical tests.  
To successfully carry out this key research object, the study had to adopt the following 
secondary research objectives: 
 To determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
 To determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship of financial 
services companies listed on the JSE play in resolving agency problems. 
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 To determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship reconciles to 
achieve the goal of maximising shareholder wealth of financial services 
companies listed on the JSE. 
To carry out this key research object, the study focused on the financial services sector 
of the JSE listed financial services companies covering 2005-2016 period. The choice 
of the financial services sector was informed by the global financial crisis of 2007 to 
2009 within the similar sector in America. Furthermore, this period was informed by 
the promulgation of dividend legislation in South Africa, which was adopted from 01 
April 2012. The rationale was to determine trends prior and beyond the implemantation 
of dividend regime within financial’ services sector of JSE listed companies. Therefore, 
the researcher had identified this sector to be a research gap locally. Theoretical 
framework provided the context within which the empirical findings from the previous 
and current studies were accepted or rejected. 
5.2 SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING SECTION PROVIDES SUMMARY 
OVERVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS CHAPTERS 
Chapter one (1) in this study the researcher highlighted the core theories together 
with sub-theories that underscore the research questions and objectives. Three types 
of agency problems articulated the Agency Theory approach on agency problems: 
firstly, between managers (agents) and owners (shareholders) (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). The second type of agency conflict arose between minor shareholders and 
block shareholders (Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Panda & Leepsa, 2017). The minority 
shareholders take leave from legal regime to protect their wealth interest. The third 
type of agency problem occurs between shareholders and creditors. This agency 
conflict is borne when shareholders commit riskier investment decisions against the 
will of the creditors. The principle of separation of ownership from control gave birth to 
all these types of agency problems aforementioned in chapter one, thus set in motion 
the evolution of corporate governance through the Agency Theory perspective. To 
mitigate challenges of agency problems, the Agency Theory advocated the use of 
corporate governance mechanisms such as foreign ownership, institutional ownership 
and directors’ ownership. Meanwhile, (MM, 1958; 1961) had put forward dividend 
irrelevance and residual theories as means to alleviate the agency problems. In line 
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with this school of thought, Graham and Dodd (1951); Lintner (1956) and Gordon 
(1959) argue for dividend relevance theories together with its sub-theories as 
mechanisms to resolve agency problems. 
The literature review had found that JSE listed financial services companies continue 
to experience agency problems despite adoption of dividend decision (Piketty, 2014). 
In light of this finding, the current study sought to determine dividend-agency 
relationship, and this formed the core of the research problem. Furthermore, despite 
the assertion by the Agency Theory that executive compensation resolves agency 
problems, the current study took a view that executive compensation form part of 
agency problems (Bebchuck & Friend, 2003). 
This chapter further merged background and introduction. The key theoretical 
concepts were defined. The research objectives and questions were briefly outlined. 
The problem statement identified through literature review informed the research gap. 
An overview of the research methodology was developed. This chapter further 
outlined the significance of the current study and the context thereof. On the context 
of the study, a brief historical account of labour market, which partly contributed to the 
poverty and inequality was identified. An emerging and local market review of literature 
on dividend-agency relationship was conducted. Notably, the study did not contrast 
the schools of thought, rather sought to investigate the relationship between dividend-
agency relationship among the JSE listed financial services companies. This chapter 
concluded by summarising the scope and demarcation of the study as well as study 
limitations. 
Chapter two (2) in the main the theoretical framework emerged from seminal work of 
distinguished scholars Modigliani and Miller (MM, 1958; 1961). Modigliani and Miller 
(1961) advanced dividend irrelevance together with residual theory, meanwhile, 
Graham and Dodd (1951), as well as Lintner (1956), Gordon (1959) propagated 
Dividend Relevance Theory. To sustain these theories, sub-theories such as bird in 
the hand, Clientele Effect Theory, Smoothed Dividend Theory and Signalling Theory 
were developed. On the other hand, the Agency Theory emanates from the seminal 
work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Easterbrook (1984). The Agency Theory put 
forward forms of ownership structure as mechanisms to mitigate agency problems. 
The current study used forms of ownership such as foreign ownership, management 
  122
ownership, leverage, and institutional ownership as proxy for the Agency Theory. The 
findings were fairly substantiated by these dividend-agency theories. The point of 
departure from previous studies is that the current study sought to determine dividend-
agency relationship rather than contrast the theories. Modigliani and Miller (1961) are 
a classic premise on a theoretical abstract of ideal world. Meanwhile, the overall 
findings demonstrated that in practice, the dividend-agency theories complement each 
other, therefore reduce agency problems of JSE listed financial services companies. 
Notably developments from the findings are that practice has managed to harmonise 
the theoretical abstract world with the real and practical environment and ensuring the 
reduction of agency problems. 
An overview of the theoretical framework upon which the study is anchored was 
presented in a schematic graph under chapter two. This chapter began by 
investigating the genesis of the dividend-agency theories. This was done through fully 
exploring dividend irrelevance and residual theories. Similarly, Dividend Relevance 
Theory was discussed in line with seminal work by Lintner (1956) and Gordon (1963). 
Lastly, the Agency Theory was discussed through ground-breaking work by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Furthermore, literature review revealed contradictory findings 
and this lead to a research gap for the current study. Dividend theories were critically 
discussed using assumption theories: Bird in the Hand Theory, Signalling Theory, 
Clientele Theory, Asymmetry Information Theory, Tax Effect Theory, and Smoothed 
Dividend Theory. Similarly, the Agency Theory was discussed using institutional 
ownership, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, agency cost and leverage. The 
development of the research questions and objectives was fully focused on the 
aforementioned theories. The choice of methodology was influenced by the research 
questions, which were determined by dividend-agency theories from this chapter. In 
this chapter, the main focus was to investigate dividend-agency relationship of the JSE 
listed companies through literature review. 
Chapter three (3) examined the relationship between dependent and independent 
variables, and the current study adopted panel data technique. As such, it provided 
advantageous analytical attributes such as combining cross-sectional and time-series 
data, which enabled the increase of degrees of freedom for the robustness of the test 
(Brooks, 2014). Furthermore, this methodological approach has the ability to mitigate 
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problems of Multicollinearity that makes the rejection of null hypothesis impossible 
(Williams, 2015). To ensure that the current results were credible and provided unique 
approach to other similar previous studies, various panel data analytical instruments 
were adopted, namely, panel data econometric analysis; panel data analytical models; 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM); and GMM estimation models. To determine 
the relevant panel data regression models, several tests of specification for panel data 
were conducted. Panel data methodology accounted for dividends trends over the 
period 2005-2016, which allowed for time effects. It is against this background that the 
researcher chooses panel data methodology for the current study. 
In order to accomplish the main research objective that involved examining 
relationship between dividend-agency relationship, the study adopted deductive 
research approach. The process of deductive research approach resonates with the 
quest to test or confirm assumption theories that guided the development of research 
questions (Creswell, 2015). Furthermore, through a deductive approach, the 
researcher was able to answer and confirm research questions that were formulated 
from the assumption theories (Brooks, 2014). This deductive research approach 
provided a point of departure from similar previous studies. Therefore, the study made 
a significant improvement relative to similar studies by using PANEL DATA instead of 
ordinary least square (OLS). 
An overview of methodological framework that briefly summarised methodological 
approach was presented in a schematic graph in Chapter 3. This chapter discussed 
econometric methods that underscore the research methodology. Several panel data 
tests and estimation models were fully developed to ensure precision, consistence 
and reliability. Furthermore, these panel data tests and models were used to control 
heterogeneity, therefore ensuring validity of the current findings. The research 
questions and objectives determined, to a large extent, the choice of methodological 
approach adopted in this chapter. The research questions were fully developed in this 
chapter as well as regression model and its variables. To answer research questions, 
this chapter employed data analysis techniques aforementioned. In line with 
methodological choice for this chapter, panel data regression techniques were 
discussed at length. The study design outlined research philosophy and 
methodological approach. On research philosophy, the study adopted positivism, 
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which used secondary data to address research problem. Quantitative research is 
usually associated with a deductive approach, where the focus was on using data to 
test or confirm theoretical assertions (Saunders et al., 2012). In addition, the 
methodological approach detailed the nature of the data and data collection process. 
To control autocorrelation and heterogeneity, the current study adopted differencing 
fixed effect regression model, instead of OLS estimation like previous studies. 
Chapter four (4) presents the empirical results and analyses of the dividend-agency 
relationship of JSE listed financial services companies for the period 2005-2016. In 
this chapter, the main research questions and objectives were answered using EViews 
version 9 to perform statistical technique such as descriptive, correlation and panel 
regression analysis. To ensure robust findings, panel unit root test, together with ADF 
test and PP test were employed. This chapter employed Co-integration analysis in 
determining dividend-agency relationship to avoid statistical bias. In light of 
unbalanced data, this chapter adopted fixed effect regression model in determining 
correlation between dividend-agency variables. This chapter demonstrated positive 
relationship between ROE, PROFITS, company SIZE, and DIV. In practice, the results 
meant that an increase of JSE listed financial institutions and company SIZE has 
positive impact on shareholder wealth. Accordingly, this finding answered the research 
question: What influence do the factors that underpin both agency problems and 
dividend policy of companies listed on the JSE have on the shareholder wealth 
maximisation? The overall findings revealed that more than 50% of JSE listed 
companies follow dividend decision, with positive and significant dividend-agency 
relationship. 
This chapter employed group descriptive statistics. Table 4.1, correlation analysis 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.2.10, fixed effect method, and panel EGLS regression model, 
to determine dividend-agency relationship of JSE listed financial services companies. 
Table 4.1 depicts the results of the group descriptive statistics analysis for the JSE 
listed financial services companies, which demonstrated high levels of indebtedness. 
This implied that JSE listed companies are heavily reliant on debt financing. As such, 
the JSE listed financial institutions rely on external markets to raise capital for financing 
investments prospects (Jensen, 1986). External markets provide corporate 
governance, and therefore enhance companies’ performance, resolve information 
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asymmetry and subsequently reduce agency costs. The results are in line with the 
Agency Theory’s assertion that the use of debt mitigates agency costs (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
Furthermore, Easterbrook (1984) argues that to significantly reduce agency problems 
companies must increase dividend payouts. Consequently, companies will be 
subjected to market discipline to ensure corporate governance, thus ultimately aligning 
the management interest to that of the shareholders. In practice, it is very difficult for 
a company to raise capital when it is in debt. However, a company that follows a 
dividend decision strategy is different from a company that is in debt owing to poor 
performance, poor corporate governance or misappropriation of funds. In line with the 
current results were Vo and Nguyen (2014), who report similar findings between 
dividend payout and leverage. On the contrary, Osegbue et al.’s (2014) findings 
reported negative relationship between LEV and dividend payout. Results from Table 
4.2 and 4.5.1 confirmed the Agency Theory’s assertion that the use of forms of 
ownership significantly reduces agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One key 
result is that previous year’s dividend is not significantly a determinant of the current 
year’ dividends. Regression results in Table 4.2.10 found negative and insignificant 
relationship between ROE and DIV. This implied that JSE listed financial companies 
are incurring agency cost in the form of cash dividends payments. Yet companies are 
not earning profits from equity. The results provide credence to Modigliani and Miller’s 
(1958; 1961) Dividend Irrelevance Theory. 
Chapter five (5) presents conclusions of the results, objectives, recommendations, 
limitations, and future research suggestions. The primary research question sought to 
determine dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies listed on the 
JSE. From Table 4.2.10, it is reported that the overall effect of the explanatory 
variables in explaining dividend payout ratio (DIV) is 89% of the JSE listed financial 
services companies for the period 2005-2016. Similarly, from Table 4.1, it can be 
observed that up to 54.69% of JSE listed financial institutions practice dividend 
decision within the same time frame quoted above. Therefore, the results demonstrate 
a very strong dividend decision practice by JSE listed financial services companies. In 
line with these results are findings by Piketty (2014), who confirmed that JSE listed 
companies exercise dividend decision albeit continuously experiencing agency 
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problems. The results contradict the proposition advanced by relevance theory, that 
the payment of dividends resolves agency problems (Easterbrook, 1984). Similarly, 
Michael (2016) reported results in which he found that dividend decision did not 
alleviate agency conflicts for Nigerian listed companies. The results demonstrate a 
trend on dividend decision practice among emerging economies within the same 
period 2005-2016. Despite a very strong dividend-agency relationship demonstrated 
by the results, agency problems remain unresolved for the JSE listed financial services 
companies. 
However, regression results in Table 4.2.10 exhibits a negative and significant 
relationship between dividend payout ratio (DIV) and D (INST) variables. Consistent 
with the results are propositions of Dividend Irrelevance Theory advocated by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1961). Further concurrence with the results is the Agency 
Theory assertion that dividends can be substituted with D (INST) therefore, reduce the 
need to pay dividends thereby resolves agency conflicts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
In the same vein, the results are consistent with Aydin and Cavdar’s (2015) findings. 
Similarly, Fairchild et al. (2014) report that companies with higher ownership 
concentration are likely to pay less dividends as is the case with current results. 
However, Daradkah and Ajlouni (2013), Thanatawee (2013), Thanatawee (2014), and 
Dandago et al. (2015) recorded contrary results all reported on positive and significant 
results between dividend payout ratio and D (INST). The results affirmed the corporate 
governance and the principle of separation of ownership from control for the JSE listed 
financial services companies for the period 2005-2016. 
The study sought to investigate the influence the factors that underpin both agency 
problems and dividend policy of companies listed on the JSE have on the shareholder 
wealth maximisation. The results from Table 4.2.10 exhibited positive and significant 
relationship between dividend payout and company SIZE. The company SIZE was 
identified as being among the factors that underpin both agency problems and 
dividend policy of companies listed on the JSE. The results imply that positive 
company SIZE leads to payments of dividends, which benefit shareholders. In this 
regard, for JSE listed financial institutions for the period quoted above. Similarly, 
Ayman (2015) reported the same findings. On the contrary, Vo and Nguyen (2014) 
and Correia et al.’s (2015) findings refutes the findings of the current study. 
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To reiterate, the study sought to investigate the role dividend-agency relationship of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE play in resolving agency problems. In 
response to this research question Table 4.2.10 exhibited negative and statistically 
significant relationship between dividend payout ratio (DIV) and D (DIRS). The results 
are in line with the principle of separation of control and ownership as advanced by 
the Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The results implied that D (DIRS) can 
be substituted for dividend payments as arguments articulated by proponents of the 
Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, King IV Report (2016) 
confined directors’ ownership not to exceed 5% of the companies’ total number of 
shares in issue. The results demonstrate that JSE listed financial institutions met this 
recommendation, hence the negative relationship between D (DIRS) and DIV. As 
such, this reduced the need to pay dividends thereby resolving agency problems 
through the role played by dividend-agency relationship of JSE listed financial services 
companies for the period 2005-2016. The results are consistent with Aydin and 
Cavdar’s (2015) findings, who also reported that there is significant and negative 
relationship between dividend payout and managerial ownership. However, 
Uwalomwa et al.’s findings (2015) refute the current’s study’s findings as they 
reportedly found statistically and positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and dividend payout. 
5.2.1 Conclusion of each objective 
In order to achieve the primary objective of the study, the secondary objectives were 
developed to determine dividend-agency relationship of JSE listed financial services 
companies for the period 2005-2016. 
Secondary objective one (1) - To determine the relationship between dividend policy 
and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
This objective was tested by running panel unit root tests: Levin, Lin and Chu test, Im, 
Pesaran and Shin W-stat test, ADF - Fisher Chi-square test, and PP - Fisher Chi-
square test. The panel unit root tests were conducted to control heteroscedasticity and 
spurious results to ensure robust findings for the JSE listed financial services 
companies. To ensure robust results the Panel Estimated Generalised Least Square 
(EGLS) was employed and the results confirmed that the model is free of 
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autocorrelation, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. Tables 4.1 and 4.5.1 recorded 
54.69% and 89% respectively on a dividend decision practice by JSE listed financial 
services companies. This implied a very strong relationship between dividend-agency 
relationship of companies listed on the JSE. However, despite this very robust 
dividend-agency relationship, agency problems remain persistent for the JSE listed 
financial services companies for the period 2005-2016. 
Secondary objective two (2) - to determine the extent to which dividend-agency 
relationship of financial services companies listed on the JSE play in resolving agency 
problems. 
This objective was subjected to panel unit root tests aforementioned to determine 
stationarity and non-stationarity of DIRS, CASH flow, FOREIGN ownership, INST 
ownership, PROF, and LEV variables used to determine secondary objective two. The 
panel root tests confirmed CASH flow, DIV, LEV, and PROF to be stationary time 
series at level (no differencing), meanwhile D (DIRS), D (FOREIGN) ownership, and 
D (INST) ownership were confirmed to be non-stationary after differencing. Table 
4.2.10 recorded negative relationship between CASH flow and DIV. This implied that 
JSE listed financial institutions for the period are forced to borrow from the markets to 
finance their capitalisation of investments projects. The results are in line with the 
Agency Theory’s assertion, which advocates for reducing the availability of CASH flow 
from management to reduce agency conflicts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This 
exposes companies to the scrutiny of financial markets, and therefore strengthens 
corporate governance of JSE listed financial services companies for the period 2005-
2016.  
Secondary objective three (3) - to determine the extent to which dividend-agency 
relationship reconciles to achieve the goal of maximising shareholder wealth of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
This objective employed fixed effect cross-sectional regression model in order to 
obtain robust results. The choice of fixed effect cross-sectional regression model was 
to ensure the statistical validation of the results for this objective. Table 4.2 
demonstrates negative relationship between DIRS, INST, and ROE for the JSE listed 
financial services companies for the period 2005-2016. This implied that dividends 
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were consistently paid out despite negative returns on companies’ equity. This 
practice is at the heart of the dividend controversy commonly known as dividend 
puzzle framed by (Black, 1976). The results are in line with Smoothed Dividend 
Theory, that uses dividend as signalling investment strategy. 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS OF STUDY OBJECTIVES 
The study had its primary object to determine the relationship between dividend policy 
and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE. To realise 
fully the primary objectives, the study had to explore the secondary objectives as inter 
alia: 
5.3.1 To determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency 
problems of financial services companies listed on the JSE 
The study employed statistical tools for analysis, such as correlation coefficient and 
descriptive statistics. The current study employed the following variables CASH 
FLOW, Company SIZE, INST, FIN LEV, PROF, FOREIGN and CEO ownership to 
determine dividend-agency relationship. The measurement formulae that were used 
in the aforementioned variables were captured in Table 3.3: variables, proxies and 
measurement formula as well as subheading 3.11.2. Table 4.1: group descriptive 
statistics of the variables for the period 2005-2016 reported that the majority of 
companies listed on the JSE under the financial services sector practice dividend 
policy as per Table 4.1. Furthermore, Table 4.2 for the correlation coefficient analysis 
exhibited positive relationship among FIN LEV, FOREIGN, INST, ROE, and PROF 
variables as per Table 4.2. 
5.3.2 To determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE in resolving agency 
problems 
Once the first secondary objective was determined, then the second objective had to 
focus on the theory assertions that Dividend-Agency Theory resolves agency conflicts. 
This implied that corporate governance ownership mechanisms underscored by 
agency theories such as institutional ownership, directors’ ownership and foreign 
ownership were adopted. Similarly, dividend sub-theories as captured per the figure 
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2.1: dividend-agency theoretical framework in summary was employed to help answer 
the second objective. Table 4.2 exhibits positive relationship between dividend payout 
ratio and INST, FOREIGN and ROE, which was contrary to the dictates of the Agency 
Theory. According to the Agency Theory, FOREIGN and INST ownership should 
exhibit a negative sign, therefore negate the need to pay dividends. Meanwhile, the 
descriptive statistics reported that 54.69% of the JSE listed financial services 
companies pay dividends despite the use of the aforementioned variables as 
substitutes as per Table 4. 1. However, Table 4.2 reports positive FIN LEV, while Table 
4.2.10 captured negative CASH FLOW. This implied that JSE listed financial services 
companies are forced to borrow from the markets to finance their investment projects. 
Accordingly, this is in line with the Agency Theory’s assertions that companies should 
reduce cash flow availability, therefore forced to borrow from the markets. This brings 
forth market monitoring mechanisms and strengthens corporate governance. 
Consequently, this significantly reduces the misappropriation of funds, and ultimately 
resolves agency costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
5.3.3 To determine the extent to which dividend-agency relationship 
reconciles to achieve the goal of maximising shareholder wealth of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE 
From Tables 4.2 and 4.5.1 it can be observed that financial leverage (LEV) exhibits a 
positive relationship between LEV and dividend payout ratio. This implied that JSE 
listed companies relied upon debt financing. As such, this brings forth monitoring 
mechanism by markets. Therefore, this strengthens corporate governance as per the 
Agency Theory’s assertion (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
5.4 CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY 
The primary objective of this study was to determine dividend-agency relationship of 
financial services companies listed on the JSE for the period 2005-2016, in light of the 
co-existence of dividends payments alongside with agency problems as confirmed by 
Piketty (2014). According to correlation statistical tests in Table 4.2, the results 
demonstrated overall significant positive relationship between dependent and 
explanatory variables. Table 4.2.10 recorded an overall 89% of the variance in the 
dependent variable. Meanwhile, an overall statistical significant P (F-statistic) value is 
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recorded at 0.0000. This meant that explanatory variables were strong and significant 
in explaining changes taking place in the dependent variables. 
What is the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial 
services companies listed on the JSE? A positive relationship was expected between 
LEV, PROF, ROE, company SIZE, and DIV (dividend payout) in terms of regression 
equation. This is consistent with the Agency Theory’s assertion that companies must 
payout dividends and use external financial markets to raise capital for investments 
projects (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Accordingly, this investment strategy brings forth 
external markets to enforce corporate governance principles, and therefore, align 
management interest to that of the shareholder. The results contradicted Modigliani 
and Miller (1958; 1961) Residual Dividend Theory’s assertion that dividends should 
be paid out from retained earnings when investments opportunities are winding down. 
In Table 4.2.10, the F-statistic value 75.6014 and DW statistic value 1.7128 
demonstrated that the panel EGLS regression model is well fitted. Therefore, the 
results can be relied upon. The aforementioned regression model and correlation 
results were able to answer the main research question and one secondary objective 
of the current study. 
What role does the dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies listed 
on the JSE play in resolving agency problems? Correlational analysis in Table 4.2 
found negative relationship between dividend payout (DIV) and DIRS and company 
SIZE. This implied that share ownership concentration by directors (DIRS) is reduced. 
Consequently, this reduces dividend payout to directors, and ultimately reduces 
agency costs. Accordingly, the findings give credence and statistical evidence to the 
Agency Theory’s assertion on how to resolve agency problems (Jensen, 1986). As 
such, management with reduced dividends ownership is less entrenched, more 
independent and aligned to the shareholders’ interest. Meanwhile, from Table 4.2.10, 
after differencing, D (DIRS) reported negative significant relationship between DIV and 
D(DIRS). This is in tandem with results in correlational analysis as per Table 4.2. 
The extent to which dividend-agency relationship of financial services companies 
listed on the JSE play in resolving agency problems was determined. Correlational 
analysis in Table 4.2 demonstrated positive and significant relationship between 
FOREIGN, institutional ownership (INST), ROE, and dividend payout (DIV). Similarly, 
  132
Steyn and Stainbank (2013) report that JSE listed companies are predominantly 
controlled by block shareholders. This implied that JSE listed financial services 
companies had a strong influence of INST control during the 2005-2016. Accordingly, 
this brings forth market disciplinary mechanism, and therefore, reduces agency 
problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, this resolves information 
asymmetry problems between insiders and outsiders’ shareholders. Similarly, panel 
EGLS regression model in Table 4.2.10 after differencing D (FOREIGN) found 
negative and significant relationship between D (FOREIGN) and dividend payout 
(DIV). The findings are in line with correlational analysis in Table 4.2. 
The extent to which dividend-agency relationship reconciles to achieve the goal of 
maximising shareholder wealth of financial services companies listed on the JSE was 
determined. The panel EGLS regression model in Table 4.2.10 found positive and 
significant relationship between company SIZE, profits (PROF) and dividend payout 
(DIV). This implied that the increase in the company SIZE and PROFITS leads to 
increase in dividends payouts (DIV), therefore, making positive impact in maximising 
shareholder wealth. Moreover, to increase dividend payout, signals positive 
investments prospects, as advanced by Dividend Signalling Theory (Easterbrook, 
1984). Similarly, Iqbal, Waseem and Asad (2014) report positive and significant 
relationship between company SIZE and DIV. Therefore, it makes a positive impact 
on shareholder wealth. 
The research problem statement emanated from the literature review that had 
identified friction in research results in that dividend assumption theories argued that 
the payment of dividends resolves agency problems (Easter Brook, 1984). However, 
Lambrechts (1992); de Wet and Mpinda (2013); and Steyn and Stainbank (2013); 
Piketty (2014) all reported contrary that JSE listed companies pay dividends, yet they 
experience agency problems. This meant that JSE listed companies continuously 
experience agency conflicts borne out of agency problems. The industry practice to 
continuously incentivise directors through dividends despite poor company 
performance, drew critique from proponents of dividend Irrelevance Theory Modigliani 
and Miller (1958; 1961) and Black (1976). This practice has sustained agency 
problems and principal-agent cost. As such, Black (1976) termed it “Dividend puzzle”. 
At the core of the research problem is dividend compensation that contributes to 
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agency problems and partly contributes to inequality (World Bank, 2018). Rajan 
(2005), Bebchuk and Spamann (2010), Haldane (2011), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) 
identified that executive compensation through dividends as part of agency problems 
that partly contributes to inequality, poverty, social instability, and unsustainability of 
businesses in a long run. Meanwhile, Smith (1776) identified agency problems as a 
threat to world economic order and companies’ outcomes. This is the research 
problem caused by agency problems that necessitated the determination of dividend-
agency relationship of JSE listed financial services companies. 
The current results concur with the Agency Theory’s assertion that the forms of 
ownership such as institutional ownership (INST), FOREIGN ownership, management 
ownership (DIRS) and leverage (LEVERAGE) can resolve agency problems (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Therefore, this resolves agency costs for those JSE listed financial 
services companies that had chosen corporate governance inclined to forms of 
ownership to substitutes dividends. Accordingly, this maximises shareholder wealth 
and upholds the principle of separation of ownership and control. The statistical results 
that substantiate this conclusion are documented and found in Table 4.1 group 
descriptive, Table 4.2 correlational analysis and Table 4.2.10 fixed effect method: 
panel EGLS regression model. Essentially, the empirical results imply financial 
stability owing to the progress achieved in resolving agency conflict of JSE listed 
financial services companies as per Tables, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4.1-4.4.9, and 4.5.1. 
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendations are made and drawn from the current results of the JSE listed 
financial services companies within the timeframe of 2005-2016. Furthermore, data on 
shareholder ownership is largely manually extrapolated. This needs to change for the 
sake of accuracy and precision. The industry is advised to adopt debt financing 
strategy as it was confirmed through these results that it does reduce agency costs 
and provide market disciplinary mechanism. The industry should strive to implement 
remuneration policies that encourage the use of forms of ownership such as INST, 
and FOREIGN ownership as it was confirmed to reduce agency problems as per Table 
4.2 and Table 4.2.10. Meanwhile, companies should reduce the availability of cash 
flows confirmed through the current results that cash availability contributes to agency 
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problems. Furthermore, industry should employ debt-financing strategies. It was 
confirmed that it brings forth corporate governance principles and therefore resolves 
agency problems. The study rationale identified inequality as partly the consequence 
of the agency problems. Accordingly, this is borne out of historic trajectory under which 
South Africa once languished. As a result, a multi-pronged approach, which 
encompasses government prescripts such as employment equity act, affirmative 
action and dividend-agency theoretical approach, should be adopted in order to 
reduce agency problems. It is advised that these policies should form part of 
requirements for all JSE listed companies. Therefore, researchers will be able to 
develop proxies to test the applicability and performance of these policies. 
5.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT STUDY 
The study was mainly focused on dividend policy and agency problems of financial 
services companies listed on the JSE for the period 2005-2016. As such, the results 
cannot be generalised for the rest of the sectors found on the JSE for the similar 
period. The data on percentages of shareholding was not disaggregated. To overcome 
this shortcoming, data had to be supplemented by financial statements. In addition, 
the researcher used directors’ reports from IRESS database to determine collective 
share ownership of directors not as individuals. Consequently, these anomalies are 
likely to compromise the robustness of the results and interpretation of the results 
thereof. The companies differed owing to factors such as leverage, percentage of 
shareholding owned by management, total assets and company size. To avoid 
statistical bias that might be imposed by this company structural imbalance, the current 
study adopted quantitative technique approach and proportional stratified sampling 
methods. In South Africa, the dividend regime was applicable for the first time from 01 
April 2012. As a result, the current results cannot be compared with other dividends 
results outside this period. The choice of dependant and explanatory variables 
didactes and confine the profile of other similar studies that can be compared with the 
current study. 
Owing to data intricacies already reported, the current study was unable to identify 
individual shareholding ownership percentages. Therefore, the researcher is unable 
to report whether the principle of not exceeding five percentage share ownership by 
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directors was complied with or not as recommended by King IV report, (2016). As 
such, the researcher is unable to report on independence of individual directors, and 
therefore conclude on whether directors are risk averse or not when taking investment 
decisions. 
5.7 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF THE FINDINGS 
To ensure that the findings are credible, reliable and valid, the researcher employed 
panel EGLS regression model, which demonstrated robust results relative to GMM 
and two stage least square (2 SLS). Therefore, panel data models ensured accuracy 
of a measurement procedure. The current study employed DW statistic test to mitigate 
autocorrelation to ensure statistical reliable and valid results. Furthermore, the study 
adopted Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method to mitigate 
heteroscedasticity to ensure precision and reliability of results. If similar 
methodological instruments are followed elsewhere consistent results should be 
attained, thus ensuring reliability (Saunders et al., 2016). The study used both time 
series together with cross-sections to enhance the quantity and quality of the data in 
ensuring statistically reliability of the results. Hausman test was used to determine the 
validity and the robustness of the fixed effect model (Brooks, 2014). Some of the 
statistical tests and panel data econometric models were modelled from the previous 
studies. As such, the results were similar. This demonstrated that the results are valid, 
and consistent therefore can be relied upon. 
5.8 CONTRIBUTION TO THE BODY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The results form an integral contribution to the multifaceted effort to find appropriate 
approach that reduces agency problems thereby increasing shareholder value. 
Consequently, principal-agent interest is aligned as confirmed by overall agency 
problems reduction and enhanced companies’ performance confirmed by results in all 
Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.5.1. The study provides statistically tested and theoretically 
substantiated findings that confirm overall reduction of agency costs through dividend-
agency relationship. The study provides baseline on any dividend-agency relationship 
study that sought to determine whether this relationship reduces or further perpetuates 
agency problems of JSE listed financial services companies. Dividend compensation 
is an instrument that partly contributes to the inequality, poverty and unemployement 
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as undersocored by Gini coefficient index of 0.8 World Bank (2018). Therefore, the 
study adds value to the body of knowledge in that dividends payments contributes to 
principal-agency costs as confirmed by Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.5.1. This indirectly 
contributes to social inequality. The school of thought of dividend irrelevance 
deductively considers the payment of dividends as determinant of agency problems 
(MM, 1958, 1961). Furthermore, Black (1976) concurs with MM (1961), hence, they 
pondered on the industry practice to pay dividends, since they are irrelevant to 
company performance. In line with this thinking is the Agency Theory approach 
postulates that dividends payments can be substituted by forms of ownership, thereby 
reduce agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Lastly key contributions to the 
corporate finance literature. It can be observed as the key finding from the current 
study that the two theories converge in that company performance, good corporate 
governance and the reduction of agency problems can be achieved without dividend 
payments as per Table 4.1 foreign confidence at 5%. Table 4.1 exhibits an increased 
leverage which brings forth market disciplinary mechanisms to align management 
interests to that of shareholders without using dividends and Thanatawee (2014) 
concurs. From Tables 4.2 and 4.5.1 it can be observed as a key finding that previous 
year’s dividend is not significantly a determinant of the current year’ dividends. 
However, contrary to these findings were (Maladjian & Khoury 2014; Dada, Malomo & 
Ojediran 2015; Khan & Ahmad 2017). 
5.9 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The current study adopted secondary data as part of its statistical analysis. Therefore, 
it is recommended that a similar study should be undertaken that will employ primary 
data in order to determine the robustness of the results of the current study. It is 
recommended that a similar research be undertaken, which will employ different 
proxies such as individual director share ownership and qualitative methodological 
approach, in order to determine the robustness of the current findings. Future research 
should explore similar topic in other sectors of JSE listed companies in order to 
determine trends emerging from sector to sector. The current study was undertaken 
at a time South Africa was declared by credit rating agencies, namely, Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P), Moody’s and Fitch Group as technically being at junk status. The 
downgrading of South Africa below investment grade could have impacted negatively 
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on FOREIGN ownership variable as investors finds this country less attractive. 
Accordingly, it is recommended that similar study be carried out post South Africa 
downgrade in order to determine the robustness of the current results. 
5.10 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This sub-section covers the essence of this chapter in line with the core theories, the 
industry practice, research problem, research questions and objective for the JSE 
listed financial institutions for the period 2005-2016. The literature review from 
previous studies, sharply revealed friction in research results, in that dividend 
assumption theories argued that the dividend decisions resolves agency problems 
(Jensen, 1986). However, from descriptive statistic table 4.1 of the current study 
recorded that on average 54, 69% of JSE listed financial services companies exercise 
dividend decision albeit continuously experiencing agency conflicts. In line with the 
current results were Lambrechts (1992); de Wet and Mpinda (2013); and Steyn and 
Stainbank (2013); (Piketty, 2014). Meanwhile, from Table 4.1 it is noted that on 
average 28.69% of JSE listed financial institutions’ directors (DIRS) consistently 
received dividends. In essence, this implied inadequacy of both divdend-agency 
theories in resolving agency problems of JSE listed financial services companies.  
This industry practice to continuously incentivising directors through dividends despite 
poor corporate governance, drew critique from proponents of dividend irrelevance 
theory (MM, 1958; 1961) and (Black, 1976). The practice is at nerve centre of dividend 
theory controversy, why industry pay dividends notwithstanding that this practice has 
sustained agency problems and principal-agent cost, commonly known as dividend 
puzzle (Black, 1976). At the core of the research problem is the dividend compensation 
that contributes to agency problems and partly contributes to inequality (World Bank, 
2018). This is the research problem caused by agency problems, therefore, 
necessitated the research objective: to determine dividend-agency relationship of JSE 
listed financial’ services companies. From Table 4.2 group correlation analysis exhibits 
that FOREIGN and PROF are positively correlated with dividend pay-out ratio (DIV). 
The results implied that JSE listed finacial institutions pay dividends (DIV) out of profits 
(PROF). This practice is in line with the assertions advanced by the proponents of 
dividend irrelevance theory (MM, 1961), who argued that dividends should be paid out 
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of retained earnings. The payment of dividends further signalled sound corporate 
governance. This attract FOREIGN ownership as they want to invest locally and 
further strengthens corporate governance. Both dividend assumption theories namely: 
Signalling and Smoothed Dividend Theories were used by JSE listed financial 
institutions as an investment strategy to attract FOREIGN and INST institutional 
ownerships. Henceforth, the practice by JSE listed finacial services companies to 
continuosly pay dividends albeit experiencing agency problems. Essentially, the 
results sought to address the research problem characterised by dividend puzzle for 
the current study.  
The current findings concur with the Agency Theory’s assertion that the forms of 
ownership such as institutional ownership (INST), FOREIGN ownership, management 
ownership (DIRS) and leverage (LEVERAGE) can resolve agency problems (Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976). Therefore, it resolves agency costs for those JSE listed financial 
institutions that had chosen corporate governance inclined to forms of ownership to 
substitutes dividends. Accordingly, this maximises shareholder wealth and upholds 
the principle of separation of ownership and control. The statistical findings that 
substantiates this conclusion are documented and found in Table 4.1 group 
descriptive, Table 4.2 correlational analysis and Table 4.2.10 fixed effect method: 
panel EGLS regression model. 
From Table 4.2.10 it is reported that LEV recorded positive and statistically significant 
relationship with dividend payout ratio. The results implied that dividend payments led 
to increase in financial leverage of financial services companies listed on the JSE. 
This implied the resolution of agency conflicts through cash flows reductions. This is 
borne out of the application of external disciplinary mechanisms to align management 
interest to that of shareholders. This strengthens corporate governance for the JSE 
listed financial services companies for the period 2005-2016.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table 3.2.1: Financial’ Services Companies Population on the JSE as at 2016 
Financial’ services Companies Population on the JSE as at 2016 (SECTOR) 
Subsectors Number 
Banks  
Barclays Africa Group Ltd 0 
Capitec Bank Holdings Limited 1 
Finbond Group Ltd 2 
Firstrand group ltd 3 
Nedbank Group Limited 4 
RMB Holdings Limited 5 
Standard Bank Group Ltd 6 
Financial Services  
African bank investment Ltd 7 
African equity employment investments Ltd 8 
Alexander Forbes group holdings Ltd 9 
BK ONE Ltd  10 
Brait services 11 
Coronation fund managers Ltd 12 
Dened investments Ltd 13 
Ecsponent Ltd 14 
EP/E Capital partners Limited 15 
Efficient Group Ltd 16 
Grade parade investments Ltd 17 
Investec Ltd 18 
Investec Plc 19 
JSE Ltd 20 
London finance and investment group plc  21 
Peregrine holdings ltd 22 
Prescient Ltd 23 
PSG group Ltd 24 
PSG consult Ltd 25 
Purple group Ltd 26 
Sasfin holdings Ltd 27 
Sygnia Limited 28 
Transaction capital ltd 29 
Trustco group holdings Ltd 30 
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Waco international holdings Ltd 31 
Zeder investments Ltd 32 
Asset Managers  
Alexander Forbes Group Holdings Ltd 33 
Coronation fund managers Limited 34 
Efficient Group Ltd 35 
London Finance and Investment Group Plc 36 
Peregrine Holdings Limited 37 
Prescient Limited 38 
Sygnia Limited 39 
Investment services  
Brait services 41 
Investec Limited 43 
Investec Plc 44 
JSE Ltd 45 
PSG Group Limited 46 
PSG konsult Ltd 47 
Purple Group Ltd 48 
Sasfin Holdings Limited 49 
Speciality Finance  
African Equity Emp Inv Ltd 50 
BK ONE Ltd 51 
Capital Appreciation Ltd 52 
Deneb Investments Ltd 53 
ECSPONENT Ltd 54 
Grand Parade Investments ltd 55 
Transaction Capital Ltd 56 
Trustco Group Holdings Limited 57 
WACO international holdings Ltd 58 
Zeder Investments Ltd 59 
Insurance  
Clientele Limited 60 
Discovery Ltd 61 
Liberty Holdings Limited 62 
MMI Holdings Plc 63 
Old Mutual plc 64 
Sanlam Limited 65 
Santam Limited 66 
Zurich Insurance company SA Ltd 67 
  168
Life Insurance  
Clientele Limited 66 
Discovery Ltd 67 
Liberty Holdings Limited 68 
MMI Holdings Ltd 69 
Old Mutual Plc 70 
Sanlam Limited 71 
Zurich Insurance Company SA Ltd 72 
Santam Limited 73 
Conduit Capital Limited 74 
Equity Investment Instruments  
Andulela Investment holdings Ltd 76 
Brimstone Investment corporation Ltd 77 
Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd 78 
Niveus Investments Ltd 79 
Pallinghurst Resources Ltd 80 
Rand Merchant Insurance Holdings Ltd 81 
Reinet Investments S.C.A. 82 
Sabvest Limited 83 
Stellar Capital Partners Ltd 84 
Sycom Property Fund 85 
Trematon Capital Investments Ltd 86 
Real Estate  
Accelerate Property Fund Ltd 87 
Acsion limited 88 
Adrenna Prop Group Ltd 89 
Arrowhead properties B 90 
Ascension prop ltd A 91 
Attach Ltd 92 
Balwin properties Ltd 93 
Bonatla property Holdings Limited 94 
Capital & Regional Plc 95 
Capital & Counties Properties Plc 96 
Capital Property Fund Ltd 97 
Delta Africa Prop Hidg L 98 
Delta Property Fund Ltd 99 
Dipula Income Fund Ltd 100 
Emira Property Fund Ltd 101 
Equites Property Fund Ltd 102 
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Fairvest Property Hildgs 103 
Fortress Inc Fund Ltd A 104 
Fountainhead Property trust 105 
Freedom Property Fund Ltd 106 
Growthpoint Prop Ltd 107 
Hospitality Prop Fund A 108 
Hyprop Investments Ltd 109 
Indluplace Properties ltd 110 
Ingenuity Property Investments Ltd 111 
Intu Properties Plc 112 
Investec Australia property fund 113 
Investec Property Fund Ltd 114 
Mas Real Estate Inc 115 
New Europe Property Investments Plc 116 
Octodec Investments Ltd 117 
Orion Real Estate Ltd 118 
Putprop Limited 119 
Rebosis Property Fund Ltd 120 
Redifine international Plc 121 
Redifine Properties Ltd 122 
Resilient Property Income Fund Ltd 123 
Rockcastle global Real Est co.Ltd 124 
SA corporate Real Estate Fund 125 
Safari Investments RSA Ltd 126 
Stenprop Limited 127 
Sycom Property Fund 128 
Synergy Inc Fund Ltd A 129 
Texton Property Fund Ltd 130 
The Pivotal Fund Limited 131 
Tower Property Fund Ltd 132 
Tradehold Limited 133 
Vukile Property Fund Ltd 134 
Waco international holdings Ltd 135 
Real Estate Investments & Services  
Acsion limited 136 
Adrenna Prop Group Ltd 137 
Attach Ltd 138 
Balwin properties Ltd 139 
Bonatla property Holdings Limited 140 
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Capital & Counties Properties Plc 141 
Delta Africa Prop Hidg L 142 
Freedom Property Fund Ltd 143 
Hyprop Investments Ltd 144 
Ingenuity Property Investments Ltd 145 
Mas Real Estate Inc 146 
New Europe Property Investments Plc 147 
Putprop Limited 148 
Rockcastle Global Real Est co.Ltd 149 
Stenprop Limited 150 
The Pivotal Fund Limited 151 
Tradehold Limited 152 
Real Estate Holding & Development   
Acsion limited 153 
Adrenna Prop Group Ltd 154 
Attach Ltd 155 
Balwin properties Ltd 156 
Bonatla property Holdings Limited 157 
Capital & Counties Properties Plc 158 
Delta Africa Prop Hidg L 159 
Freedom Property Fund Ltd 160 
Hyprop Investments Ltd 161 
Ingenuity Property Investments Ltd 162 
Mas Real Estate Inc 163 
New Europe Property Investments Plc 164 
Putprop Limited 165 
Rockcastle Global Real Est co.Ltd 166 
Stenprop Limited 167 
The Pivotal Fund Limited 168 
Tradehold Limited 169 
Real Estate Investment Trusts  
Accelerate Property Fund Ltd 170 
Arrowhead properties B 171 
Ascension prop ltd A 172 
Capital & Regional Plc 173 
Capital Property Fund Ltd 174 
Delta Property Fund Ltd 175 
Dipula Income Fund Ltd 176 
Emira Property Fund Ltd 177 
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Equites Property Fund Ltd 178 
Fairvest Property Hildgs 179 
Fortress Inc Fund Ltd A 180 
Fountainhead Property trust 181 
Growthpoint Prop Ltd 182 
Hospitality Prop Fund A 183 
Hyprop Investments Ltd 184 
Indluplace Properties ltd 185 
Intu Properties Plc 186 
Investec Australia property fund 187 
Investec Property Fund Ltd 189 
Octodec Investments Ltd 190 
Orion Real Estate Ltd 191 
Rebosis Property Fund Ltd 192 
Redifine international Plc 193 
Redifine Properties Ltd 194 
Resilient Property Income Fund Ltd 195 
SA corporate Real Estate Fund 196 
Safari Investments RSA Ltd 197 
Stenprop Limited 198 
Sycom Property Fund 199 
Synergy Inc Fund Ltd A 200 
Texton Property Fund Ltd 201 
Tower Property Fund Ltd 202 
Vukile Property Fund Ltd 203 
Diversified REITS  
Ascension prop Ltd A 204 
Dipula Income Fund Ltd 205 
Emira Property Fund Ltd 206 
Fortress Inc Fund Ltd A 207 
Growthpoint Prop Ltd 208 
Intu Properties Plc 209 
Orion Real Estate Ltd 210 
Rebosis Property Fund Ltd 211 
Redifine international Plc 212 
Redifine Properties Ltd 213 
SA corporate Real Estate Fund 214 
Texton Property Fund Ltd 215 
Tower Property Fund Ltd 216 
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Industrial & Office Reits  
Arrowhead Properties B 217 
Capital Property Fund Ltd 218 
Delta Property Fund Ltd 219 
Equities Property Fund Ltd 220 
Investec Australia Property Fund 221 
Indluplace Properties Ltd 222 
Retail REITs227  
Accelerate Property Fund Ltd 223 
BK ONE Ltd 224 
Capital & Regional Plc 225 
Fairvest Property Hildgs 226 
Fountainhead Property trust 227 
Hyprop Investments Ltd 228 
Intu Properties Plc 229 
Octodec Investments Ltd 230 
Resilient Property Income Fund Ltd 231 
Safari Investments RSA Ltd 232 
Sycom Property Fund 233 
Synergy Inc Fund Ltd A 234 
Vukile Property Fund Ltd 235 
Waco international holdings Ltd 236 
Source: IRESS Database (2016). 
